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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this doctoral thesis is essentially two-fold: first, it seeks to ascertain whether 
the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in the contexts of marriage and divorce are 
adequately protected in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, and secondly, whether any valuable 
lessons could be learnt in this regard by South Africa based on the specific legal experiences 
of two (other) African jurisdictions, notably Morocco and Tunisia.  
The scope of this doctoral thesis and the accompanying research is thus restricted to the legal 
impact of marriage and divorce on Muslim women and is situated within a critical 
comparative Islamic and human rights framework. 
To this end, this doctoral thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 serves as a basic 
introduction to the study and articulates the research question and problem statement, 
delimits the conceptual framework (including the theoretical and philosophical parameters 
that will inform this research) and explores the applicable human rights and constitutional 
contexts within the issues are to be situated. Chapter 2 seeks to establish a suitable theoretical 
and philosophical framework intended to inform the research as a whole. Consequently, 
Chapter 2 critically explores applicable aspects of Islamic jurisprudence, notably the basic 
legal ideas and concepts in Islamic thought, approaches to scriptural interpretation, gender 
sensitivity as projected by modernism, conservatism and fundamentalism in Islam as well as 
the four primary schools of Islamic thought. 
Chapter 3 is the first of three chapters during the course of which a comparative analysis will 
be conducted. Consequently, Chapter 3 critically explores the rights, freedoms and status of 
women in Moroccan law. In particular, attention will be paid to secularism and the Moroccan 
legal system as well as recent reforms in marriage and divorce law. The Moroccan response 
to the international human rights system as well as the African human rights framework will 
be examined critically against the backdrop of the African Decade of Women. 
Chapter 4 critically evaluates the rights, freedoms and status of women in Tunisian law. Here 
too the issue of secularism and its impact on the Tunisian legal system is examined, including 
recent reforms pertaining to marriage and divorce as well as the impact of the new 
constitutional dispensation adopted in January 2014. As was the case in the preceding 
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chapter, Chapter 4 likewise examines the Tunisian response to both the international and the 
regional human rights framework as these specifically relate to women in Africa.  
Chapter 5 consists of a critical analysis of the legal status of Muslim women in South Africa 
and thus focuses on the invalidity of Muslim marriages, the legal implications thereof, as well 
as the legal implications of divorce. The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, which may well be 
tabled in Parliament during the latter part of 2014, is critically examined against the backdrop 
of the applicable rights and freedoms contained in the South African Constitution, notably 
equality, human dignity, freedom and security of the person, and freedom of religion, belief 
and opinion. And as was the case in the preceding two chapters, Chapter 5 examines the 
South African response to the international human rights system and the African human 
rights framework as these find specific application to women.  
Chapter 6 assesses critically whether or not the two comparative (African) jurisdictions hold 
any lessons for South Africa. Both Morocco and Tunisia have adopted Muslim personal law 
and have sought to progressively address key issues pertaining to marriage and divorce even 
though their legal and political contexts differ. Not deemed “spouses” for the purposes of 
South African law, Muslim women have been forced to either accept an intolerable situation 
or approach the courts in an attempt to realize their fundamental rights and freedoms. It is 
cause for great concern that only women married in terms of Islamic rites are compelled to 
make such a choice under the existing South African law.  
Chapter 7 constitutes the culmination of this doctoral thesis and sets out the various 
conclusions reached, submits suitable recommendations and answers the research question 
articulated in Chapter 1.   
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
The following abbreviations and acronyms will be used throughout this doctoral thesis: 
ACRWC   African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
AU   African Union 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination  
Against Women 
ERC    Equity and Reconciliation Commission 
ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICERC International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination  
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
MJC Muslim Judicial Council 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OPICCPR Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
UDHR    Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UNHRC   United Nations Human Rights Committee 
VCLT    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties     
       
VDRA    Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
 
The titles of international and local law journals and other periodicals have not been 
abbreviated. Arabic terms are italicised and appear in round brackets in the text. All Arabic 
terms are explained where they occur in the respective chapters of this doctoral thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction to the Study       
 
1.1 Introduction           1 
 
1.2 Problem Statement         3 
 
1.3 Research Question         5 
 
1.4 Conceptual Framework                   5 
 
1.4.1 Sex, gender and patriarchy                     5 
 
1.4.2 Feminism                                 6 
 
1.4.3 Muslim personal law                              7 
 
1.5 Theoretical and Philosophical Framework: Islamic and  
 
Constitutional Imperatives         8 
 
1.6 Human Rights Standards: International and African  
 
Perspectives         10
   
1.7 Literature Review         11 
 
1.8 Research Methodology        14 
 
1.9 Chapter Outline         14 
 
CHAPTER 2: Theoretical and Philosophical Framework     
2.1 Introduction          16 
2.2 Islamic Jurisprudence        17 
2.2.1 Origins of Islam and Islamic law       17 
2.2.2 Brief overview of the sources of Islamic law      23 
2.2.3 Nature and objectives of Islamic law       27 
2.3 Basic Legal Ideas and Concepts in Islamic Thought   30 
2.3.1 Duty           31 
2.3.2 Honour          35 
 
 
 
 


2.3.3 Equality          36 
2.3.4 Human dignity         38 
2.4 Islamic Approach to Scriptural Interpretation    40 
2.5 Ideological Positions in Islam       43 
2.5.1 Modernism, conservatism and fundamentalism in Islam    43 
2.5.2 Gender sensitivity in Islamic thought       46 
2.6 Dominant Schools of Islamic Thought     47 
2.6.1 Hanafi school                     48 
2.6.1.1  Requirements for marriage                  49 
2.6.1.2  Guardianship         51 
2.6.1.3  Types of divorce        51 
2.6.2 Maliki school          53 
2.6.2.1  Requirements for marriage       54 
2.6.2.2  Guardianship         54 
2.6.2.3  Types of divorce        55 
2.6.3 Shafi’i school          56 
2.6.3.1  Requirements for marriage       56 
2.6.3.2  Guardianship         56 
2.6.3.3  Types of divorce        57 
2.6.4 Hanbali school         57 
2.6.4.1  Requirements for marriage       57 
2.6.4.2  Guardianship         58 
2.6.4.3  Types of divorce        58 
2.7 Critical Assessment of the Schools of Thought    59 
2.8 Concluding Observations       66 
 
CHAPTER 3: Rights, Freedoms and Status of Women in Moroccan Law  
3.1 Introduction                    69 
3.2 Historical Overview         72 
 
 
 
 


3.3 Secularism and the Moroccan Legal System     77 
3.4 Recent Reforms in Marriage       81  
3.5 Recent Reforms in Divorce       91  
3.6 Human Rights and Legal Reform in Morocco    94 
3.6.1 Morocco’s response to the international human rights system   94 
3.6.2 Morocco’s response to the African human rights framework            105 
3.7 Concluding Observations              107 
 
CHAPTER 4: Rights, Freedoms and Status of Women in Tunisian Law     
4.1 Introduction                 110 
4.2 Historical Overview               111 
4.2.1 Islamic family law                 112 
4.2.2 Political independence and totalitarian rule              114 
4.3 Secularism and the Tunisian Legal System            117 
4.3.1 A democratic revolution                117 
4.3.2 Constitutional reform and the rise of an Islamist movement            120 
4.4 Recent Reforms in Marriage               126 
4.5 Recent Reforms in Divorce               134 
4.6 Human Rights and Legal Reform in Tunisia            138 
4.6.1 Tunisia’s response to the international human rights system            138 
4.6.2 Tunisia’s response to the African human rights framework            141 
4.6.2.1  Tunisia and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa          147 
4.6.2.2  Tunisia and the African Decade of Women             147 
4.7 Concluding Observations              149 
 
CHAPTER 5: Legal Status of Muslim Women in South Africa  
5.1 Introduction                 153 
5.2 Muslim Marriages and the South African Courts           154 
5.2.1 Brief historical overview                154 
 
 
 
 


5.2.2 (In)validity of Muslim marriages               155 
5.2.3 Legal implications of divorce               164 
5.3 Draft Muslim Marriages Bill              170 
5.3.1 Marriage as conceptualised in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill           172 
5.3.1.1  Equal status and capacity of spouses               172 
5.3.1.2  Validity of Muslim marriages              172 
5.3.1.3  Registration of Muslim marriages                         173 
5.3.1.4  Proof of age of parties to a proposed marriage and age of majority          173 
5.3.1.5  Propriety consequences of Muslim marriages and contractual  
capacity of spouses               175 
5.3.2 Divorce as conceptualised in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill        177 
5.3.2.1  Termination of Muslim marriages             177 
5.3.2.2  Compulsory mediation              180 
5.3.2.3  Maintenance                181 
5.3.2.4  Dissolution of an existing civil marriage           182        
5.4 Critical Assessment of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill         183 
5.5 Constitutional Context: Affected Rights and Freedoms                    189 
5.5.1 Equality                             190 
5.5.2 Human dignity                            192 
5.5.3 Freedom and security of the person               194 
5.5.4 Freedom of religion, belief and opinion              195 
5.5.5 Reasonable and justifiable limitation                         200 
5.6 South Africa’s Response to the International Human  
Rights System               202 
5.7 South Africa’s Response to the African Human Rights  
Framework                205 
5.7.1 South Africa and the African Charter                         206 
5.7.2 South Africa’s response to the African Women’s Protocol           206 
5.7.3 South Africa’s commitment to the AU Solemn Declaration and African   
 
 
 
 


Decade of Women                   212 
5.8 Concluding Observations               213 
 
CHAPTER 6: Lessons for South Africa from Morocco and Tunisia? 
6.1 Introduction                           216 
6.2 Jurisprudential Framework                217 
6.2.1 Dominant schools of thought and fundamental principles of Islam            217 
6.2.2 Constitutional values and imperatives              222 
6.3 Codification of Muslim Personal Law              226 
6.4 Role of the Courts: Judicial Interpretation             230 
6.3 Revisiting the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill             234 
6.6 Political Will for Effective Legal Reform            239 
6.7 Concluding Observations                241 
 
CHAPTER 7: Conclusions and Recommendations              
7.1 Introduction                 244  
7.2 Conclusions                247 
7.3 Recommendations               257 
7.3.1 Integration of Islamic and human rights principles               257 
7.3.2 Prohibition of polygyny                258 
7.3.3 Formal recognition of Muslim marriages             259 
7.4 Research Question Answered                        261 
7.5 Concluding Observations              261      
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY                  xiv   
BOOKS                   xiv 
JOURNAL ARTICLES                 xix 
INTERNET ARTICLES              xxxv  
CASE LAW               xxxix       
 
 
 
 


South Africa               xxxix     
Foreign Jurisdictions                xli     
Canada                  xli 
India                   xli 
United States of America                xli         
International Courts and Tribunals             xli 
International Court of Justice                xli 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS        xli 
INTERNATIONAL DELARATIONS            xlii      
CONSTITUTIONS               xlii 
South Africa                 xlii 
Foreign Jurisdictions             xliii     
Kenya                  xliii 
Morocco                xliii       
Tunisia                           xliii 
LEGISLATION AND BILLS            xliv     
South Africa                xliv 
Foreign Jurisdictions              xlv 
Bangladesh                 xlv 
Egypt                   xlv 
India                   xlv 
Morocco                 xlv 
Tunisia                          xlv 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORTS       xlvi       
OTHER REPORTS AND PAPERS           xlvi        
THESES AND DISSERTATIONS           xlvii       
OTHER PUBLICATIONS            xlvii        
INTERNET DATABASES                         l 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES                         l
 
 
 
 


CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
“Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings."1 
Experience shows that Muslim leaders make exceptions to their religious and cultural practices when 
political expediency and economic development require it ... [y]et with women’s rights, they insist 
traditions are unshakeable”.2 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This doctoral thesis seeks to critically assess the rights and freedoms of women in Islamic 
jurisprudence with particular reference to the institutions of marriage and divorce. The issue 
warrants careful consideration as some of the rules and practices that exist in respect of marriage 
and divorce could well be construed as barriers to the emancipation of Muslim women. And 
while the concepts of marriage and divorce stand central to many traditional and religious 
communities, compassion, love and the full recognition of women are quite evident throughout 
the Qur’an. Surah 30 verse 21, for example, reads:  
 
“And among His signs is this, that He created from you mates from amongst yourselves, that ye may dwell in 
tranquility with them, and He has put love and mercy between your hearts; verily in that are signs for those who 
reflect”. 
 
The question of women’s rights in general, and those of Muslim women in particular, have 
remained prominent on the agenda of developing states caught up in the often painful processes 
of political liberation, social development and nation-building. These challenges confront nations 
across the African continent and governments share a common responsibility to address the 
emancipation of women amidst increased resistance against state interference in religious 
matters.     
Traditional views on Muslim women appear to represent two extremes: the one extreme includes 
women who accept pronouncements on Islamic law (shari’ah) completely and uncritically, albeit 
 
1
 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para, 1 UN Doc A/49/668, adopted 25 June 1993. The 
Declaration and Programme of Action was endorsed by the General Assembly in Resolution 48/121 on 20 
December 1993.   
2 See Moosa N “Early Beginnings of Islam (First and Second Periods)” in Moosa N Unveiling the Mind: The Legal 
Position of Women in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 20 at 23.  
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that this group may well be unaware of how and under what conditions Muslim scholars (ulama) 
made those pronouncements. Religious treatise and philosophical debates are often of slight 
value to women who have little formal education or who are only educated within the strict 
confines of Islamic law.3 The other extreme category would include women who are completely 
indifferent to religious teachings, advocate a secular approach and consider religion as a distinct 
impediment to the realisation of women’s rights and liberties.4 Within the spectrum of these two 
extreme positions, and thus among women themselves, myths and stereotypical assumptions 
about the role and status of women abound.  
Since the status of women in Islam is unavoidably based on interpretations of the (primary) 
sources of Islam, the point made by Enjineer is important. Interpretations are not monolithic and 
range from ultra-conservative to ultra-liberal. The word qawwam found in verse 4:34 of the 
Qur’an is a good case in point. Qawwam has been interpreted to mean, amongst other, “ruler”, 
“manager”, “protector”, “supporter”, and “to be in charge”. 5 Yet a conservative interpretation 
would yield a decidedly patriarchal construction whereby qawwam is interpreted to mean “men 
are rulers over women”, thus providing a basis for justifying the superior status of men over 
women. A liberal translation would produce yet a different result and qawwam could be 
interpreted to mean “in charge”, “protector” or even “manager”. And yet the latter interpretation 
too could be said to carry seeds of (male) superiority, and therefore other interpretations of 
qawwam have been suggested which could loosely be construed to mean “those who run around 
to earn”.6 The latter interpretation reduces the notion of superiority considerably, and thus the 
word qawwam is interpreted to denote a function rather than biological superiority and/or 
inferiority. A woman can accordingly also be qawwam if she earns an income (as many Muslim 
women in modern society do, some rightly even more than men). Enjineer is thus of the opinion 
that women too could become qawwam if a liberal interpretation of the Qur’an is followed. 
Classical Islamic jurisprudence, as represented by the four main schools of thought, may well 
have to be challenged to the degree that it lacks gender sensitivity and/or is oblivious to the 
 
3
 See, in general, Nadvi S “Part II Muslim Personal Law” in Nadvi S Islamic Legal Philosophy and the Quranic 
Origin of Islamic Law (1989) 47 at 52. 
4
 Ibid. See also Moosa N “Introductory Perspectives” in Moosa N Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position of Women 
in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 1 at 1. 
5
 See Enjineer AA “Introduction” in Enjineer AA The Rights of Women in Islam 2ed (2004) 1 at 1. 
6
 Ibid.  
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distinct needs of, and disadvantage experienced by, women within the specific contexts of 
marriage and divorce. As Hoodfar rightly observes: 
“Islamic justice does support women’s rights; often, however, this is generally not recognised publicly nor upheld 
institutionally by states which use selective interpretations of Islamic customs and texts to limit women’s legal 
status. Muslim activists agree that women’s human rights can be approached within an Islamic framework of justice 
and fairness, and that Islamic principles can be applied to contemporary problems. ”7 
This doctoral thesis does not proceed from a distinct school of feminist thinking, nor does it call 
for the emancipation of women outside of the context of the basic tenets of Islamic thought. And 
yet the liberation of Muslim women cannot be assessed without due consideration and 
appreciation of the broader applicable legal, social and political reality. Liberation, political or 
otherwise, never occurs in a vacuum. Modern realities dictate a distinct and broad context 
seeking to promote fundamental individual rights and freedoms. The call for women’s liberation 
permeates the African continent, a call preceded by the adoption of an international framework 
with the specific intent to further women’s basic rights and liberties. No convincing assessment 
of the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in Islam can therefore be undertaken without due 
consideration of the human rights frameworks applicable at both the international and regional 
(African) level. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
It need not be argued that women constitute a vulnerable group, both legally and politically. The 
non-recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa has placed women married in terms of 
Islamic rites in a particularly disadvantaged position. Not deemed “spouses” for the purposes of 
South African law, Muslim women have been forced to either accept an intolerable situation or 
approach the courts in an attempt to realize their fundamental rights and freedoms. It is cause for 
great concern that only women married in terms of Islamic law are compelled to make such a 
choice under the existing South African law.8  
Both Morocco and Tunisia have codified Muslim personal law and have sought to progressively 
address key issues pertaining to marriage and divorce, albeit within somewhat different legal and 
 
7
 See “Abstract” to Kelly P “Finding Common Ground: Islamic Values and Gender Equity in Reform Personal 
Status Law in Tunisia” in Hoodfar H (ed) Women and Law in Muslim World Programme Special Dossier Volume I: 
Shifting Boundaries in Marriage and Divorce in Muslim Communities (1996) 75 at 75. Emphasis added. 
8
 Women married in terms of African customary law are not, for example, compelled to make such a choice by 
virtue of the adoption of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
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political contexts.9 In a South African legal context, recent judgments have highlighted the plight 
of Muslim women in relation to marriage and divorce, thus revealing the impossible situation of 
Muslim women both in terms of the existing international and (African) regional human rights 
framework and in terms of South African (constitutional) law.  
An uneasy stalemate has developed twenty years after the introduction of a constitutional 
democracy in South Africa. Although resistance to attempts by the apartheid government to 
recognise Muslim marriages is quite understandable, more recent attempts to secure recognition 
have also secured little progress. The Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim Marriages (the 
Draft Muslim Marriages Bill)10 released by the South African Law Reform Commission in 2003, 
and adapted in 2010, was met with mixed responses from within the Muslim community, and 
significantly, a large number of prominent Muslim scholars (ulama) issued a qualified critique 
on the basis that the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill amounts to state interference in matters of 
religion as well as a distortion of the true nature of Islamic law.11 
This impasse is significant as both Morocco and Tunisia have successfully introduced legal 
reform in spite of strong resistance and opposition. Tunisia, in particular, has fearlessly embraced 
the emancipation of women both in marriage and divorce and has managed, amidst severe 
political and socio-economic turmoil, to adopt a new constitution in January 2014 which 
explicitly recognises equality between men and women. And while it is true that a future Islamic 
Marriages Act will indeed be subject to the South African Constitution as the supreme law of the 
Republic,12 the reality of the constitutional dispensation in South Africa allows for interference 
 
9
 While Morocco adopted its first Code of Personal Status in 1957, Tunisia adopted a progressive Code of Personal 
Status as early as 1956. Both Morocco and Tunisia have subsequently introduced both legal and constitutional 
amendments specifically aimed at advancing the position of women in terms of marriage and divorce. See also, in 
general, Kelly P “Finding Common Ground: Islamic Values and Gender Equity in Reform Personal Status Law in 
Tunisia” in Hoodfar H (ed) Women and Law in Muslim World Programme Special Dossier Volume I: Shifting 
Boundaries in Marriage and Divorce in Muslim Communities (1996) 75 at 75-106. 
10
 See South African Law Reform Commission Project 106 – Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (July 2003).  
11
 See, for example, “Comments and observations on the latest Muslim Marriages Act” submitted by Madrasah 
Arabia Islamia at a panel discussion at the Jamiatul Ulema Transvaal on 27 July 2003. See also, in particular, Motala 
Z “The Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim Marriages: An Unwise, Improvident and Questionable 
Constitutional Exercise” (2004) 37 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 327. 
12
 The supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic of South African of 1996 is recognised in section 1(c) which 
forms part of the Founding Provisions and in section 2 which read: “[t]his Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”.  
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in matters of religion even in the event that Muslim personal law, especially marriage, remains 
unrecognised.13 
1.3 Research Question  
The research question to be investigated by this doctoral thesis is essentially two-fold: first, this 
doctoral thesis seeks to ascertain whether the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in the 
contexts of marriage and divorce are adequately protected in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, and 
secondly, whether any valuable lessons are to be learnt in this regard by South Africa based on 
the specific legal experiences of two (other) African jurisdictions, notably Morocco and Tunisia. 
The research question will thus be restricted to the legal impact of marriage and divorce on 
Muslim women and will be situated within a comparative Islamic and human rights framework.  
1.4 Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework will be based on an assessment of women’s rights and freedoms in 
the contexts of marriage and divorce in Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa against the backdrop 
of fundamental international and regional human rights standards, including specific national 
constitutional imperatives.  
The following key concepts will be used throughout:      
1.4.1 Sex, gender and patriarchy   
Within the context of this doctoral thesis, the term “gender” refers to the socially constructed 
roles and identities of females and males that are attributed to them on the basis of their sex.14 
“Sex” in this context will refer to the physical and biological characteristics of men, women and 
children.  
“Patriarchy” denotes the feminist term for the pervasive dominance, in and of society, by the 
male hierarchy.15 Buskens rightly point out that the term “patriarchal” refers to a model of family 
 
13
 See Moosa N “A Snapshot of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) in South Africa: Past to Present” in Moosa N 
Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position of Women in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 143 at 161. 
14
 See Bender W, Kiskaye EM and Obertleimer G (eds) Human Rights of Women: International Instruments and 
African Experience (2002) 1 at 1 available at http://www.findarticles.com [accessed 28 December 2010]. 
15
 See Van Blerk AE “Feminism and the law” in Van Blerk AE Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1996) 171 at 171. 
The most prejudicial myth is that men have a natural right to dominate women. In the Greek myth of Perseus, for 
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life in which senior men are entitled to a dominant position over subordinate women and 
children.16 This male dominance, grounded in their almost untouchable position as husbands and 
fathers, is expressed in norms about religion, gender, descent, obedience, sexuality, the use of 
space and freedom of movement, as well as about the economy of the household.17 Patriarchal 
behavior or ideology, passed down from generation to generation, thus strengthens the hold of 
male dominance in and of society. Patriarchal attitudes create an almost impenetrable ideology, 
giving rise to pervasive practices whereby the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, in 
this particular instance, Muslim women, are infringed.  
1.4.2 Feminism  
Bender explains that the term “feminism” was coined early in the twentieth century to signify the 
advocacy of revolutionary changes to the status of women.18 Van Blerk highlights that the 
analysis of feminism usually commences with an exposure of the various myths propagated by 
patriarchy about women.19 Feminism proceeds from the basic assumption that gender is a social 
assumption crested within a hierarchy of male domination and female subordination20 and, in 
spite of divergent views among the different schools of feminist thought, this assumption 
remains the basic point of departure. Irrespective of its jurisprudential roots, feminism at its core 
strives for the rejection of patriarchy.  
There exist various degrees of activism among Muslim women and, as Moosa rightly points out, 
their views range from “secular and religionist modernism to conservatism and 
fundamentalism”.21 Consequently, feminist views in Islam are diverse and so too are the 
perceptions of gender inequality and the subsequent need for, as well as the nature of, legal and 
political reform.  
    
example, Perseus beheads Medusa, a female gorgon or monster, and presents her head to Athena, the goddess of 
wisdom, who then places it upon her shield. Athena is considered to be a patriarchal female stereotype and a 
projection of male needs. Because she was not born of a woman but sprang fully grown from her father, Zeus, 
Athena is represented as always at her father’s side, a product and an avowed servant of patriarchy.  
16
 See Buskens L “Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Politics in an Emerging 
Public Sphere” (2003) 10:1 Islamic Law and Society 70 at 75. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 See Bender L “A Lawyers Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort” (1998) 30 Journal of Legal Education 3 at 5-6. 
19
 Ibid.   
20See Van Blerk AE “Feminism and the law” in Van Blerk AE Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1996) 171 at 171. 
21See Moosa N “Different Perspectives on Women and Islam” in Moosa N Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position 
of Women in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 84 at 98. 
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As stated above, this doctoral thesis does not proceed from a distinct feminist perspective nor 
does it intend to produce a feminist framework within which to assess women’s rights and 
freedoms in Islam. The terms “feminism” and “women’s activism”, will thus be used generically 
to refer to all attempts intended to further women’s position, especially as identified, 
conceptualised and enshrined, in international and regional human rights standards as well as 
national constitutions, within the specific contexts of marriage and divorce in Islam. 
1.4.3 Muslim personal law  
The term “Muslim personal law” relates, in broad terms, to marriage,22 divorce, maintenance, 
custody, guardianship and inheritance, together with the ensuing (legal) consequences, that fall 
within the category of family law,23 thus constituting a religious-based private law.24 The origin 
of Muslim personal law is derived from the Qur’an which is considered to be, and thus 
interpreted as, the literal word (ipsissima verba) of Allah.25 The Qur’an, together with the 
sunnah of Muhammad (PBUH),26 constitute the primary sources of Islam.  
Various scholars have rightly argued that religion is patriarchal based on the premise that the 
interpretation of religious texts is male dominated and that women have been excluded from any 
form of interpretation of some (or even all) religious texts.27 In a South African context, high 
levels of illiteracy, poverty and abuse render women unaware of their rights within Islam. These 
particular socio-economic conditions have created serious impediments for Muslim women to 
enjoy their constitutional rights, such as the right to be treated equally. 
 
22
 The Islamic concept of marriage incorporates the practice of polygyny, thereby allowing a man to be married to 
up to four wives simultaneously. Whereas the term “polygyny” refers to a plurality of wives, the term “polyandry” 
would refer to a plurality of husbands. Although polygamy is a gender neutral and generic expression enveloping 
both practices, only polygyny is permissible in terms of Muslim personal law. The term polygyny will accordingly 
be used throughout this doctoral thesis. See also, in general, Moosa N “Polygynous Muslim Marriages in South 
Africa: Their Potential Impact on the Incidence of HIV/AIDS” (2009) 12:3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
65 at 65 n 2.   
23
 See Moosa N “The interim and final Constitution and Muslim personal law: Implications for South African 
women” (1998) 9:2 Stellenbosch Law Review 196 at 196-206. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid.  
26
 It is customary that whenever Muhammad’s name is mentioned, this should be accompanied by a salutation, 
hence the abbreviation PBUH (Peace and Blessings Upon Him). This salutation will, for the sake of respect, be 
implied, but not repeated throughout this chapter.  
27
 See Moosa N “The interim and final Constitution and Muslim personal law: Implications for South African 
women” (1998) 9:2 Stellenbosch Law Review 196 at 196-206.  
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In the context of this doctoral thesis, the terms “Islamic” and “Muslim” will be used 
interchangeably as a similar approach was successfully adopted by the South African Law 
Reform Commission.28   
1.5 Theoretical and Philosophical Framework: Islamic and Constitutional 
Imperatives  
The word “jurisprudence” is derived from the Latin words ius (meaning “law”) and iuris 
(meaning “of the law”). In addition, the word prudens means “knowledge”, “science” or 
“philosophy”.29 Therefore, jurisprudence means knowledge of the law or the philosophy of law.  
Goolam rightly explains that Islamic jurisprudence is primarily concerned with the manner in 
which the laws of the Qur’an are derived or translated together with the sunna of Muhammad 
(i.e. the traditions or behaviour of Muhammad).30 The Qur’an was revealed to Muhammad over 
a period of almost twenty three years, partly in Mecca and Medina, and is regarded as the 
foundational pillar of Islam. Islamic jurisprudence, therefore, deals with the (primary) sources of 
Islamic law as well as their interpretation. Moosa aptly describes Islam as a tree which has at its 
base two main roots (or primary sources) and, as its fruits, the shari’a (Islamic law or 
jurisprudence).31  
Four dominant schools of thought exist within Islam, namely the Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki and 
Hanbali schools which administer the sunna of Muhammad. No fundamental differences on the 
basic laws of Islam exist between the four schools of thought.32 Nadvi thus rightly points out that 
differences are confined to minor issues (furu’at) of theology rather than the fundamental 
principles (usul) of belief.33 In addition to the jurisprudence of the four dominant schools of 
thought, Islam embraces a number of basic concepts which could greatly assist the realization of 
 
28
 See South African Law Reform Commission – Project 106 – Islamic Marriages and Related Matters Report (July 
2003). 
29
 See, in particular, Moosa N and Goolam NMI “Islamic Jurisprudence in Roederer C and Moellendorf D (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2004) 463 at 463. See also, in general, Goolam NMI “Islamic Law” in Rautenbach C and Goolam 
NMI (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Part II – Religious Legal Systems (2002) 1 at 14-20. 
30
 Ibid 1 at 19. 
31
 Ibid 1 at 19-20. 
32See Nadvi S “Part I The Quranic Origins of Islamic Law” in Nadvi S Islamic Legal Philosophy and the Quranic 
Origins of Islamic Law (1989) 29 at 42.  
33
 Ibid 29 at 42. 
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the rights and freedoms of women in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned. These include 
the concepts of duty, honour, tolerance, equality and human dignity.  
At face value, these concepts are closely aligned with the spirit and object of the South African 
Constitution, the core values of the South African constitutional and legal order34 and the type of 
society envisaged in the Preamble. Section 1(a) of the South African Constitution expressly 
states that the Republic is a sovereign democratic state founded on the values of “[h]uman 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms”. The 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights under section 39(1)(a) and the limitation of rights under 
section 36(1) must likewise both take place in accordance with what is “reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The rights to equality,35 human dignity,36 freedom and security of the person37 and freedom of 
religion, belief and opinion38 are explicitly enshrined in the South African Constitution. A 
considerable body of constitutional jurisprudence exists on the interpretation, including the 
scope, meaning and application, of these distinct rights and freedoms.  
While both formal and substantive equality are recognised in the South African Constitution and 
the right to human dignity proceeds from the assumption that the dignity of all humans must be 
respected by virtue of their membership to humanity,39 the South African Constitution also 
affords the individual protection from both physical and psychological harm.40 And although the 
South African Constitution does not prevent the state from recognising or supporting religion, 
thus allowing for the recognition of religious marriages,41 religion(s) should be treated equally.42 
 
34
 The values of human dignity, equality and freedom are explicitly mentioned in section 1(a), section 7(1), section 
9, section 10, section 36(1) and section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
35
 The right to equality is enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
36
 The right to human dignity is entrenched in section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 
1996. 
37
 The right to freedom and security of the person is enshrined in section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa of 1996. 
38
 The right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion is entrenched in section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa of 1996. 
39
 See Van der Poll L “The impact of traditional sex practices on the construction of female sexuality: An African 
human rights perspective” (2009) 13:2 Law, Democracy and Development 1 at 15. 
40Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 combines the right to freedom and security 
of the person in respect of both the right to bodily and the right to psychological integrity. 
41
 See section 15, and in particular, section 15(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South African of 1996 which 
entrenches freedom of religion, belief and opinion. 
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The practice of polygyny in Muslim marriages, including the unilateral right of a husband to 
divorce his wife,43 could thus be construed as highly problematic within a constitutional order 
which strives to uphold the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. And yet 
constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute, and thus a limitation by law of general 
application is allowed on condition that such limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on the constitutional principles of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.44  
1.6 Human Rights Standards: International and African Perspectives   
The creation of treaties and conventions by the international community serve only as a basis 
from which to build further structures that will both protect and administer the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Wing rightly observes that: 
“[i]nternational law is a significant symbolic tool, but may be a very weak device in reality to assist in improving the 
actual lives of women around the world, including Muslim women.”45  
Therefore, treaties and conventions are useful in that they provide a type of human rights 
structure, yet the effective monitoring and policing of states’ observation and the obligations of 
signatory states is often sadly ineffective.46 Once these measures are in place and enforced at 
international level, it will filter down to ensure greater accountability, responsibility and 
enforcement of international human rights instruments. Only in this way will states be 
answerable for all (or any) violations of women’s rights.47  
    
42
 See, in general, Motala Z and Ramaphosa C “Freedom of Expression, Assembly, Association, and Religion” in 
Motala Z and Ramaphosa C Constitutional Law: Analysis and Cases (2002) 363 at 379-383. 
43
 See Kaganas F and Murray C “Law, Women and the Family: The Question of Polygyny in a New South Africa” 
in Bennett T et al (eds) African Customary Law (1991) 116 at 130. See also Cachalia F “Citizenship, Muslim Family 
Law and a Future South African Constitution: A Preliminary Enquiry” (1993) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 392 at 402. 
44
 See section 36(1) of the South African Constitution which reads: “[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
only in terms of the law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extend 
of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose”.  
45
 See Wing AK Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures 1 at 1 available at 
http://www.encislam.brill.nl/public/international-conventions.html [accessed 1 January 2014]. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. 
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Given the particular context of this doctoral thesis, the extent to which the three comparative 
jurisdictions have ratified key international and regional (African) human rights instruments will 
thus be examined. In particular, attention will be given to whether or not Morocco, Tunisia and 
South Africa have made any interpretative declarations and/or reservations to the selected 
instruments. To this end, applicable provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),48 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),49 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)50 as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)51 
and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa (African Women’s Protocol)52 will be examined. The latter assessment will be 
contextualised against the backdrop of the African Union Solemn Declaration on Gender 
Equality in Africa (AU Solemn Declaration) and the African Decade of Women.  
1.7 Literature Review 
The research will include a critical review of a variety of both primary and secondary research 
materials, including international and regional human rights instruments, comparative legislation, 
constitutions, books, journal articles, case law, theses, reports and internet databases against the 
backdrop of the rights and freedoms typically enshrined in international and regional human 
rights instruments and in national constitutions. This doctoral thesis will also necessitate an 
assessment of applicable provisions of the primary sources of Islam, notably the Qur’an and the 
sunnah, including scholarly interpretations thereof. In particular, the research materials will 
guide the assessment of the manner in which women’s status has been construed in Islamic 
jurisprudence pertaining to the institutions of marriage and divorce with particular reference to 
the experiences of Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa. 
 
48
 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GOAR 21st Session Supp 
No 16 UN Doc A/6316 (1996) 999 UNTS 171 adopted on 16 December 1966. 
49
 See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GOAR 21st 
Session Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 993 UNTS 3 adopted on 16 December 1996. 
50
 See the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women GA Re 34/180 UN 
GAOR 34th Session Supp No 46 UN Doc A/34/36 (1980) adopted on 18 December 1979, opened for signature on 1 
March 1980 and entered into force on 3 September 1981 following receipt of the twentieth ratification. 
51
 See the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU) Doc. CAB/LEG/6/7/3 rev. 5 21 ILM 58 
(1982) adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
52
 See the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 1999 
DOC/OS (XXXVII) adopted on 15 November 1999 and entered into force on 11 July 2003. 
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Due to the codified nature of and colonial histories that have impacted on the Moroccan and 
Tunisian legal systems, little reliance is placed on judicial precedents as judges neither have 
discretion nor are obligated to follow existing precedents.53 Consequently, the case law analysed 
in this doctoral thesis predominantly concern significant judgments handed down by a range of 
superior courts in South Africa, including the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court, particularly as these precedents acutely illustrate the challenging legal status of Muslim 
women who are married in terms of Islamic rites in South Africa.  
Although a fair body of academic scholarship on Muslim marriage and divorce exists in South 
Africa, most of these are of a decidedly historical nature54 or merely set forth the basic tenets of 
Islam, including core elements of marriage and divorce.55 Very few South African authors have 
substantively and critically56 addressed the status of Muslim women from a human rights and/or 
a constitutional perspective and sought to align these commitments with the core tenets of 
Islam.57 And while some South African scholars have conducted comparative analyses on the 
situation of Muslim women, especially in India, Pakistan and Egypt,58 almost no legal 
scholarship exists on the legal and constitutional reforms introduced in Morocco and Tunisia, 
even though women in these two African jurisdictions have progressively enjoyed the fruits of 
legal and political emancipation since the mid-1950s.   
 
53
 See, in particular, Voorhoeve M “The Interaction between Codified Law and Divine Law: The Case of Divorce 
for Disobedience in Tunisia” (2009) 204 Revue de l’Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes 269 at 280 n 28. 
54
 See, in particular, Moosa N Unveiling the Mind: A Herstory of the Historical Evolution of the Legal Position of 
Women in Islam (2004) (Cape Town: Mills Litho) and Moosa N Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position of Women 
in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) (Claremont: Juta & Co Ltd). 
55
 See, amongst other, Doi ARI Women in Shari’ah (Islamic Law) (1989) (London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd); Calder N 
Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (1993) (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Esposito JL and DeLong-Bas NJ Women 
in Muslim Family Law 2ed (2001) (New York: Syracuse University Press); Rautenbach C and Goolam NMI (eds) 
Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Part II – Religious Legal Systems (2002) (Cape Town: 
Butterworths); Tucker JE Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law (2008) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press); Rautenbach C, Bekker JC, Goolam, NMI (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3ed (2010) 
(Durban: LexisNexis); and Arshad R Islamic Family Law (2010) (London: Sweet & Maxwell). 
56
 See, in particular, Goolam NMI “Human Dignity – Our Supreme Constitutional Value” (2001) 4:1 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 43. 
57
 See, for example, Moosa N “The Interim and Final Constitutions and Muslim Personal Law: Implications for 
South African Women” (1998) 9:2 Stellenbosch Law Review196 and Moosa N “Human Rights in Islam” (1998) 14 
South African Journal of Human Rights 508.  
58
 See, amongst other, Abu-Odeh L “Modernising Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt” (2004) 3 Oxford 
University Comparative Law Forum 1; Shah NA Women, the Koran and International Human Rights Law: The 
Experience of Pakistan (2006) (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers); Lombardi CB State Law as Islamic Law in 
Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Shari’s into Egyptian Constitutional Law (2006) (Leiden: Brill Publishers); 
and Narain V “Muslim Women’s Equality in India: Applying a Human Rights Framework” (2013) 35 Human 
Rights Quarterly 91.  
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Feminist scholarship is particularly instructive in highlighting the strategies employed by women 
to facilitate meaningful legal and political reform. Yet although feminism in Islam has a long 
history, no homogenous body of feminist scholarship exists.59 Much of the legal scholarship of 
feminist writers is situation-specific and emanates from their own particular (geographical) 
experiences of male domination and oppression.60 While some feminists situate their arguments 
in Islam, others argue for women’s liberation from a decidedly secular perspective. Definitions 
of feminism in Islam thus vary considerably. While some scholars employ a definition of 
feminism which derives its legitimacy from Islam directly,61 others emphasise the need for 
gender equality, empowerment and justice.62 For these reasons, the (feminist) literature examined 
in this doctoral thesis often specifically relates only to the chosen comparative contexts of 
Morocco and Tunisia, rather than to a broad and uniform movement arguing for women’s 
emancipation.63  
 
59
 See Moosa N “Different Perspectives on Women and Islam” in Moosa N Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position 
of Women in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 84 at 89-90. 
60
 See, for example, Mir-Hosseini Z “The Construction of Gender in Islamic Legal Thought and Strategies for 
Reform” (2003) 1:1 Journal of Women of the Middle East and Islamic World 1; Mir-Hosseini Z “Muslim Women’s 
Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism” (2006) 32:4 Critical Inquiry 629; Mir-Hosseini Z “How 
the Door of Ejtihad was Opened and Closed: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Family Law Reforms in Iraq and 
Morocco” (2007) 64:4 Washington and Lee Law Review 1499; Almihdar Z “Human Rights of Women and Children 
under the Islamic Law of Personal Status and Its Application in Saudi Arabia” (2008) 5:1 Muslim World Journal of 
Human Rights 1; and  Narain V “Muslim Women’s Equality in India: Applying a Human Rights Framework” 
(2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 91.   
61
 See, in particular, Mir-Hosseini Z “The Construction of Gender in Islamic Legal Thought and Strategies for 
Reform” available at http://www.brill.nl [accessed 4 June 2013] and Mir-Hosseini Z “‘Islamic Feminism’ as the 
‘Unwanted Child’ of Political Islam” (2010) Paper Presented at the Islamic Feminism Conference in Madrid, Spain 
available at http://www.wluml.org/node/6745 [accessed 14 January 2014].   
62
 See, in particular, Lewis P “Zainab al-Ghazali: Pioneer of Islamist Feminism” (2007) 4:2 Michigan Journal of 
History 1. 
63
 See, for example, Anderson LND “The Tunisian Law of Personal Status” (1958) 7:2 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 262; Lewis WH “Feuding and Social Change in Morocco” (1961) 5:1 The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 43; Morse AM and Sayeh LP “Tunisia: Marriage, Divorce, and Foreign Recognition” (1995) 
29:3 Family Law Quarterly 701; Mednicoff D “Think Locally – Act Globally” Cultural Framing and Human Rights 
Movements in Tunisia and Morocco” (2003) 7:3 The International Journal of Human Rights 72; Omri B “The 
Status of Women under Tunisian Law” (2004) 18 Journal of Policy Studies 147; Maddy-Weitzman B “Women, 
Islam, and the Moroccan State: The Struggle over the Personal Status Law” (2005) 59:3 Middle East Journal 393; 
Sadiqi F and Ennaji M “The Feminization of Public Space: Women’s Activism, the Family Law, and Social Change 
in Morocco” (2006) 2:2 Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 86; Sadiqi F “The Central Role of the Family in 
Morocco Feminist Movement” (2008) 35:3 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 330; Voorhoeve M “The 
Interaction between Codified Law and Divine Law: The Case of Divorce for Disobedience in Tunisia” (2009) 204 
Revue de l’Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes 269; Hursh J “Advancing Women’s Rights through Islamic Law: The 
Example of Morocco” (2010) 27:2 Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice 252; Molina IF “The Monarchy vs 
the 20 February Movement: Who Holds the Reigns of Political Change in Morocco?” (2011) 16:3 Mediterranean 
Politics 435; and Hanafi L “Moudawana and Women’s Rights in Morocco: Balancing National and International 
Law” (2011-2012) 18:2 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 515. 
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This doctoral thesis welcomes both Islamic and secular feminist perspectives that seek to 
critically explore the situation of women in marriage and divorce. The research literature is 
consulted for this specific purpose. No distinct feminist perspective is embraced, nor is the 
intention to produce a feminist framework to facilitate an examination of women’s rights and 
freedoms in Islam within the contexts of marriage and divorce.   
1.8 Research Methodology 
The research methodology followed in this doctoral thesis will entail a comparative and critical 
investigation into the patriarchal and societal assumptions about women’s status, role and 
identity that exist in both law and religion, including societal stereotypical attitudes, as these find 
expression in aspects of Muslim personal law and Islamic jurisprudence, within the specific 
contexts of marriage and divorce. This investigation will be conducted with particular reference 
to Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa and will conform to the traditional scientific conventions 
of legal scholarship. 
1.9 Chapter Outline 
This doctoral thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 serves as a basic introduction to the 
study and articulates the problem statement and research question, delimits the conceptual 
framework, including the theoretical and philosophical parameters that will inform this research, 
and explores the applicable human rights and constitutional contexts within the issues are to be 
situated.  
Chapter 2 seeks to establish a suitable theoretical and philosophical framework intended to 
inform the research as a whole. Consequently, Chapter 2 critically explores applicable aspects of 
Islamic jurisprudence, notably the basic legal ideas and concepts in Islamic thought, approaches 
to scriptural interpretation, gender sensitivity as projected by modernism, conservatism and 
fundamentalism in Islam as well as the four primary schools of classical Islamic thought. 
Chapter 3 is the first of three chapters in which a comparative analysis will be conducted. To this 
end, Chapter 3 critically explores the rights, freedoms and status of women in Moroccan law. In 
particular, attention will be paid to secularism and the Moroccan legal system as well as recent 
reforms in marriage and divorce law. The Moroccan response to the international human rights 
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system as well as the African human rights framework will be examined critically against the 
backdrop of, amongst other, the African Decade of Women. 
Chapter 4 seeks to critically evaluate the rights, freedoms and status of women in Tunisian law. 
Here too the issue of secularism and its impact on the Tunisian legal system will be examined, 
including recent reforms pertaining to marriage and divorce. As was the case in the preceding 
chapter, Chapter 4 will likewise examine the Tunisian response to both the international and the 
regional human rights framework as these specifically relate to (African) women.  
Chapter 5 consists of a critical analysis of the status of Muslim women in South Africa and will 
thus focus on the invalidity of Muslim marriages, the legal implications thereof, as well as the 
legal implications of divorce. The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, which seeks to accord legal 
recognition to Islamic marriage and divorce, will be critically examined against the backdrop of 
the applicable rights and freedoms contained in the South African Constitution, notably human 
dignity, freedom and security of the person, equality and freedom of religion, belief and opinion. 
And as was the case in the preceding two chapters, Chapter 5 will examine the South African 
response to the international human rights system and the African human rights framework as 
these find specific application to women.  
Chapter 6 assesses critically whether or not the two comparative (African) jurisdictions hold any 
lessons for South Africa in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned. Both Morocco and 
Tunisia have adopted Muslim personal law and have sought to progressively address key issues 
pertaining to marriage and divorce even though their legal and political are somewhat different. 
The non-recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa has compelled Muslim women to 
either accept an unbearable situation or to approach the courts so as to realize their fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the South African Constitution. And yet only women 
married in terms of Islamic rites are forced to make such a choice under the existing South 
African law.  
Chapter 7 will be the culmination of the research and will set out the various conclusions 
reached, propose suitable recommendations and answer the research question identified in 
Chapter 1.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical and Philosophical Framework 
“Many scholars are sceptical of the claims that Muslim interpretations of Islamic law, as found in the 
Qur’an ... are a barrier to women’s equal status. Many of these scholars, including Muslim feminists, argue 
that patriarchal attitudes and misreading of Islamic sources, not Islam doctrine itself, are at the root of 
discrimination against women in Islamic countries ... They argue that the Qur’an embodies the same basic 
principles as many international documents on human rights, and, therefore, that Islamic law is not a barrier 
to the    implementation of equal rights for women”.1 
“Can a feminist discourse that takes its legitimacy from Islam’s sacred texts and that must operate within a 
closed legal system like fiqh, with little support from the power base in that tradition, break that closed 
system apart? In other words, can its advocates nurture a gender discourse that meets women’s aspirations 
for equality?”2  
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter is intended to develop the theoretical and philosophical framework for the 
arguments to be advanced throughout this doctoral thesis. To this end, the different theoretical 
and philosophical underpinnings of Islam will be subjected to close critical scrutiny. First, the 
origin, nature, objectives and sources of Islamic law will be examined, where after the basic legal 
ideas and concepts in Islamic thought will be explored critically with the emphasis on marriage 
and divorce. In particular, attention will be paid to the approaches to scriptural interpretation 
with due consideration of modernism, conservatism and fundamentalism in Islamic thought.  
There exists predominately four schools of thought in Islam, namely Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki and 
Hanbali. No one school of thought enjoys universal dominance, however, and in Morocco and 
Tunisia, for example, the Maliki school of thought is the most influential, whereas in Egypt, the 
Hanafi school of thought appears to be the most popular.3 In closing, the chapter will examine 
critically whether the four schools of thought have the potential to support arguments for the 
recognition of women’s fundamental rights and freedoms in so far as marriage and divorce are 
 
1
 See Entelis J “International Human Rights: Islam’s Friend or Foe? Algeria as an Example of the Compatibility of 
International Human Rights Regarding Women’s Equality and Islamic Law” (1997) 20 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1251 at 1254-1255. 
2
 See Mir-Hosseini Z “Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism” (2006) 32:4 
Critical Inquiry 629 at 645. 
3
 See Al-Sarmani M “Recent Reforms in Personal Status Laws and Women’s Empowerment: Family Courts in 
Egypt” The American University in Cairo Social Research Centre (2007) available at 
http://www.parthwaysempowerments.org [accessed 10 February 2011]. 
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concerned against the backdrop of the chosen comparative framework and within the South 
African legal and constitutional contexts. 
2.2 Islamic Jurisprudence 
2.2.1 Origins of Islam and Islamic Law  
During the sixth century of the Christian Era (CE), the city of Mecca, founded within the 
precincts of Arabia, was rife with idol worship4 and polytheism was common throughout the 
Arabian Peninsula.5 
As Al-Azami observes:  
“[t]he foundation of Arab faith was deep-rooted idolatry, which for centuries had stood proof, with no palpable 
symptoms of decay, against every attempt at evangelisation from Egypt and Syria”. 6 
The history and growth of Islamic jurisprudence can best be understood with reference to four 
distinct historical periods. According to Ajijola, there exists a consensus of opinion on the stages 
of development of Islamic legal history.7 The first period of Islamic history, classified as the 
legislative period,8 commences with the life of Muhammad (PBUH)9 and the first Qur’anic 
revelation. The first Qur’anic verse revealed to Muhammad was Chapter 96 which reads:  
“Proclaim! (or read) in the name of thy lord and Cherisher, who created”. 
It is generally agreed that the origin of Islam as a faith can be traced back to the seventh century 
CE amongst a small group of believers in Arabia.10 The meaning of the word Islam is derived 
from the Arabic word-root s-l-m, which refers to peace and submission. Therefore, specifically, 
Islam relates man(kind)’s submission to the will of God. Followers of Islam, referred to as 
 
4
 See Fatima S “Nature and Effects of the Islamic Attitude to Women” (1982) 21:1 Islamic Studies 105 at 121. 
5
 See Al-Azami M “The Place of the Law in Islam” in Al-Azami M On Schachts Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence (1985) 7 at 7.  
6
 Ibid.  
7
 See Ajijola AD “History of the growth of Islamic Jurisprudence” in Ajijola AD Introduction to Islamic Law (1983) 
1 at 2-3. See, in particular, Yusuf Ali A “Chapter XCVI” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and 
Commentary (1938) 1761 at 1761. Of note, the first revelation to Muhammad occurred in the cave of Hiraa at 
around 610 CE.  
8
 Ibid. 
9
 The salutation PBUH (Peace and Blessings Upon Him) will, for the sake of respect, be implied, but not repeated 
throughout this chapter. 
10
 See El Alami DS “The Supremacy of the Shari’ah in Personal Status Laws” in El Alami DS The Marriage 
Contract in Islamic Law (1992) 1 at 1. 
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Muslim, believe that God (or, in Arabic, Allah) revealed His will to Muhammad and other 
prophets, including Adam, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. A person who describes herself as a 
Muslim therefore makes this very submission. The word Muslim is directly related to the word 
Islam and means “one who surrenders” or “submits” to Allah, or is a “vassal” of Allah. 
Although all Muslims are deemed equal in faith there exist different levels of belief. These levels 
will depend specifically on how a particular Muslim wishes to practice her belief and the school 
of thought to which she adheres. However, all Muslims share core beliefs. These fundamental 
beliefs are summarised in the following narration of Muhammad:  
“faith in Allah and his Messenger (Muhammad), pray (salah), fasting (sawm) which is fasting during the month of 
Ramaadan, pilgrimage (hajj) at least once in your lifetime, if the person can afford it and one who is an able-bodied 
person and giving arms to the poor and needy (zakah)”.11 
The core beliefs are commonly known as the five pillars of Islam. In addition to these tenets, all 
Muslims are required to believe in the angels and the Final Day of Judgment when all matters 
will be judged, including all the revealed scriptures such as the Gospel, Torah and the Qur’an.  
Moosa points out that Islam is regarded as the last of the revealed religions after the fulfilment of 
the monotheism religions, namely Judaism and Christianity.12 The core of Islamic faith is to be 
found in the belief of the Qur’an and Muhammad.  
Around 610 CE Muhammad experienced a religious transformation that not only changes his 
life, but also fundamentally impacted upon the history of a large part of the world. It is believed 
that Muhammad heard a divine voice, later believed to be the angel Gabriel (Jibril), commanding 
him that there exist only one God, namely Allah. The basis of Muslim belief is found in the core 
of this revealed message and is affirmed in the following:  
“there is no God but Allah (The God), and Muhammad is the messenger of God”.13 
As Al-Azami correctly observes, idol worship in Mecca reinforced Muhammad’s message: La 
IlahaIllallah (there is no god but Allah).14 Muhammad’s message was seen as a threat to those 
 
11
 See, in particular, Arshad R “Introduction to Islam” in Arshad R Islamic Family Law (2010) 1 at 5. 
12
 See Moosa N “Historical Arguments: The Two Histories” in Moosa N An Analysis of the Human Rights and 
Gender Consequences of the New South African Constitution and Bill Of Rights with Regard to the Recognition and 
Implementation of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) 14 at 15. 
13
 See Al-Azami M “The Place Of The Law in Islam” in Al-Azami M On Schacht’s Origins of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence ( 1985) 7 at 7. 
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tribes that practiced idol worship and those who engaged in usury, both of which were 
widespread practices in Mecca. The message that Islam calls for a total submission to the will of 
Allah was not, however, intended for a particular family or tribe only, but was to be conveyed to 
the entire world.15 
The life of Muhammad as a preacher and the leader of a small faith based community first 
impacted on his wife Khadja and their close friends, all of whom reverted to Islam. Despite a 
relatively large difference in age, the marriage between Muhammad and Khadja, a widow of 
forty years of age, was reportedly a happy one and lasted all of twenty three years. They 
remained loyal to each other until her death.16Muhammad’s affirmation of monotheism, coupled 
with the warning of the Day of Judgment, posed a serious threat to the practice of polytheism in 
Mecca. This warning, in accordance with Qur’anic reasoning, is found in Chapter 34 verse 28 
which reads:  
“We have not sent thee but as a universal (messenger) to men, giving them glad tidings, and warning them (against 
sin), but most men understand not”.17 
Moosa rightly points out that the Qur’an, which is considered to be the primary source of Islam 
and the literal word of Allah as revealed to Muhammad, was communicated in a piecemeal 
fashion to the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina.18 The reason for the piecemeal communication 
of the Qur’an was that the traders in Mecca, as well as other tribal leaders, saw the message of 
Muhammad as a threat to both their way of life and their deities. Because of this threatening 
situation, Muhammad and his followers relocated to Medina, giving rise to the second period in 
the development of Islam. 
The second period of Muhammad’s life is thus characterised by the emigration (hijrah) to the 
city of Medina (Yathrib or Al-Medina). The emigration is of immense significance and has 
    
14
 Ibid. 
15
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter XXXIV verse 28” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary 
(1938) 1132 at 1142-1143. Chapter 34 verse 28 states the following: “We have not sent thee But as a universal 
(Messenger) To men, giving them Glad tidings, and warning them (Against sin), but most men Understand not”. 
16
 See Osman AR “Muhammad” in Osman AR The Prophets of Islam Adam to Muhammad (May Allah Be Pleased 
With Them) 2 at 108. 
17
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter XXXIV verse 28” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary 
(1938) 1132 at 1142-1143.  
18
 See Moosa N “Historical Arguments: The Two Histories” in Moosa N An Analysis of The Human Rights and 
Gender Consequences of the New South African Constitution and the Bill Of Rights with Regard to the Recognition 
and Implementation of Muslim Personal Law(MPL) (1996) 11 at 15. 
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prompted Muslims to identify this date as the beginning of the Islamic calendar, also referred to 
as the Islamic Era (AH or Anno Hegirae), corresponding to the year 622 CE.19 The city of 
Medina in time became known as the City of the Prophet and the home of Muhammad. As such 
it represented a model of an ideal Islamic state and society. By contrast to the practices of the 
prevalent tribal groups in Arabia, the new community (ummah) was open to all who subscribed 
to the basic affirmation of the Islamic faith. Loyalty to the faith was to supersede any loyalty that 
was due to clan, family or commercial enterprise.  
The political structure of the new community was informal, the rationale being that although 
Muhammad was the messenger of Allah, he was an ordinary person and could not, as such, 
assume the position of a monarch. Coulsen aptly describes Muhammad as the “judge-supreme” 
responsible for the interpretations of the revelations of the Qur’an to assist with particular 
problems as and when they arose.20 During Muhammad’s prophecy of twenty three years two 
primary sources of Islam emerged, commonly referred to as the Qur’an and sunnah. These two 
primary divine sources of Islamic law constitute shari’ah law, literally meaning “the straight 
path”.21 As primary sources, Ajijola states that: 
“the qur’an is to the Shari’ah Law, what the Twelve Tables were to the Roman Law”. 22 
Although the precise date of Muhammad’s death is not certain, it is commonly thought to have 
occurred around 632 CE.23 By this time the Muslim community of Medina was firmly 
established, Mecca was defeated and many of the traditions that existed in Medina had been 
incorporated into Mecca. The shrine (ka’ba) situated in Mecca, originally a place of polytheism 
pilgrimage, was re-interpreted as the altar built by the prophet Abraham. For the new community 
of Muslims, Mecca thus became the centre of pilgrimage (hadj) and direction for prayer. 
 
19
 Ibid. The beginning of the Islamic Era and calendar is referred to as Anno Hegirae (AH) named after 
Muhammad’s migration (hijrah) to the City of Medina (also known as Yathrib). 
20
 See Pearl D “Historical Introduction” in Pearl D A Textbook On Muslim Personal Law 2ed (1987) 1 at 7. 
21
 See Nadvi SHH “The Qur’anic Origins of Islamic Law” in Nadvi SHH Islamic Legal Philosophy and the 
Qur’anic Origins of The Islamic Law: A Legal-Historical Approach (1989) 29 at 34-35. 
22
 See, in general, Ajijola AD “History of the growth of Islamic Jurisprudence” in Ajijola AD Introduction to 
Islamic Law (1983) 1 at 3. 
23
 See Moosa N “Historical Arguments: The Two Histories” in Moosa N An Analysis of the Human Rights and 
Gender Consequences of the New South African Constitution and the Bill of Rights with Regard to the Recognition 
and Implementation of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) 11 at 15. 
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After the death of Muhammad, it was believed that the revelations were completed for he was 
deemed as the seal of all prophets. Two specific challenges confronted the new Muslim 
community. While the first related to the creation of formal institutions to preserve the 
community, the second was concerned with who was to succeed Muhammad as leader and 
defender of the Muslim faith. Disagreement concerning the succession of Muhammad led to a 
division within Islam culminating into two factions, namely sunnite (sunni) and shi’ite (shia).24 
The second period of Islamic history dates from the eleventh to the fortieth year of the migration 
(hijra) and is characterised by the emergence of the first four caliphs (khalifahs) or successors of 
Muhammad.25 According to Nadvi, this period could also be classified as the Republican period 
or the period of the “rightly-guided four successors”.26 Special attention was therefore given to 
the collections of narratives issued during the lifetime of Muhammad, giving rise to the sunnah 
of Muhammad. This included all that is narrated from Muhammad, his acts, his sayings and 
whatever he tacitly approved, including all reports which describe his physical attributes and 
character.27 But specifically excluded from the definition of sunnah would be any description of 
the physical features of Muhammad.28 The second period, which supplemented the Qur’anic 
injunctions with the factual life of Muhammad,29 drew to a close with the emergence of the four 
dominant schools of Islamic thought. 
The third period of Islamic history commences at the second century after the migration and 
comes to an end at the turn of the third century after the hijra. The period is characterised by the 
introduction of the four sunni schools, namely Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, and Hanbali. The 
founders of each of the four schools of thought were revered as a great learned scholar (imam).30 
 
24
 See www.file://F:\Islam.htm [accessed 10 June 2011]. Some consider Sufism, also referred to as mystic Islam, as 
another branch of Islamic faith, although many sufi orders consider themselves to be either sunni or shia. Even 
though Sufism is found across Islam, regional variations do exist. 
25
 See Ajijola AD “History of the Growth of Islamic Jurisprudence” in Ajijola AD Introduction to Islamic Law 
(1983) 1 at 2-3. 
26
 See, in general, Nadvi SHH “The Qur’anic Origins of Islamic Law” in Nadvi SHH Islamic Legal Philosophy and 
the Qur’anic Origins of the Islamic Law (A Legal-Historical Approach) (1989) 29 at 37.  
27
 See Kamali MH “The Sunnah” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1991) 44 at 44. The term 
hadith refers to the divine inspiration which was communicated in and through the words of Muhammad. 
28
 Ibid. The Prophetic sunnah (sunnah al-Nabi or sunnah al-Rasul) does not occur in the Qur’an as such. However, 
the phrase uswahhasanah (excellent conduct), which is found Sura al-Ahzab verse 33:21 and which refers to the 
exemplary conduct of Muhammad, is the nearest Qur’anic equivalent of sunnah al-Nabi. 
29
 See Ajijola AD “History of the Growth of Islamic Jurisprudence” in Ajijola AD Introduction to Islamic Law 
(1983) 1 at 4-5. 
30
 Ibid.  
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It could well be argued that while the second period laid the foundation of Islamic jurisprudence, 
the third period shaped the legal philosophy that the schools of thought subsequently developed. 
It is during this period that the collection of traditions of Muhammad were sifted and edited by 
the respective schools of thought and, to some degree, select commentaries on the Qur’an were 
produced.31 In addition, further sources of Islam, such as ijma and qiyas, were developed during 
the second and third periods, based on the consensus of the community and due to a need for 
new legislation.32 
During this time, however, political tension grew, giving rise to forged hadiths attributed to 
Muhammad and the introduction of qiyas (meaning personal reasoning or analogical deduction 
based on comparison, with a view to suggest equality or similarity between two things in order to 
find a solution to a particular problem)33 as a further source of Islamic law.34 
The fourth period in the history of Islam is classified as the scientific and research period. The 
period extends from the third century after the migration to the middle of the fourth century after 
the hijra. Indicative of this period was the expansion of industry, trade, commerce and 
agriculture which necessitated new laws in the growing fields of human expansion.35 As human 
endeavours expanded into various activities, the four primary schools of thought emerged. The 
result was that principles of Islamic law and jurisprudence were fixed and systemised. In 
addition, books on Islamic law and the hadiths (narrations of Muhammad) were collected and 
compiled.36 This period saw the greatest transformation and reformation of Islam. 
 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 See Nadvi SHH “The Qur’anic Origins of Islamic Law” in Nadvi SHH Islamic Legal Philosophy and the 
Qur’anic Origins of the Islamic Law: A Legal-Historical Approach (1989) 29 at 45. See also , in particular, NM 
Bernard, du Plessis W, Gokul R, NMI Goolam, MF Heyns and Rautenbach C “Religious Legal Systems: General 
Foundations” in  Rautenbach C Bekker JC Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal Pluralism 3ed (2010) 215 at 235. 
33
 Ibid. See, in particular, Kamali MH “Qiyas (Analogical Deduction)” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence (1991) 197 at 197. 
34
 See Gokul R, NM Bernhard, du Plessis, NMI Goolam and MF Heyns “General Foundations” in Rautenbach CR 
and Goolam NMI (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Part II Religious Legal Systems (2002) 1 at 
17. 
35
 See Nadvi SHH “The Qur’anic Origins of Islamic Law” in Nadvi SHH Islamic Legal Philosophy and the 
Qur’anic Origins of the Islamic Law: A Legal-Historical Approach (1989) 29 at 46. 
36
 Ibid. Authors such as Nadvi and Ajijola are not, however, in agreement on the number of historical periods in 
Islam. Nadvi, for example, identifies seven periods whereas Ajijolarefers to six periods of transformation. For the 
purpose of this doctoral thesis, only four periods of transformation will be considered. 
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Although the primary and secondary sources of Islamic law include the Qur’an, sunnah, ijma 
and qiyas,37 the list is not exhaustive and further sources have been recognised. These sources 
are viewed as supplementary38 and include custom (’urf), personal reasoning (ijtihad), public 
interest (istihsan), legal presumption (istishab) and blocking the ways (sadd al-dharai). 
A brief overview of the sources of Islamic law follows next. 
2.2.2 Brief overview of the sources of Islamic law 
The Qur’an is regarded as the first primary source of shari’ah or Islamic law and is divided into 
one hundred and fourteen chapters.39 The Qur’an was revealed in piecemeal over a period of 
twenty two years, two months and twenty two days to provide solutions to the problems which 
came before Muhammad.40 The revelation of the Qur’an began with Chapter 96 verse 96:1, 
commencing with the words “Read in the name of your Lord”, and ending with the verse in 
Chapter 5 verse 5:3 which states: 
“Today I have perfected your religion for you and completed my favour toward you, and chosen Islam as your 
religion”.41 
The contents of the Qur’an are not classified according to subject. Kamali rightly points out that 
the verses (ayah) on various topics appear in unexpected places, and that no particular order can 
be ascertained in the sequence of the text. For example, the command relating to pray (salah) 
appears in the second chapter, in the midst of other verses (ayah) which relate to the subject of 
divorce.42 Furthermore, in the same sura, rules relating to wine-drinking, apostasy and war are 
followed by passages concerning the treatment of orphans and the marriage of unbelieving 
women.43 Rules relating to marriage, divorce and revocation are found in different chapters 
(notably in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 65) and any attempt to follow only certain parts of 
 
37
 See, in general, Bernhard NM, du Plessis, Gokul R, Goolam NMI, Heyns MF and Rautenbach C “ Religious 
Legal Systems: General Foundations” in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal 
Pluralism 3ed (2010) 215 at 234-237. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 See, in general, Doi ARI “Holy Quran: The First Primary Source of Shari’ah” in Doi ARI Shari’ah The Islamic 
Law (1984) 21 at 21. In addition, there are approximately 6 666 verses (ayat or ayah) in the Qur’an. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 See Kamali MH “The First Source of Shari’ah: The Quran” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: 
Introduction (1991) 14 at 14-15. 
42
 In Chapter 2 verses 2:228-2:248. See also, in particular, Yusuf Ali A “Chapter II” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy 
Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 15 at 89. 
43
 See, in particular, Chapter 2 verse 2:216-2:217. 
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the Qur’an and abandon others will be rendered invalid. Of particular note is Chapter 2 verse 
5:52 which supports this idea through the issuing of a warning by Muhammad: 
“Beware of them (i.e. the disbelievers) lest they seduce you away from a part of that which God has sent down to 
you”.44 
Kamali thus rightly concludes that the Qur’an is an indivisible whole and a guide for belief and 
action which must be accepted and followed in its entirety.45 Doi stresses that Muhammad never 
spoke from his own enterprise, but spoke only of what Allah had revealed to him.46 In pre-
Islamic times, the Arab tribes did employ terminology such as sunnah with reference to the 
ancient and continuous practice of the community which was handed down from generation to 
generation. Thus it could be said that the pre-Islamic tribes had their own sunnah which they 
considered to constitute the foundation of their identity and pride.47 Kamali thus rightly indicates 
that the concept sunnah means “clear path” or a “beaten track”, but that the concept has also 
been used to imply a normative practice, or an established course of conduct.48 
Apart from the Qur’an and the sunnah which constitute the primary sources of the Islamic legal 
system or shari’ah law, two secondary sources, commonly referred to as ijma, qiyas and ijtihad, 
are derived from the legal injunctions of the Qur’an and the sunnah of Muhammad.49 The final 
sanction for all intellectual activities in respect of the development of the shar’ah comes from 
nowhere else but the Qur’an itself. Any hadith which is contrary to the Qur’an is thus not to be 
considered as authentic.50 Al-Ijma, which refers to the consensus of juristic opinions of the 
 
44
 See Kamali MH “The First Source of Shari’ah” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: Introduction 
(1991) 14 at 15. See also Yusuf Ali A “Chapter V” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and 
Commentary (1938) 237 at 259. 
45
 Ibid. Similarly, the verses (ayah) relating to the pilgrimage (hajj) occur in both Chapter 2 verse 2:196 to 2:203 and 
Chapter 22 verse 22:27. 
46
 See Doi ARI “The Sunnah: Second Primary Source of Shari’ah” in Doi ARI Shari’ahThe Islamic Law (1984) 45 
at 45. See also Yusuf Ali A “Chapter XVI” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text Translation and Commentary 
(1938) 655 at 667. 
47
 Ibid. The opposite of sunnah is bid’ah (or innovation) which is assessed by a lack of precedent and continuity 
with the past. In the Qur’an the word sunnah, and its plural, sunan, have been expressed on a number of occasions 
(sixteen times in fact). In all these instances, sunnah has been used to imply an established practice or course of 
conduct. 
48
 See Kamali MH “The Sunnah” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: Introduction (1991) 44 at 44. 
49
 See, in particular, Doi ARI “The Secondary Sources of Shari’ah” in Doi ARI Shari’ah The Islamic Law (1984) 64 
at 64-65. 
50
 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 


learned ulama of the ummah after the death of Muhammad,51 can be classified as the consensus 
of opinion of the companions (sahabah) of Muhammad, and the agreement reached on the 
decisions taken by the learned jurists (muftis) on various Islamic matters.52 
According to Kamali, ijma plays a significant role in that it ensures the correct interpretation of 
the Qur’an, the faithful transmission of the sunnah and the legitimate use of ijtihad.53 The 
question as to whether the law, as illustrated in the divine revelation or sources, has been 
properly interpreted is always open to criticism, especially with reference to the deduction of 
new rules by way of analogy. Kamali therefore concludes that it is only ijma which can put an 
end to doubt by giving support to a particular ruling, the effect of which is that the ruling then 
becomes decisive and infallible.54 
Ijma can thus also be described as an interpretive tool, including an instrument of tolerance and 
an evolution of ideas in directions which may reflect the vision of scholars in the light of fresh 
educational and cultural advancements in the sphere of Islamic jurisprudence. Kamali is thus of 
the opinion that ijma enhances the authority of rules which are of a speculative origin. 
Speculative rules do not have a binding character, but once ijma is held in their favour, these 
rules become definite and binding.55 
Qiyas could be defined in the Islamic theological vernacular as “analogy” or “analogical 
deduction”. Therefore, qiyas could be described as the legal principle introduced in order to 
derive at a logical conclusion of a certain law on a particular issue that concerns the welfare of 
Muslims.56 Exercising the concept of qiyas must be based on the Qur’an, sunnah and the ijma. 
 
51
 Ibid. The word ulama refers to Islamic scholars or jurists who have undertaken an in-depth study of the Qur’an. 
The term ummah refers to the Islamic community: see, in particular, Moosa N and Goolam NMI “Islamic 
Jurisprudence” in Roederer C and Moellendorf D (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 463 at 466. 
52
 See, in particular, Doi ARI “The Secondary Sources of Shari’ah” in Doi ARI Shari’ah The Islamic law (1984) 64 
at 65. 
53
 See Kamali MH “Ijma, or Consensus of Opinion” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: 
Introduction (1991) 169 at 170-171. The term ijtihad refers to the interpretation of either the Qur’an or the sunnah. 
54
 Ibid. The ijma can be divided into three broad categories, namely: (a) the verbal consensus of opinion; (b) the 
consensus of opinion on an action; and (c) the silent consensus. See, in particular, Doi ARI “The Secondary Sources 
of Shari’ah” in Doi ARI Shari’ahThe Islamic Law (1984) 64 at 66. 
55
 See Kamali MH “Ijma or Consensus of Opinion” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: 
Introduction (1991) 168 at 169. 
56
 See Doi ARI “The Secondary Sources of Shari’ah” in Doi ARI Shari’ah The Islamic Law (1984) 64 at 70-71. 
According to Doi, the concept of qiyas was introduced by the late imam Abu Hanifa, the founder of the Hanafi 
school of thought, situated in Iraq. The reason for the introduction of this concept or principle was to curb the 
excessive thinking and digression of the people from the Islamic legal position. Doi explains that many new 
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Kamali explains that the concept of qiyas refers to the measuring of, or ascertaining the length, 
weight or quality of, something.57 
In addition, the concept of qiyas could also be used as a means of comparison, with a view to 
suggest equality or similarity between two things. Therefore, qiyas suggest a type of equality or 
close similarity between two things, one of which is taken as the criterion for evaluating the 
other.58 Kamali therefore concludes that qiyas is a step beyond the scope of mere interpretation 
as the application of qiyas is placed on the identification of a common cause between two cases 
which is not indicated in the language of the text itself. Identifying the effective cause thus 
involves, to a degree, intellectual exertion on the part of either the scholar or jurist, who is called 
upon to make a determination by going back, not only to the semantics of a given text, but also 
to his understanding of the accepted objectives of the law.59 
There are, however, some who are opposed to the principle encapsulated in qiyas. These 
opponents include scholars and jurist (termed anti-qiyas and pro-qiyas, respectively) who have 
brought forth evidence to support their argument.60 Those who oppose qiyas base their argument 
on the fact that Allah has revealed the Qur’an simply as a guide to mankind. By contrast, those in 
favour of qiyas base their argument on mankind’s understanding and the use of common sense to 
deduce Islamic law according to the narration (hadith) of Muhammad.61 
Goolam suggests a solution by arguing that should a problem arise in which some of the sources 
fail to provide a remedy, jurists must attempt, through reasoning and an in-depth study, to come 
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Muslims from far-away lands quite expectedly brought with them their particular philosophical outlook, culture and 
even religious and legal notions into the fold of Islam. 
57
 See Kamali MH “Qiyas (Analogical Deduction)” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: 
Introduction (1991) 198 at 198. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid. Scholars and jurists regard qiyas essentially as an extension of the existing law, but are, however, of the 
opinion that by extending the law through the process of analogy does amount to the establishment of a new law. 
Therefore, the role of qiyas is characterised as a means of discovering, and perhaps developing, the existing law 
within the Islamic legal system. 
60
 See Doi ARI “The Secondary Source of Shari’ah” in Doi ARI Shari’ah The Islamic Law (1984) 64 at 70-71. 
61
 Ibid. The pro-qiyas group believe in the following narration (hadith) which is attributed to Muhammad: A 
companion of Muhammad was sent to Yemen as judge and governor. Before leaving, the companion was asked on 
what basis he would judge if confronted with a problem. The companion said that he would judge on the basis of the 
contents of the Qur’an. The following was asked: “assuming that you do not find it in the Qur’an, on what basis 
would he then judge?” The companion replied that he would then judge on the basis of the sunnah of Muhammad. 
Muhammad then asked: “assuming you do not find it in both the Qur’an and the sunnah, on what basis would the 
companion then judge?” The companion then replied that he would use his own individual judgment, and 
Muhammad was very happy to hear this statement. 
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to an appropriate rule by analogy and logical inference.62 This course of action is referred to as 
ijtihad and the jurist is in this instance referred to as a mujtihad.63 
In addition to the primary and secondary sources that are to be found in the shari’ah, a number 
of supplementary, or ancillary, sources are also recognised. These include: (a) custom; (b) 
juristic writings and rulings; and (c) judicial contribution.64 Whereas consensus has been reached 
that custom has its origin in pre-Islamic Arabia which has filtered down as a source into Islam,65 
juristic writings and rulings would include explanations on the Qur’an and the sunnah. Judicial 
contribution as a source of Islamic law would include the contribution of jurists rather than 
judges.66 
But Coulsen rightly cautions that the Qur’an and the sunnah, taken together, by no means 
constitute a comprehensive code of law.67 On the basis of their content and the fact that both the 
Qur’an and the sunnah contain a collection of piecemeal rulings on particular issues covering a 
wide variety of different topics, one would be hard pressed to conclude that these two sources of 
Islamic law represent a substantial corpus juris.68 
The nature and particular objectives of Islamic jurisprudence will be examined next. 
2.2.3 Nature and objectives of Islamic law 
As pointed out above, the meaning of Islam at its core is “total submission” or “surrender” which 
implies that a person who refers to him or herself as a Muslim must surrender to the will of 
 
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 See Gokul R, Benhard NM, Du Plessis W, Goolam NMI and Heyns MF “General Foundations” in Rautenbach 
CR and Goolam NMI (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Part II – Religious Legal Systems 
(2002) 1 at 17. 
63
 Ibid. The term mujtihad is used to refer to a person who is capable of exertion or initiative in legal thought.  
64
 See, in particular, Gokul R, Benhard NM, Du Plessis W, Goolam NMI and Heyns MF “General Foundations” in 
Rautenbach CR and Goolam NMI (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Part II – Religious Legal 
Systems (2002) 1 at 17. 
65
 See Kamali MH “Custom” in Kamali MH Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: Introduction (1991) 281 at 281-
282. Kamali describes custom, in its primary sense, as the known as opposed to the unknown; as the familiar and 
customary as opposed to the unfamiliar and strange. Custom could thus rightly be described as “that which is 
known”. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 See Coulsen NJ “Revelation and Reason” in Coulsen NJ Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (1969) 3 
at 4-6. 
68
 Ibid. 
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Allah.69 Islamic law, according to the classical theory, is the command of Allah as revealed to 
Muhammad70 and thus is regarded by many scholars and jurists as divine law. It could be argued 
that Islamic law is unique in the sense that it has completely matured from religion. Although 
there may exist a complete separation of religion and law in other jurisdictions, in Islam there is 
no separation between the religion of Islam and the concept of Islamic law.71 It may be argued 
that in the Western tradition, the law extracts its authority from the will of man and from his 
moral consciousness. In addition, law seeks to uphold norms, values and conduct which society 
prescribes, being the majority, and these norms, values and conduct thus change as society 
evolves.  
The opposite applies to the religion of Islam. Religious law guides the lives of all Muslims in all 
spheres.72 Therefore, the very nature of Islamic law is indissolubly intertwined with a belief 
system and the moral values espoused in Islam. All Muslims accordingly believe that any 
transgression of Islamic law is not only a sin, but constitutes a crime also. All of this proceeds 
from an acceptance of the Qur’an as the literal word (ipsissima verba) of Allah, coupled with the 
narrations of Muhammad, thereby constituting the primary sources of Islamic law.  
Muslehuddin aptly explains the nature of Islam as follows:  
“[i]t is a divinely ordained system preceding the Islamic State and not preceding it, controlling the Islamic State and 
not controlled by it”.73 
Therefore, in an Islamic state, Allah would be sovereign and in Him would vest absolute power 
and authority. The opening chapter of the Qur’an is indicative of the “Oneness of Allah” and 
states the following:  
“Praise be to Allah, The Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds, Most Gracious, Most Merciful, Master of the Day of 
Judgment, Thee do we worship, And thine aid we seek, Show us the straight way”.74 
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 See Gokul R, Benhard NM, Du Plessis W, Goolam NMI and Heyns MF “General Foundations” in Rautenbach 
CR and Goolam NMI (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Part II – Religious Legal Systems 
(2002) 1 at 14-15. 
70
 See Muslehuddin M “Distinctive Features of Islamic Law” in Muslehuddin M Philosophy of Islamic Law and the 
Orientalist: A Comparative Study of Islamic Legal System (1985) 55 at 55. 
71
 See Okoye UN “Women’s Rights under the Shar’a: A Flawed Application of the Doctrine of ‘Separate but 
Equal’” (2007) 27 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 103 at 104 at 105. 
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 Ibid. 
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 See Muslehuddin M “Distinctive Features of Islamic Law” in Muslehuddin M Philosophy of Islamic Law and the 
Orientalists: A Comparative Study of Islamic Legal Systems (1985) 54 at 55. 
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The opening chapter of the Qur’an is significant in the lives of all Muslims as must be recited by 
all in their obligatory five daily prayers. By virtue of the continual recital of the opening chapter 
of the Qur’an, Muslims are thus reminded of the “Oneness or Greatness of Allah”.  
The primary objective of Islamic law is to promote that which is beneficial to the community and 
prohibit that which is deemed harmful.75 In similar vein, Islamic law promotes three primary 
values, namely educating the individual, establishing justice and promoting the interest of the 
public.76 
Ibn Qayyim al Jawziyyah, a fourteenth century Islamic jurist, thus explains the nature and 
objectives of Islamic law as follows: 
“[s]haria embraces justices, kindness, the common good and wisdom. Any rule that departs from justice to injustice, 
from kindness to harshness, from the common good to harm or from rationality to absurdity cannot be part of Sharia, 
even if it is arrived at through individual interpretation”.77 
The following Qur’anic injunction, the first to be revealed to Muhammad,78 demonstrates the 
importance of educating the individual:  
“Read in the name of your Lord”.79 
The notion of education is wide enough to include knowledge and thus the terms are used 
interchangeably to denote the general intellectual enhancement of the human being.    
Chapter 4 verse 58 in the Qur’an explains the concept of justice as follows:  
“Allah doth command you To render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due; And when ye judge between 
man, That ye judge with justice”.80 
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 See Yusuf Ali A “Sura I” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 13 at 14-15. 
Sura1 is the opening chapter and is also referred to as the “Essence of the Book”. A further importance of Chapter 1 
is that it spells out the attributes of Allah. 
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 See Yakub A I “The Islamic Roots of Democracy” (2004) 12 University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review 269 at 288-289. 
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 See, in particular, Bernhard NM, du Plessis, Gokul R, Goolam NMI, Heyns and Rautenbach C “Religious Legal 
Systems: General Foundations” in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and Goolam NMI (eds) 3ed Introduction to Legal 
Pluralism in South Africa (2010) 215 at 232-233. 
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 See, in particular, Arshad R “Sharia Law” in Arshad R Islamic Family Law (2010) 15 at 15. 
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 See Abdal-Haqq I “Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and Elements” in Ramadan HM (ed) Understanding 
Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary (2006) 1 at 9. 
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 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter XCVI” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 
1764 at 1764. 
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 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter IV verse 58” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary 
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The application of justice is also found in Chapter 6 verse 152 which reads:  
“And come not nigh to the orphans property, Except to improve it, until her attains age of full strength; give measure 
and weight with (full) justice”.81 
The concept of justice runs like a golden thread through the Qur’an. In Chapter 4, titled “The 
Women”, the issue of justice covers a range of aspects such as marriage, divorce, property rights 
(including the property of orphans), succession and the conduct of the individual.82 The issue of 
conduct does not only refer to a person’s behaviour towards others in concluding business 
transactions, but also refers to the issuing of legal decrees within the community, or, more 
generally, the dispensing of justice. 
The basic legal ideas and concepts in Islamic thought will be examined next.  
2.3 Basic Legal Ideas and Concepts in Islamic Thought  
As pointed out above, shari’ah law controls every aspect of a Muslim’s life and thus permeates 
all spheres of law. In states where Muslims are not a majority they are compelled to adhere to the 
jurisdiction of the state in which they live, and thus the only aspect of Islamic law which is 
practiced relates to the personal sphere or family law. It is this part of Islamic law which 
engenders the most criticism and is regarded as the most oppressive to women. The position in 
traditional Islamic societies is that while women are restricted to the private domain, men enjoy 
an unhindered freedom to engage in all spheres of society, law and politics.83 
Islam seems to have (unavoidably) incorporated many of the customs of ancient Arabia. Yet the 
Qur’an and the teachings of Muhammad have significantly improved the status of Muslim 
women. The Qur’an, in particular, was regarded as revolutionary in addressing the plight of 
women when compared to the oppressive treatment of women found in the foundational texts of 
other religions that developed during the same period as Islam.84 The Qur’an, for example, states 
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 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter VI” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 288 at 
335. 
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 See, in particular, Yusuf Ali A “Chapter IV” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary 
(1938) 178 at 178. 
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 See Entelis J “International Human Rights: Islam’s Friend or Foe? Algeria as an Example of the Compatibility of 
International Human Rights Regarding Women’s Equality and Islamic Law” (1997) 20 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1251 at 1268. 
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that women have rights that are, at least theoretically, equal in nature to the rights enjoyed by 
men. It is not correct, therefore, to allege that Islam, as such, oppresses women and refuses to 
recognise their rights.85 The Qur’an contains an entire chapter on issues affecting women, 
including the rules regarding marriage and divorce, the number of wives to which the man is 
entitled, the principles governing inheritance, the evidence required to prove adultery and the 
honour of women. Yet Blenkhorn rightly points out that the Qur’an does not accord Muslim 
women the type of rights that most Western jurisdictions would.86 To its credit, the Qur’an 
admonishes men who oppress or who ill-treat women as follows:  
“O you who believe! You are forbidden to inherit against their will. Nor should you treat them with harshness, that 
you take away part of the dowry you have given them – except when they have become guilty of lewdness. On  the 
contrary live with them on a equal footing of kindness and equity. If you take a dislike to them, it may that you 
dislike something and Allah will bring about it a great deal of good”.87 
And yet very little meaningful change has occurred in the area of Islamic family law since the 
early part of the tenth century CE. The reason for this stagnation could be attributed to the rise of 
religious fundamentalism with the result that any attempt at feminist reform is accordingly 
regarded as anti-Islam. Any type of reform in Islamic states is either stalled or derailed on the 
basis that this will lead to the destruction of the family, which is regarded as the core of Muslim 
communities, and the basic tenets of Islam.88 This sadly shows that unwavering patriarchal 
cultural and religious forces remain firmly entrenched.89 
The basic concepts of duty, honour, equality and human dignity in Islamic jurisprudence, as 
these relate to the situation of women, will be explored next. 
2.3.1 Duty 
Rights and duties are correlative in nature. This means that an individual cannot have a right 
without a corresponding duty, and similarly, there can be no duty without a right related to it. In 
Islam there is no difference between men and women in so far as it relates to their relationship 
 
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86
 See Blenkhorn LE “Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials 
and Their Effect on Muslim Women” (2002) 76 Southern California Law Review 189 at 192-193. 
87
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with Allah. In Islam both women and men are promised a reward for good conduct and the same 
punishment for committing wrongful acts.90 Therefore, the duty that is owed to Allah is exactly 
the same irrespective of whether the believer is male or female. No distinction is made between 
the two sexes. However, the concept of a duty has become a contentious issue in the field of 
family law, especially in respect of marriage and divorce. The role of a duty is displayed in the 
following Qur’anic verse which reads:  
“And for women are rights over men similar to those of men over women”.91 
Goolam correctly finds the above verse to be related to the question of divorce, but also points 
out that the verse may be interpreted to extend to other areas concerning female and male 
relations.92 The verse thus encapsulates rights and duties which either spouse is entitled to. The 
verse continues and states:  
“But men have a degree (Of advantage) over them. And Allah is Exalted in Power, Wise”.93 
This verse has created a great deal of confusion and debate from Western scholars as it could be 
interpreted to mean that men are superior to women, or that women are inferior to men. This is 
not, however, the case as Doi explains: 
“[t]he Shari’ah regards women as the spiritual and intellectual equals to men. The main distinction it makes between 
them is in a physical realm based on the equitable principle of fair division of labour. It allots the more strenuous 
work to man and makes him responsible for the maintenance of the family. It allots the work of managing the home 
and the upbringing and training of children to the women, work which has the greatest importance in the task of 
building a healthy and prosperous family”.94 
The husband and the wife enjoy equal social and legal rights within an Islamic union. However, 
their duties to each other reflect a type of functional distribution between the partners. It could 
thus be said that within an Islamic framework there exists marked differences between men and 
women. The differences that exist must be assessed in relation to the fields of work that they do 
as well as to their biological and psychological differences. Blenkhorn thus rightly concludes that 
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91
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although both partners are equal, they are not deemed to be similar in so far as Islamic law is 
concerned. 
Countless verses in the Qur’an corroborate this difference. Chapter 3 verse 36, for example, 
reads:   
“When she was delivered, she said: ‘Oh my Lord! Behold! I am delivered of a female child!’ And Allah knew best 
what she had brought forth “And nowise is the male like the female.”95 
The above could suggest discrimination, yet in an Islamic context there exists no difference 
between believers. To this end, Chapter 3 verse 195 expressly states that:  
 “Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, Be he male or female: Ye are members, one of another”.96 
On the basis of these few verses Muslims believe that Allah created women and men as equal 
contributors in the praising of Allah. Therefore, the duty that is owed to Allah is the same for 
both men and women, and any form of gender discrimination or oppression of the female gender 
is considered to a significant offence in terms of Islamic law.97 
In Islam the concept of duty specifically relates to, and impacts upon, marriage, maintenance and 
divorce. Since celibacy is discouraged and marriage is encouraged in Islam,98 men and women 
have a duty to each other to enter the bounds of marriage. The four schools of Islamic thought 
are unanimous that marriage is obligatory and recommendable for a male, who can support a 
family, and for a woman. A man who is not able to support a wife, or suffers from a serious 
illness, or possesses no sexual desire at all is under no compulsion to marry.99 As marriage is a 
duty on all Muslim males, there is no prohibition on a woman to propose marriage to a male. 
As far as the marriage contract is concerned, there must be an offer (ijab) and acceptance 
(kabul). There is accordingly a duty on the male and the female has a reciprocal duty. The duty 
of the male is to offer marriage and the female can elect to accept or refuse.  
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In the case of maintenance, the word nafaqah (or nafqah) refers to the duty of the husband to 
maintain the wife during marriage. Maintenance is considered to be the lawful right of the wife 
under a valid contract of marriage. It is understood according to the teachings of Islam, and 
especially the Qur’an and the sunnah, that the husband is responsible for the upkeep of the wife 
and children and this would include food, clothing, toiletries and other essential services. Where 
the wife is of a particular social standing, maintenance is still compulsory on the husband.100 The 
Qur’an expressly provides that:  
“Let no man of means spend according to his means and the man whose resources are restricted, let him spend 
according to what Allah has given him. Allah puts no burden on any person beyond what he has given him. After 
difficulty, Allah will soon grant him relief”.101 
In the case of divorce, Chapter 2 verse 229 of the Qur’an instructs:  
 “The parties should either hold Together on equitable terms Or separate with kindness”.102 
Although Islamic law has always recognised the right of the husband or wife to proceed with a 
divorce action, both the Qur’an and the sunnah have laid down strict requirements which must 
be followed by both parties. Divorce is, in fact, frowned upon by the Qur’an and the sunnah. In 
the words of Muhammad:  
 “That nothing is more hated in the sight of God than divorce”.103 
He further said:  
“Marry and do not divorce, undoubtedly the Throne of the Beneficient Lord (Allah, shakes due to               
Divorce)”.   
Where there is friction between the husband and the wife, there is a duty on both parties to resort 
to arbitration or mediation by relatives in order to mend the marriage. The Qur’an stipulates that:   
“If you fear a breach between them twain, Appoint two arbiters, one from his family and the others from hers; If 
they wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation: For Allah hath full knowledge and is acquainted with all 
things”. 104 
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Should reconciliation fail and the couple cannot reconcile, then in terms of Islamic law the 
parties should separate. 
2.3.2 Honour  
One of the ways in which honour is bestowed upon women in Islam is through marriage. 
However, the situation that existed before Islam in terms of the marriage contract was one of 
sale. The wife became the object or the property of the husband once negotiations were 
concluded between the males of the various tribes.105 The wife’s tribe relinquished all rights to 
her including her children. In return her tribe received a price or gift. Marriage thus resembled a 
contract of exchange with the wife receiving no benefit as the object of exchange. The Qur’an 
highlights that:  
“When news is brought to one of them of (the birth of) a female (child), his face darkens, and he is filled with 
inward grief! With shame does he hide himself from his people because of the bad news he had! Shall he retain it 
(on sufferance and contempt), or bury it in the dust? Ah! What an evil (choice) they decide on”.106 
Some of the pagan Arab tribes regarded female children as evil, as is evident from the above 
Qur’anic verse.107 In addition, due to ongoing conflicts between tribes, sons were regarded as a 
source of strength. Males would procreate and strengthen the tribe and in this way the bloodline 
would continue. Islam introduced a radical transformation by creating a shift from blood kinship 
to fellowship, from loyalty to a particular tribe to that of the extended family of believers or 
fellow Muslims. The idea of the tribe being all encompassing was abolished and the family unit 
became the new social structure. This new idea of a family unit meant recognition not only of 
male rights, but also for the rights of the female.108 
It could well be argued that Islam, at its very beginning, afforded women significant rights. The 
Qur’an is implicit in the rights afforded to women and there is abundant proof detailed in the 
Qur’an and the narrations of Muhammad that women were to be accorded a high status within 
Islamic society. Western cites the following narration of Muhammad as a case in point:  
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“it has been reported that Mu’aviyahibn Jahimah, came to the Prophet, and said, O Messenger of Allah! I intend that 
I should enlist in the fighting force and I have come to consult thee. The prophet said: Hast thou a mother? He 
replied, Yes. The prophet said: Then stick to her, for paradise is beneath her two feet”.109 
Both the status and general treatment of women are held in high regard and is often equated with 
the notion of paradise. This means that if women or mothers are not treated with honour and 
respect by children, husbands and the male community, the latter will certainly not enter 
paradise. A further narration exemplifies the status of women in Islam:  
“Abu Hurairah reported that a man asked the Messenger of Allah as to who amongst his near ones has the greatest 
rights of him. The Prophet replied: Your mother. He asked, Then who is next? The prophet replied: Your mother. He 
asked again, Then who is next? The Prophet replied: Your mother. He asked again, Then who is next? The prophet 
replied: Your father. (Agreed upon)”.110 
It was during the time when men were proclaiming patriarchy as an absolute order that 
Muhammad indicated that women, especially mothers, were to be esteemed above the patriarchal 
order. The husband or the father was to follow after the wife or the mother in terms of reverence. 
This honour to be bestowed upon women was exceptional at the time, bearing in mind that 
women were treated as chattel.111 What is truly astounding was the fact that a man of God was 
preaching and proclaiming that the honour and dignity of women were to a degree higher than 
that of men. 
2.3.3 Equality  
As far as the relationship between Allah and his servants is concerned, no differentiation is made 
between the sexes. Both sexes are rewarded for good behaviour, and both are promised the same 
punishment when sin is being committed. The Qur’an explicitly states:  
“And for women are rights over men similar to those of men over women”.112  
There are various verses in the Qur’an which expressly testify to the fact that equality between 
men and women is indeed recognised. Also in terms of religious and spiritual duties men and 
women are addressed equally. The Qur’an clearly states:  
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“For Muslim men and women - For believing men and women, For devout men and women, For true men and 
women, For men and women who are patient, For men and women who humble themselves, For men and women 
who give charity, For men and women who fast (and deny themselves), For men and women who guard their 
chastity, And for men and women who engage much in Allah’s praise - for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and 
a great reward”.113 
Women’s rights in pre-Islamic Arabia were non-existent as they were controlled by their fathers 
and other male relatives. Therefore, if the father was deceased the control would be taken over 
by the older brother. In terms of marriage, the woman had no choice at either the inception or 
termination of the relationship. A further inequality existed in the husband’s right of unlimited 
polygyny which rested solely on the male’s ability to capture or purchase females. 114 
With the introduction of Islam a number of singular changes occurred which improved the status 
of women significantly. Marriage was now regarded as a contract between the parties and, as 
such, had to be in writing. The parties thus had to consent to their union, consisting of an offer 
(ijab) and acceptance (qabul), being formalised in a written contract.115 
Under Islamic law the concept of coverture does not exist. Therefore, a Muslim woman does not 
lose her legal identity upon the conclusion of the marriage. Furthermore, the concept of 
community of property or marital property is foreign to Islam. Should any property be acquired 
by the parties during the subsistence of the marriage, the person who acquired the property is the 
owner thereof. In the event that the marriage dissolves, each party retains the property he or she 
brought or acquired during the course of the marriage.116 
In so far as divorce is concerned, Islamic law does allow for the dissolution of marriage when the 
spouses reach the point of incompatibility. Therefore, the right to divorce within an Islamic 
context extends to both the husband and the wife and a number of methods exist through which a 
Muslim woman can obtain a divorce at her request.117  
2.3.4 Human dignity 
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The right to human dignity proceeds from the assumption that the dignity of all persons must be 
respected by virtue of their membership to humanity.118 During the lifetime of Muhammad 
women were actively involved in all spheres and in all aspects of society. Women were thus not 
perceived as dependant individuals.119 Their involvement spanned diverse areas of society such 
as business, literature, law, religion and even included active engagement in warfare.120 It has 
been reported that the wives and daughters of Muhammad were directly involved in the 
development of the religion of Islam. In addition, Muhammad, on various occasions, sought the 
counsel of his wives relating to the many challenges that came before him.121 
And yet the changes effected by Muhammad may have fallen by the wayside due to the 
misogynistic traditions and interpretations of Islamic law that arose as a form of male resistance 
to the power and active involvement of women in the public sphere during the lifetime of 
Muhammad.122 It has therefore been argued that the exclusion of women from the public domain, 
including any position that may influence the progress of Islam, may in fact have been 
intentional. For example, Ibn ‘Umar, the son of the second Caliph and a prominent scholar in 
hadith and the law, reported the following:  
“when Muhammad was alive we were cautious when speaking and dealing with our women for fear that a revelation 
would come [from God] concerning our behaviour. With the demise of Muhammad, we were free to speak and deal 
with them [more freely]”.123 
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This comment certainly provides a rare admission that certain men opposed the early Islamic 
reforms affording women greater rights. This appears to have been the case especially amongst 
men in Mecca and this included opposition to women attending public forums even during the 
lifetime of Muhammad. As a direct result, Muhammad specifically commanded men not to 
prevent women from attending prayers in the mosques which are revered as holy ground.124 Yet 
notwithstanding this express command, men continued to allow women to only attend the 
mosque for morning prayers, but not for this purpose at night. This, in turn, prompted 
Muhammad to reinterpret his command to the effect that women could attend any of the prayers, 
whether they were at night or in the morning.125 The Qur’an is succinct in dealing with the 
individuality of women. It maintains that men and women will be judged on their respective 
religious merits. The Qur’an expressly states:  
“Surely the men who submit and women who submit, and the believing men and the believing women, and obeying 
men and women, and the truthful men and the truthful women, and the patient men and the patient women, and the 
humble men and humble women, and charitable men and charitable women, and the fasting women, and the men 
who guard their chastity and women who guard their chastity, and the men who remember who remember Allah 
praise – For them Allah prepared Forgiveness and great reward”. 126 
According to this verse of the Qur’an, there seems to be no suggestion of any type of 
discrimination between men and women in any respect. Both women and men are promised 
“great reward” for their religious secular duties. This begs the question as to why modernity 
regards the position of women in Islam to be of an inferior status. In fact, to adopt such a view 
could be said to be destructive of the spirit, purport and sacredness of the Qur’an. Perhaps the 
issue could be best understood in terms of the social prejudices particular to the Muslim 
theologians of the time and that these views thus ought to be seen as a deviation from the core of 
Islam. It is from these social prejudices that traditions emerged which purported to motivate that 
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women were inferior to men, thereby engendering general contempt for women.127 Enjineer 
correctly point outs that the hadith literature is full of such instances: 
“one of these traditions or social prejudices states that a nation who has assigned a woman as its leader will never 
prosper. We find this tradition in the works of Al-Ghazzali’s Ihya al-‘Ulum, a noted scholar in Islamic jurisprudence 
and respected in world of Islam. According to another tradition reported by Bukhari, a woman is like a crooked rib: 
it will break if you try to straighten it”.128 
These traditions must not be taken as the “divine word of Allah”, and even though they have 
been reported by some of the leading scholars of Islam, there exists no guarantee of their 
authenticity. Social prejudices played a very important role in personal narrations and this also 
holds true in so far as the narrations of the scholars are concerned.129 The reforms introduced by 
Muhammad, relating to the rights of women, were radical indeed.130 
The various approaches in Islam to scriptural interpretation will be examined next. 
2.4 Islamic Approaches to Scriptural Interpretation  
The religion of Islam is regarded as the basis of Islamic or shari’ah law. The principle of 
separation between church and state is foreign to Islam, when compared to the historical position 
in Western legal and political theory.131 Islamic law advances on the basic principle of 
unconditional submission to the will of Allah. This unconditional submission is obligatory on 
both women and men alike. 
The interpretation of the Qur’an and the sunnah as a means to deduce legal rules necessitates a 
firm understanding of the language of both the Qur’an and the sunnah.132 The study and 
illustration of Islamic jurisprudence is referred to as Usul-al-Fiqah, meaning the roots or 
jurisprudence of the law.133 It has been pointed out by Moosa that the classical formulation and 
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codification of Islamic law by the various schools of thought and early jurist, such as Ibn Hanbal, 
Imam Malik, Imam Shafi and Abu Hanifa, are not canonical, but instead “man-made”.134 
Although the law in Islam is interpreted as the literal word of Allah, it is after all man(kind) that 
has to interpret and apply the law135 and has to walk on the path of  shari’ah  or, in Arabic, “a 
way to a watering place”.136 
Islamic law draws its principles from its sources, namely, the Qur’an, traditions (sunnah), 
analogy (qiyas), consensus among Muslim scholars (ijma) and independent reasoning 
(ijtihad).137 Although the Qur’an is seen as Allah’s divine word to mankind and as such is 
sacred, the traditions of Muhammad enjoy the same status. The Qur’an is observed as guidance 
(huda) and not as a code of law138 and thus the Qur’an, at its core, offers ethical guidelines. Yet 
Pearl and Menski rightly observe that some scholars, including certain Islamic states, have 
elevated the ethical guidelines contained in the Qur’an and the sunnah to the status of law and 
thus the principles or sources of Islamic law are used to supplement what the Qur’an does not 
directly set forth.139 
It is in the interpretation of the Qur’an and the sunnah where much of the divergence and 
disagreement arise amongst Islamic scholars. This has led, rather unavoidably, to a variety of 
interpretations.140 Reiss thus correctly argues that due to the various interpretations and 
application of Islamic principles, an internal form of legal pluralism has come into existence 
within Islamic law.141 And thus it could well be argued that because of the various forms of 
interpretation and application, left explicitly in the domain of men to the exclusion of women 
interpreters, the real danger arose that women were disadvantaged. In addition, texts were often 
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interpreted without taking into account the rights of women and the significant role they played 
during the time of Muhammad. 
Other approaches to scriptural interpretation also exist and these include personal reasoning 
(ijtihad) and imitation or emulation (taqlid). Although personal reasoning (ijtihad)142 too has 
been the subject of much debate, the fashionable view amongst jurist is that the gates of personal 
reasoning (ijtihad) have been closed based on the fact that all legal issues have been discussed 
and consensus reached. Yet tension between various scholars and the governing caliphs escalated 
as the ruling party wanted the views of the scholars to agree with the agenda of the present 
caliph.143 The result of this practice compelled the ruling government to create governmental 
posts for prominent scholars, which they could control, thereby curtailing the independence of 
those scholars who were seen as a threat to the government. As a consequence, the intellectual 
interaction that had previously existed and that had given prominence to (and that had 
encouraged the development of Islamic jurisprudence) resulted in a stalemate. It could thus 
rightly be said that the scholastic practice had atrophied.144 
In essence the practice of personal reasoning (ijtihad) requires the analysing of the original 
textual sources for the solution to a new problem and, in the event that no answer is provided, 
personal reasoning is evoked to extend those principles to the new problem.145 It is worth noting 
that neither the Qur’an, nor the sunnah, nor the companions of Muhammad ever closed these 
gates.146 As a result of the “closing of the gates of ijtihad” a new doctrine emerged, referred to as 
imitation or emulation (taqlid). This doctrine was to be applied specifically to solve new 
problems that arose. In religious terms, this means that the views and/or practices of a certain 
imam or of a school of law had to be followed. The effect of taqlid can be described as implicit 
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acceptance of the reigning thought on a particular issue and compelled jurist to follow legal 
doctrine that had already been recorded by the various schools of thought. Warren rightly argues 
that the “closing of the door of ijtihad” and the emergence of taqlid have caused Islamic 
jurisprudence to be inadequate to come to terms with the changing conditions of society.147 
The distinct ideological positions in Islam, together with gender sensitivity in Islamic thought, 
will be examined next. 
2.5 Ideological Positions in Islam 
2.5.1 Modernism, conservatism and fundamentalism  
The debate on women’s rights and freedoms in Islam and, in particular, the reaction to the 
Western challenge relating to the status of women, has evoked three core responses that could be 
classified as modernist, conservative and fundamentalist.148 As a consequence, scholars and 
feminist authors in Islam are divided into these three groups on the basis of their ideological 
inclination and philosophical viewpoint.149 
The modernists in Islam embrace the Western ideal of (women’s) emancipation. Proponents of 
equality argue that the general principles of the Qur’an, if properly understood, establish 
complete equality among the sexes and thus discrimination is not accepted in any form. In 
addition, they believe that the principles which are to be found in the Qur’an are similar to the 
principles which serve as a basis of international and regional human rights instruments.150 
Sisters in Islam, for example, argue that: 
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 “it is not Islam that oppresses women, but human beings with all their weakness who have failed to understand 
Allah’s intentions [who oppress women]”.151  
Sisters in Islam accordingly call for a reconstruction of Islamic principles, procedures and 
practices in light of basic Qur’anic principles of equality and justice.152 They are of the opinion 
that much of the Qur’anic reasoning stems from ideas such as tolerance, autonomy, justice, 
freedom, consultation and equality. 
In dealing with gender relations, the Qur’an states that Allah has created women and men from 
the same soul to give each other tranquillity, affection and mercy.153 Moosa correctly points out 
that Islam establishes complete equality between the sexes and that both scholars and non-
scholars have confused religious and social prejudices, thus clouding the true meaning of what 
Islam stands for.154 
Conservatives and fundamentalists, however, are of the opinion that Islam restricts the notion of 
equality as such, and thereby restrict equality to religious beliefs, such as, belief in Allah, 
prayers, charity, fasting and pilgrimage. In other words, equality is only to be found and 
interpreted within the confines of the five foundational pillars of Islam.155 Most conservatives 
defend a type of communalism that adheres to the view that different cultures construct what is 
essential to each culture in completely different ways. The conservatives, for example, reject the 
idea that the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is universally 
applicable.156 A further characteristic of the conservatives is that they do not reject human rights 
altogether, but instead attempt to redefine rights within an Islamic legal context. In addition, 
conservatives and fundamentalists contend that social issues, such as family law, for example, 
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can never change over time, in direct and stark contrast to the position adopted by the 
modernists.157 
A further distinction is to be found in the fact that modernists propagate a view based on the idea 
of “going back to the Qur’an” but “onward to modernity”. The modernist suggestion is that 
separation is required between that which is contextual as opposed to that which is normative.158 
Conservatives, by contrast, subscribe to the “scriptural inequality” of the sexes, while the 
fundamentalist adhere to a strict interpretation of the Qur’an.159 These groups are of the opinion 
that women’s rights are complementary and the issue of equality between the sexes is not 
accordingly advocated. Some scholars, such as Enjineer, are, however, of the view that the 
Qur’an supports the idea that women are to be treated equally and may not be reduced merely to 
the role of mother, wife or daughter.160 
In spite of fundamental differences there does exist agreement that the Qur’an and hadith serve 
as the primary sources within an Islamic legal framework.161 And yet the fundamentalist hold the 
view that the primary sources must be interpreted as they were thousands of years ago, thereby 
excluding all other forms of understanding or interpretations. The modernists, by contrast, strive 
to derive principles from those sources which could be applied to the realities of current human 
behaviour. In addition, the conservative community (ulamma), which in a sense is typically 
hostile to any form of change, advocates that Islam is in itself liberating and therefore precludes 
the need to engage in other type of discourse relating to (women’s) liberation.162 Although it 
could well be argued that Islam, in its pure form, (i.e. as propagated by Muhammad and his 
companions) is liberating, the same cannot be said of the version(s) delivered by clerics who 
possess social bias. One will be hard pressed to argue that the latter versions can offer solutions 
to specific problems such as discrimination against women or to the liberation of women within 
an Islamic legal framework. According to one of Islam’s leading feminist scholars, Zainab al-
 
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Ghazali, a law is deemed to be in the public interest if it is in agreement with the spirit of the 
law.163 However, should a choice arise between two interpretations relating to the sacred texts, 
the preferred choice is that which is less prejudicial to society. Therefore, the protection of life, 
property and liberty must be observed as divinely inspired aims of the Qur’an and the behaviour 
of Muhammad164 and, as such, must constitute the philosophical foundation for the advancement 
of women’s liberation. 
2.5.2 Gender sensitivity in Islamic thought  
It has been argued that the realisation of the rights of women was one of the main aims that Islam 
tried to alleviate and, to this end, Pearl points out that the second major reform of the Qur’an 
occurred in the sphere of family law.165 Scholars regard the fact that the wife of Muhammad was 
not only the first to convert to Islam, but was also the first person to whom the first revelation 
was conveyed, as significant.166 
The Qur’an regards both Adam and Eve as jointly responsible for being expelled from the 
Garden of Eden due to their joint disobedience to Allah. And as a consequence, both received 
forgiveness.167 In the words of the Qur’an: 
“In the result, they both ate of the tree, and so their nakedness appeared to them: they began to sew together, for 
their covering, leaves from the garden: thus did Adam disobey His Lord, and allow himself to be seduced”.168 
The contention that women can be described as evil and that they will lead men astray cannot, 
therefore, be supported. Gender sensitivity is thus commanded and this explains why 
Muhammad sought to transform the status of women from being mere chattel to a person in her 
own right. But since Muhammad’s sole purpose was to preach what was revealed to him and 
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nothing more, gender sensitivity can only be understood to originate from the Holy Texts as 
required by Allah.169 
A further example that women were accorded an elevated position in Islam is to be found in an 
often quoted narration of Muhammad:  
“ Mu’aviyahibn Jahima reported, Jahima came to the Prophet, and said, O Messenger of Allah! I intended that I 
should enlist in the fighting force and I have come to consult thee. The Prophet said: Hast thou a mother? He said, 
Yes, then stick to her, for paradise is beneath her feet”.170 
Women are to be considered only in the highest regard in Islam, not only as mothers, wives or 
daughters, but as women in and of themselves.171 
The four dominant schools of Islamic thought will be examined next. 
2.6     Dominant Schools of Islamic Thought  
Before the codification of laws, religious scholars referred to as qdis (judges) assumed 
jurisdiction in a small area of law.172 The jurisdiction of these qdis was mainly of force in areas 
of family law and succession.173 In addition to the primary sources found in Islam, family 
disputes were adjudicated according to the doctrines of one of the four dominant schools. These 
schools are, in chronological order, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’ and Hanbali.174 
It is generally accepted that there exist two prominent sects in Islamic jurisprudence, namely the 
sunni and shia. The sunni school, in particular, emerged during the fourth stage of the 
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development of Islamic law.175 Muslims usually follow the tenets of the school to which their 
parents subscribe and yet there exists significant flexibility to abandon the jurisprudence of their 
primary school and to follow the opinion of another school. This occurs where the other school’s 
point of view is deemed superior, or is believed to render more assistance than the first, in 
resolving a particular dispute or legal question.176 This understanding is helpful in appreciating 
the different approaches to scriptural interpretation of the Qur’an. Although the four primary 
schools agree on the fundamental principles of Islam, there are significant differences to be 
found on issues of theology.177 
A brief overview of the four primary schools follows in the paragraphs below. This overview is 
intended to provide the theoretical premise for a critical assessment of the schools towards the 
end of this chapter. The objective of the critical assessment is to ascertain which school (or 
schools) will be best suited to support arguments for the recognition of women’s fundamental 
rights and freedoms pertaining to marriage and divorce against the backdrop of the chosen 
comparative framework and the South African legal and constitutional orders. 
The overview of the four schools will only centre upon the requirements for marriage, the issue 
of polygyny and the question of guardianship as this relates to marriage. By contrast, the position 
of each of the schools relating to divorce will be limited to the types of divorce as well as the 
grounds of divorce available to the wife. 
2.6.1 Hanafi school 
The Hanafi school is deemed to be the first of the four dominant schools situated within sunni 
Islam.178 The school is named after its founder Abu Hanifa an-Nu’man bin Thabit,179and 
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although this was the first school to be established, it is interesting to note that this only occurred 
after the death of the scholar.180 
2.6.1.1 Requirements for marriage  
The term nikah literally means “joining together”. However, in a technical sense the term nikah 
refers to marriage.181 Classical jurists, such as the Hanafi school, interpret marriage in isolation 
to mean sexual intercourse.182 The purpose of the Islamic marriage contract is to regulate 
relations between the sexes and this encompasses the lawful entitlements of each party,183 
including the social relations affecting both of them in terms of their mutual and social 
responsibilities.184 This view of marriage seems to be the most widely accepted by the 
scholars.185 
It is generally agreed that an adult male of sound mind has the capacity to contract his own 
marriage. By contrast, only a divorced or widowed woman is entitled to contract her own 
marriage.186 
A marriage contract is constituted by proposal and acceptance.187 Furthermore, the proposal and 
acceptance can be in written or in oral form. However, it is desirable that the marriage contract 
be in written form as to eradicate any misunderstandings which may arise in the future. 
The parties must possess legal capacity to conclude a valid marital contract.188 Factors such as 
legal incapacity, minority and insanity may stain the validity of the marriage contract.189 A girl is 
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considered an adult when she starts to menstruate.190 There exists a presumption in Islam that 
puberty may be reached at fifteen years of age, but evidence can, however, be adduced that it 
may be reached sooner.191 The minimum age would appear to be twelve years in the case of 
males and nine years for females.192 The Hanafi school maintains that in the case of non-
menstruation or in the absence of any other evidence relating to her puberty, the age of majority 
would be set at the age of sixteen.193 
A further condition for the validity of the marriage is the consent of the parties. A marriage 
without consent is deemed to be invalid. According to the Hanafi school, the guardian cannot 
compel the woman to enter into a marriage contract. Furthermore, the marriage contract of an 
adult woman, irrespective of whether she is a virgin, divorced or widowed, without her consent 
or against her will made at the instance of the father or grandfather cannot take place.194 
The issue of whether or not witnesses should be present is another significant aspect of Islamic 
marriage. There appears to be three considerations which should be noted. These are the 
presence of witnesses, the number of witnesses and, lastly, the eligibility or competency of the 
witnesses to hear the evidence of proposal and acceptance. The Hanafi school holds that the 
presence of witnesses is an essential requirement.195 The presence of witnesses will ensure that 
the marriage is not concluded in secret. In dealing with the number of witnesses, this school 
requires the presence of two males or one male and two females. The witnesses should hear both 
the proposal and acceptance at the time of marriage. In dealing with the eligibility of witnesses 
there seems to consensus that the witnesses should be free citizens, sane, adults and Muslim.196 
The four primary schools of thought situated within sunni jurisprudence all acknowledge the 
practice of polygyny, i.e. the legal entitlement of a husband to be married to more than one wife 
simultaneously. The four schools are furthermore all in agreement that the authority for the 
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husband to be married to more than one wife at a time is to be found in the primary sources of 
Islam,197 and thus no divergence of opinion exists in the jurisprudence of the four dominant 
schools of Islamic thought in so far as the practice of polygyny is concerned. 
2.6.1.2 Guardianship  
The Hanafi school holds the general view that only a male person, who is a relative of the ward, 
can act as a guardian. The guardian must be a person who is an agnate or residuary (‘asbah-
binafsih) in his own right.198 Where there is no ‘asbah, the uterine relation through the mother 
(dhawil-arhm), shall have the right of contracting the minor into marriage. Where there are no 
relatives of the ward, the judge (qdi) has similar rights to that of parents. However, these rights 
have to be conferred onto the judge by the state, failing which the right of guardianship to 
contract the marriage of the ward would reside in the state.199 
Difference of opinion exists about the capacity of an adult virgin who is of sound mind to enter 
into marriage. The Hanafi school holds the view that a virgin who has reached the age of 
majority, or a divorced or widowed woman can contract her own marriage, even in instance 
where the husband is not her social equal. However, in the event that the husband is not her 
social equal, the guardian has the right of raising an objection to the marriage and shall have 
recourse to the court to have the marriage rescinded.  
2.6.1.3 Types of divorce  
The Hanafi school defines divorce as an act of terminating the bond created by the marriage 
contract by express or implied words or by any other means such as, for example, by qadi 
decree. Generally, divorce at the instance of the wife has always been portrayed as extremely 
onerous.200 This could be particularly true for the Hanafi school which seems to hold the most 
restrictive views in this regard.201 This school is of the opinion that divorce will be effective even 
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if the words are uttered in jest or in sport, or in a state of drunkenness or under compulsion.202 
When divorce is pronounced orally, this school deems it desirable to have two witnesses 
present.203 
The talaq al-tafwid, also referred to as a delegated divorce, is at the disposal of the wife. The 
“delegation of the right to divorce”204 occurs when the husband hands over to the wife the 
capacity to act as the husband’s delegate in pronouncing divorce to the wife.  The Hanafi school 
is of the opinion that once the power to delegate has been confirmed it cannot be revoked or 
taken away.  
Divorce can also be effected by the mutual agreement of the parties to the marriage contract. 
This form of divorce is referred to as khul and mubarat.205 In terms of Islamic law the term khul 
means that the husband may accept compensation from the wife and renounces his rights and 
authority under the marriage contract. The Hanafi school accepts this type of divorce, which is at 
the wife’s request, as perfectly valid.206 By contrast, Pearl and Menski argue that the wife cannot 
insist on such a type of divorce as the husband must first pronounce the talaq and, therefore, the 
divorce is in fact based on an agreement by mutual consent, commonly referred to as khul.207 
When the aversion is mutual and both parties contemplate separation, the termination of the 
marriage bond is known as mubarat. While in the case of a mubarat divorce the aversion is to be 
mutual, in instances of a khul divorce the aversion is on the wife’s side and is concluded by way 
of an offer by the wife accepted by the husband.208 The offer of termination may originate from 
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either of the parties, and as soon as the offer has been accepted, the dissolution is terminated. In 
such cases no court is involved as the matter is settled by agreement between the parties.209 
A further type of divorce available to the wife is a judicial divorce, known as tafriq. In terms of 
this type of divorce the husband or the wife may bring a suit for a judicial separation.210 Under 
judicial separation two types of divorce exists, namely li’an and faskh. The term faskh denotes 
the formal rescission of a Muslim marriage.211 In terms of the Hanafi school, faskh seems to be 
the only ground upon which a woman can achieve judicial termination of the marriage if she can 
prove to the court that her husband is incapable of consummating the marriage.212 In addition, 
this schools comments that if the wife finds in her husband a physical defect or disease that 
hampers sexual intercourse, the wife will be entitled to have the marriage dissolved.213 
2.6.2 Maliki school 
The Maliki school, founded by Malik bin Anas,214was the second distinct school in Islam to 
become established.215 Malik bin Anas appreciated the legitimate diversity of the various schools 
of thought and refused to lay claim to correct jurisprudence.216 It is reported that when the Caliph 
al-Mansur requested that the Maliki school of thought be imposed on the entire Muslim 
community, the scholar refused and instead advanced the validity of the views of his 
predecessors.217 
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2.6.2.1 Requirements for marriage  
According to the Maliki school of thought, five requirements for marriage must be observed, 
namely: (a) the guardian must give his consent to the marriage; (b) the bridegroom must be 
competent to enter into marriage; (c) the bride must also be competent to marry and should not 
be in state of iddah (waiting period)218 nor in a state of ihram (performing the pilgrimage or 
visiting the holy shrines of Islam); and (d) there should be sighah, i.e. ijab (the proposal) and 
qabul (the acceptance); and (e) the dowry must be agreed upon.219 
In so far as the issue of witnesses is concerned, the Maliki school holds the view that the 
presence of witnesses is not an essential condition for the validity of a marriage.220 However, the 
marriage must be duly publicised and as a consequence, the Maliki school prescribes the beating 
of drums as a means to announce the marriage.221 
2.6.2.2 Guardianship 
There seems to be consensus amongst the various schools that an adult male of sound mind is 
entitled to contract his own marriage. Similarly, a woman who has experienced married life and 
who is divorced or widowed may contract in her own right.222 Differences of opinion are, 
however, to be found amongst the schools of thought in so far as the capacity is concerned of an 
adult virgin, who is of sound mind, to contract her own marriage. The Maliki school holds the 
view that such a female cannot contract her own marriage without the intervention of the 
guardian.223 By contrast, in the case of a divorced or widowed woman, the Maliki school argues 
that the guardian has no compulsion or imperative authority to act on behalf of such a woman.   
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2.6.2.3 Types of divorce  
The intention to divorce, which is the husband’s unilateral right, can be given either orally or in 
writing.224 The Maliki school is of the opinion that the presence of two witnesses at the time of 
oral revocation is, however, desirable. Although there is no prescribed formula for the utterance 
of a divorce, the words used must expressly convey the intention of the husband, namely that he 
wishes to dissolve the marriage.225 In addition, any divorce pronounced by the husband without 
the proper intention (such as, for example, being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or 
being in a state of extreme anger, or by way of jest, or merely to please somebody) or in the 
absence of free choice (where there is, for example, a threat to his life or property) is regarded as 
invalid.226 
The Maliki school recognises four types of divorce at the request of the wife, namely: (a) 
delegated divorce (talaq al-tafwid); (b) khul; (c) mubarat; and (d) formal judicial rescission.227 
Six grounds are recognised upon which the wife may institute divorce proceedings. These 
include (a) physical and mental defects on the part of the husband; (b) the (wilful) failure and/or 
refusal to maintain the wife during the marriage; (c) desertion for more than six months without 
cause; (d) absence for more than one year for whatever reason; (e) ill-treatment (dara); and (f) 
failure to comply with certain conditions as stipulated in the marital contract.228 
Of particular importance is the Maliki school’s understanding of the nature of a decree of divorce 
granted to the wife. The decree of divorce granted to the wife is, in fact, seen as a way of 
exercising the husband’s right of talaq, thereby continuing the husband’s exclusive right to 
repudiate the wife.229 Pearl correctly points out that the Maliki school is the only school which 
allows a divorce to take place on the basis of cruelty and/or ill-treatment by the husband.230 
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2.6.3 Shafi’i school   
The Shafi’i school was founded by Muhammad Idris Al-Shafi’i231 who studied both under the 
tutelage of Malik as well as the teachings of the Hanafi school of thought. The Shafi’i school was 
the third school to be established in sunni Islam.232 
2.6.3.1 Requirements for marriage   
The Shafi’i school does not recognise the validity of divorce when it is pronounced in ignorance 
of the meaning of the words uttered by the husband.233 According to the Shafi’i school of 
thought, five requirements for marriage must be observed, namely: (a) the guardian must give his 
consent to the marriage; (b) the bridegroom must be competent to enter into marriage; (c) the 
bride must also be competent to marry and should not be in the waiting period (iddah) nor be 
performing the pilgrimage or visiting the holy shrines of Islam (ihram); (d) there should be 
sighah, i.e. a proposal (ijab) and acceptance (qabul); and (e) the dowry must be agreed upon.234 
In so far as witnesses are concerned, the Shafi’i school is of the opinion that the presence of 
witnesses is an essential condition for the validity of a marriage.235 
2.6.3.2 Guardianship 
The Shafi’i school holds the view that an adult virgin, who is of sound mind, cannot contract her 
own marriage without the intervention of a guardian.236 However, in the case of a divorced or 
widowed woman, the guardian has no right of compulsion or imperative authority to act on 
behalf of such a woman. 
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2.6.3.2 Types of divorce  
The pronouncement of divorce must be made by a person who is an adult and who is of sound 
mind. In addition, the Shafi’i school holds the view that divorce pronounced under compulsion 
holds no effect.237 Opinion is divided, however, regarding witnesses at the time of the 
pronouncement of divorce. While the first view is that the presence of witnesses at the time of 
divorce and oral revocation is desirable, the second view deems it incumbent. The first view 
appears to be accepted as the final verdict.238 In situations where divorce is pronounced in a state 
of (self-induced) intoxication, the Shafi’i school deems such a divorce ineffective.   
The Shafi’i school recognises four types of divorce at the request of the wife, namely: (a) 
delegated divorce (talaq al-tafwid); (b) khul; (c) mubarat; and (d) formal judicial rescission.239 
Four grounds are likewise recognised upon which the wife may institute divorce proceedings. 
These include: (a) physical and mental defects on the part of the husband; (b) the (wilful) failure 
and/or refusal to maintain the wife during the marriage; (c) desertion for more than six months 
without cause; and (d) absence for more than one year for whatever reason.240 
2.6.4 Hanbali school 
The Hanbali school, the fourth school to crystallise in sunni Islam, was founded by Ahmad bin 
Muhammad bin Hanbal.241 
2.6.4.1 Requirements for marriage 
According to the Hanbali school of thought, five requirements for marriage must be observed, 
namely: (a) the guardian must give his consent to the marriage; (b) the bridegroom must be 
competent to enter into marriage; (c) the bride must also be competent to marry and should not 
be in the waiting period (iddah nor be performing the pilgrimage or visiting the holy shrines of 
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Islam (ihram); and (d) there should be sighah, i.e. a proposal (ijab) and acceptance (qabul); and 
(e) the dowry must be agreed upon.242 However, the Hanbali school stresses the proposal and 
acceptance as pillars of the marital contract. According to the Hanbali school, the parties are 
allowed to insert additional conditions in the marriage contract. These conditions must not, 
however, be contrary to the tenets of Islam or the institution of marriage, in which case the 
conditions shall be deemed void, although the marriage will nevertheless be valid.243 
The Hanbali school regards the presence of witnesses a condition for the validity of the 
marriage.244 
2.6.4.2 Guardianship 
The Hanbali school is of the opinion that a woman who is an adult virgin cannot contract her 
own marriage without the intervention of a guardian.245 The duties of guardianship would by 
necessity also extend to a minor. However, in the case of a woman who has been divorced or 
widowed, there seems to be consensus that the intervention of the guardian is not necessary.246 
2.6.4.3 Types of divorce 
According to the Hanbali school, the divorce shall be invalid if the husband pronounces a 
divorce without understanding the substance of the words uttered.247 Similarly, if a divorced is 
pronounced in a state of intoxication, it will be ineffective. There seems to be divergent views, 
however, concerning the presence of witnesses at the time of the pronouncement of divorce. The 
prevailing view appears to be that the presence of witnesses at the time of revocation is not a 
condition, but is deemed desirable instead.  
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The Hanbali school recognises four types of divorce at the request of the wife. These include: (a) 
various physical and mental defects on the part of the husband; (b) failure to maintain the wife; 
(c) desertion for more than six months without cause; and (d) failure to comply with a condition 
in the marriage contract.248 
A critical assessment of the views of the four schools of thought pertaining to marriage and 
divorce follows next. 
2.7 Critical Assessment of the Schools of Thought 
In order to understand the central role of Islam within the family, it becomes necessary to first 
consider the growth, metamorphosis and contextualisation of the shari’ah.249 There exists 
general agreement that the shari’ah is directly derived from the Qur’an and sunnah250 through 
specific methodology (usl al-figh) developed by early Muslim scholars.251 These scholars 
applied various techniques to supplement and interpret the primary sources in order to create 
rules for specific observance. The rules that began to crystallise constituted the early models of 
the four primary schools of Islamic jurisprudence. It would therefore be correct to argue that the 
labyrinth of religious, moral and ethical raw material obtained from the primary sources were 
cultivated and subsequently given shape and direction by Islamic scholars. Therefore, the 
codification of Islamic law, or the shari’ah within sunni jurisprudence, was principally the work 
of the four primary schools of thought.  
In instances where no firm answers were to be found in the primary sources, the four schools of 
thought would, by way of analogy, visit the secondary sources of Islam, including that of 
consensus (ijma), analogy and deduction (qiyas). These secondary sources provided essential 
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tools for reaching an agreement and thus facilitated legal certainty. In addition, the secondary 
sources also provided a forceful methodology in the interpretation of the primary sources.  
Although no doubt sincere in their development of the values of the shari’ah, in reality the 
founders of the four dominant schools of thought established legal principles in accordance with 
their own subjective understanding of Islam. The articulation of shari’ah principles in a broader 
pragmatic framework is therefore no more than the extension of values advanced by the four 
schools of thought that emerged during the second and third century of the Muslim calendar.252 
The jurisprudence of the four primary schools of thought has received wide recognition in both 
Muslim and non-Muslim states, including South Africa. It would thus be correct to assume that 
most sunni Muslims subscribe to one of the four dominant schools of thought. The four schools 
of thought have no doubt provided valuable and comprehensive principles in the interpretation of 
the primary sources of Islam. They have also stimulated critical academic debate and have thus 
facilitated the finding of solutions to (legal) challenges that did not exist in the time of 
Muhammad.  
Yet since these developments occurred approximately one hundred and fifty to two hundred and 
fifty years after the demise of Muhammad, Rehman rightly points out that subsequent to the 
demise of Muhammad, male dominated societies entered into an abuse of the system with 
substantial exploitation of the rights of women.253 The exploitation and eroding of women’s 
rights occurred as a result of the biased construction of Islamic jurisprudence where gender 
neutral terms have been translated and interpreted as masculine, thereby creating gender 
hierarchies and unequal rights for men and women.254 
The four dominant schools of thought have each embraced a distinct interpretation of marriage. 
While the Hanafi school defines marriage as “the husband’s exclusive right to sexual enjoyment 
of his wife”, the Shafi’i school considers marriage to include the “exclusive right to sexual 
intercourse, whatever the term used, so long as the joining of two people is implied”.255 The 
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Maliki school likewise defines marriage as “the legitimate sexual gratification from a woman”.256 
These interpretations of marriage appear to be discriminatory and biased in nature and could well 
be said to both deprive women of their free will, to expose women to male authority and to 
reduce women to sexual objects.257 If these sexualised definitions as proposed by the four 
primary schools are to be accepted, the sincerity of the schools may well have to be questioned in 
so far as they claim to derive there their opinions from the primary sources of Islam.258 
According to Thompson and Yunus, marriage should be interpreted as: 
“[a] contract which has been lawfully concluded between a man and a woman, the ends of which are, inter-alia, the 
formation of a family based on love, compassion, co-operation, chastity of the two spouses and the preservation of 
legitimate lineage.”259  
The preferred view of marriage according to the Qur’an appears to be that: 
“He created for you mates from among yourself, and that you may dwell in tranquillity with them, and He has put 
love and mercy between your hearts.”260  
These views expound a more suitable conception of marriage, namely that it is a union bound by 
compassion, understanding and companionship. It could be very well argued that what the four 
schools of thought merely emphasise the contractual nature of the rights and obligations of the 
parties in marriage.261 
There seems to be consensus amongst the four dominant schools that an adult male of sound 
mind is entitled to contract his own marriage. Similarly, a woman who is divorced or widowed 
may contract in her own right.262 Differences of opinion are, however, to be found amongst the 
schools of thought in so far as the capacity of an adult virgin, who is of sound mind, to contract 
her own marriage is concerned. The Hanafi school appears to be the most liberal in holding that 
such a woman possess the legal capacity to arrange her own marriage.  
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By contrast the Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali schools hold a more conservative view on the issue 
of guardianship. These schools argue that an adult woman who is a virgin and who possesses 
legal capacity cannot contract her own marriage without the intervention of a guardian.263 In the 
event that such a woman contracts her own marriage, the marriage will be void. The question of 
guardianship is controversial as the Maliki and Shafi’i schools centre their argument for 
guardianship upon the virgin status (i.e. sexuality (in)activity) of the woman. These schools 
accordingly hold the view that if a woman reaches maturity without losing her virginity, the 
guardianship continues. If, however, the woman is no longer a virgin before she has attained 
maturity, then guardianship will cease,264 a view also endorsed by the Hanbali school.265 
Ur-Rahman rightly argues that the correct interpretation should be that a woman who has legal 
capacity should have the right to contract her own marriage. The argument that women do not 
have the capacity to understand the complexities of marriage amounts to a gross 
misrepresentation of women’s capabilities and places a restriction on women to fully exercise 
and enjoy their rights and freedoms.266 The right of the father to give his daughter in marriage 
without her consent is in itself non-Qur’anic and, although widely practiced, is now revoked in 
many jurisdictions.267 All four schools are, however, in complete agreement that a woman can 
never act as a legal guardian.  
Current academic opinion is divided on the most suitable interpretation of polygyny as 
articulated in the primary sources of Islam.268 Two verses of the Qur’an are of particular 
significance in this regard. Chapter 4 verse 3 of the Qur’an reads: 
“Marry women of your choice, Two, or three, or four; But if ye fear that ye shall not Be able to deal justly [with 
them], Then only one”.269 
Doi thus correctly argues that should a married man enter into a further marriage, the equal 
treatment of the wives is imperative.270  The duty of the husband would be to make available 
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identical provisions for each wife, including the children, and that the same amount of time 
should be spent with each wife.271 And yet Chapter 4 verse 129 of the Qur’an explicitly 
confirms: 
“Ye are never able To be fair and just As between women, Even if it is Your ardent desire”.272 
Therefore, although the first verse reveals that polygyny is allowed, this is conditional and 
Mashhour correctly points out that the logical interpretation of the second verse is that it is 
prudent to marry only one wife.273 The concept of justice is not, however, defined in either of the 
two verses. Doi and Mashhour interpret the concept of justice to mean equal treatment in respect 
of food, clothing, housing and the time spent with each wife,274 but they concede that the concept 
of equal treatment can also be interpreted to include love and tenderness, which renders it an 
impossible ideal to attain.275  
Although Western points out that in early Islam polygyny served as a mechanism to assist 
women whose husbands had died in battle,276 the liberal view holds polygyny to be an 
inappropriate practice in a modern society. Unscrupulous men could very well resort to 
extracting the property of widows through the practice of polygyny. And yet the conservative 
view would maintain that polygyny as recorded in the Qur’an constitutes the literal word of 
Allah and cannot, therefore, be altered. Engineer rightly argues that the spirit of the Qur’an 
regarding polygyny is definite and must be interpreted as a means to assist widows and orphans 
rather than as a vehicle to engage in a variety of sexual pleasure.277  
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It need not be argued that patriarchal societies and the ensuing customs have interpreted the 
Qur’an to favour men and the idea that women are not allowed to have more than one husband at 
the same time could indeed be seen to constitute such a patriarchal custom. Mashhour rightly 
argues that the patriarchal interpretation of polygyny suggest that men have greater sexual 
potential than women and cannot restrain themselves when their wives are unable to satisfy their 
needs due to menstruation, having given birth or any other reason. The patriarchal argument 
would be that, in such instances, more than one wife would prevent a husband from engaging in 
extra-marital affairs,278 thus transferring the responsibility of sexual control and restraint to 
women.    
As pointed out above, the four dominant schools of thought interpret the Qur’an to confer to a 
husband the unilateral power to divorce his wife without providing any reason(s). It could well 
be argued that the fear of unilateral divorce at the husband’s instance is the most discriminatory 
source of intimidation for women in Islam. As for the various forms of divorce, straightforward 
repudiation is by far the most common.279 Another form of discrimination is that of the waiting 
period (iddah). As soon as the husband repudiates the wife, she has to undergo a mandatory 
waiting period. For the husband there is no waiting period, in fact, the husband may enter into a 
further marriage contract during that period.280 A similar form of discrimination occurs when the 
husband dies and the widow is placed under a mandatory waiting period while the same does not 
apply to the widower. As matter of fact, the widower may immediately enter into another 
marriage contract.  
The right of the husband to unilaterally repudiate the wife does not seem to be absolute, 
however.281 Islam strongly discourages the right to exercise divorce on superficial and ill-
considered grounds, the reason being that divorce destroys the family unit, especially where 
children are involved.282 Muhammad has cautioned that although divorce is acceptable, it is not 
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desirable and Honarvar correctly points out that several statements on divorce can be attributed 
to Muhammad.283 A further tempering of the husband’s unilateral right to repudiate his wife is 
that it has been commented that Muhammad interdicted men from exercising their right without 
the intervention of an arbiter or judge. In addition, the pronouncing of talaq should be only made 
once.284 
By contrast, a woman has limited grounds for obtaining a divorce within Islam. As pointed out 
above, the four primary schools of thought agree on the following means by which the wife may 
obtain a divorce, namely: (a) delegated divorce (talaq al- tafwid); (b) khul; (c) mubarat; and (d) 
judicial authority. However, where divorce takes place by judicial authority, the four dominant 
schools of thought differ considerably in the number and types of grounds available to women. 
In this regard the Maliki school, followed by the Shafi’i and Hanbali schools, are regarded as the 
most liberal, whereas the Hanafi school is considered to be the most conservative.285 The Hanafi 
school accordingly restricts the judicial process and is of the opinion that a court may dissolve 
the marriage contract when the husband is unable to consummate the marriage or if the husband 
is missing or absent.286 By contrast, the more liberal views expressed by the Maliki, Shafi’i and 
Hanbali schools allow divorce on several grounds, including maltreatment and harm (dara), 
refusal or inability to maintain the marriage, desertion or absence for more than a year, any 
physical or mental defects that would render the continuation of the marriage harmful to the 
wife.287 In addition, the Maliki school is regarded as the only dominant school of thought that 
emphasises the concept of harm (dara), although the interpretation of the concept is to be left in 
the hands of the applicable judicial authority.  
A further ground for divorce which is available to the wife occurs in the event of a breach of any 
condition stipulated in the marriage contract. Shah emphasises the contractual nature of the 
marriage contract in that it is similar to other contracts and that it is contracted between different 
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parties, meaning that each party is allowed to insert any type of condition. Therefore, any breach 
of the clauses or conditions could be a ground for divorce.288 According to Mashhour, one of the 
conditions that have persistently been included in marriage contracts is that if the husband 
marries another woman, the first wife will, by virtue of that breach, be divorced or would be in a 
position to apply for a divorce.289 
In reality the authority to delegate this power to the wife seldom occurs because of social 
constructs that render husbands (men) and wives (women) unequal. The husband’s unilateral 
right of repudiation as understood by the four schools of thought seems to be of an absolute 
nature; by contrast, the limited grounds for divorce available to the wife starkly accentuate her 
position of inequality.  
It could very well be argued that patriarchal societies and customs have influenced the growth of 
Islam and that Muslims today experience difficulty in differentiating which aspects of life are 
mandated by sincere interpretations of the primary sources of Islam and which have resulted 
from the perseverance of certain male-dominated structures.290 Although the codification of 
family law, in particular marriage and divorce, is not, however, entirely based on the 
jurisprudence of the four dominant schools of thought, these schools have developed marriage 
and divorce in a specific socio-historical context in which gender inequality and the subjugation 
of women were often practiced.291 Anwar and Rumminger thus rightly point out that Muslim 
family laws are regrettably halted in assumptions that are centuries old and do not address or 
conform to, or perhaps even have any bearing on, the demands imposed by modern societies.292 
2.8 Concluding Observations 
This chapter sought to develop the theoretical and philosophical framework for the arguments to 
be advanced throughout this doctoral thesis. The examination of the four dominant schools of 
 
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thought in Islam has revealed that opinion is divided on key aspects relating to marriage and 
divorce. And although the schools display a degree of consensus on some issues within the 
framework of Islamic law, they have failed to adequately address particular concerns pertaining 
to the status of women and their fundamental rights and freedoms in so far as marriage and 
divorce are concerned.  
It could thus well be argued that women in Islam are faced with a dilemma which is compounded 
by the particular school(s) of thought to which they, their families or their husbands subscribe. 
The dilemma is particularly acute in the interpretation of the four dominant schools in relation to 
the Qur’an and the argument that the interpretation of the primary sources of Islam has been 
overwhelmingly male dominated and thus displays a distinct male bias. 
The basic concepts of duty, honour, equality and human dignity in Islam, as these relate to the 
situation of women, may, however, be of particular significance in furthering the rights, 
freedoms and interests of women. These basic concepts may thus well have the potential to 
transcend the historical and often stagnant views on marriage and divorce, including entrenched 
views on the practice of polygyny, advanced by the jurisprudence of the four dominant classical 
schools of Islam.  
Moreover, these four basic conceptual values in Islam appear to be closely aligned with the 
fundamental values enshrined in the South African Constitution and therefore appear to, as such, 
have the potential to serve as a primary theoretical framework for this doctoral thesis. Human 
dignity, equality and freedom are recognised as fundamental constitutional values in section 1(a), 
section 7(1), section 9, section 10, section 36(1) and section 39(1)(a) of the South African 
Constitution.293 Section 1(a) expressly states that the Republic of South Africa is a sovereign 
democratic state founded on the values of “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms”. The interpretation of the Bill of Rights under 
section 39(1)(a) and the limitation of rights under section 36(1) must both take place in 
accordance with what is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. 
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Such an interpretation would appear to correspond with a modernist view in Islam which 
proceeds from the premise that the general principles of the Qur’an, if properly interpreted, 
facilitate equality between men and women, thereby rejecting discrimination of any kind. 
Moreover, the core principles found in the Qur’an could potentially be integrated successfully 
into the fundamental rights and freedoms typically enshrined in international and regional human 
rights instruments and in national constituions.294 
The next chapter of this thesis, the first of a comparative analysis over the course of three 
chapters, will critically examine the rights, freedoms and status of women under Moroccan law.
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CHAPTER 3 
Rights, Freedoms and Status of Women in Moroccan Law 
“Morocco is currently a country in a process of political transformation that encompasses the wider        
religious sphere ... However, the reform must also be seen as serving political – as opposed to purely      
religious – goals; it is also aimed – implicitly – at strengthening the role of Morocco’s King as          
Commander of the Faithful”.1  
“We know that the journey towards true social justice is long and that there is still much to do, but if 
women’s organisations continue their work with the same strength and commitment as they have 
demonstrated in the past 20 years, they will achieve their goals and ensure that future generations enjoy 
their rights – regardless of their gender”.2 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
One of the subtle, but most pervasive, areas of discrimination against Muslim women is the 
inequity and injustice that occur within the context of the family unit.3 In 1957, together with the 
adoption of the Moroccan Constitution, King Mohamed V took advantage of his religious status 
to codify the family law, which, in turn, led to the adoption of a religiously inspired Code of 
Personal Status (commonly referred to as the Moroccan family code or the mudawana).4 The 
religious nature of Morocco’s Code of Personal Status bears testament to the monarch’s eternal 
status as Commander of the Faithful (amr al-mu’minn).5 As a result, the mudawana was 
accepted as sacred and as an unalterable document, thereby officially supporting distinctions in 
gender equality and the restriction of women’s freedom to enter into marriage or to obtain a 
divorce.6  
The adoption of a modern Code of Personal Status in 2004,7 however, has been hailed as a major 
victory for the promotion and protection of Moroccan women both domestically and as a model 
 
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 See El-Katiri M “The Institutionalisation of Religious Affairs: Religious Reform in Morocco” (2013) 18:1 The 
Journal of North African Studies 53 at 54. 
2
 See Outaleb F “Women’s Rights in Morocco: From the Private to Public Sphere” (2011) available at 
http://www.commongroundnews.com [accessed 29 January 2014].  
3
 See Anwar Z and Rumminger JS “Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: Challenges, Possibilities and 
Strategies for Reform” (2007) 64 Washington and Lee Law Review 1529 at 1529.  
4
 The mudawana (or al-mudawana al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya) is literally a translation from the French statut personnel 
or code of personal status. 
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 See Zoglin K “Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women” (2009) 31:4 Human Rights Quarterly 
964 at 965. The Constitution of Morocco has been amended five times, notably in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996. 
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 See Article 19 of the Constitution of Morocco of 1996. 
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for the broader Muslim community.8 Few laws have such a severe impact on everyday life as 
those found in family codes, which essentially regulate issues pertaining to marriage, divorce, 
child custody and inheritance.9 Morocco’s modern Code of Personal Status has introduced 
progressive measures in furthering the promotion and protection of women’s rights. 
In light of the particular challenges encountered by Muslim women after the introduction of a 
constitutional democracy in South Africa in 1994, the need to consider other (African) 
jurisdictions for guidance within a legal and constitutional context has become increasingly 
important. South Africa, which consists of an ethnically diverse pluralistic community, has 
rightly opted to conceptualise legislation to address the rights and freedoms of Muslim women, 
but which has, to date, not received any formal recognition. In fact, a frustrating stalemate has 
ensued following the release of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill in 2003.10 The latter has still not 
been tabled before the South African Parliament more than ten years after its conception, and is 
still in the process of awaiting comments.11  
Although the similarities and dissimilarities between Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa should 
not be oversimplified, particularly due to the codified nature of and similar colonial histories that 
have shaped the Moroccan and Tunisian legal systems, a strong case could be made for 
embarking on such a comparative study. While little reliance is, for example, placed on judicial 
precedents in Morocco and Tunisia, as judges neither have discretion nor are obligated to follow 
existing precedents,12 all three states are ethnically diverse pluralistic African jurisdictions that 
are challenged to conform their legal systems with the commands of key international and, in 
some instances, regional human rights instruments, such as the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)13 and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
 
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 See Zoglin K “Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women” (2009) 31:4 Human Rights Quarterly 
964 at 964. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 See South African Law Reform Commission Project 106 – Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (July 2003).  
11
 See Chanza N “News from Parliament” (2013) 36 De Rebus 13-14 at 13.  
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 See, in particular, Voorhoeve M “The Interaction between Codified Law and Divine Law: The Case of Divorce 
for Disobedience in Tunisia” (2009) 204 Revue de l’Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes 269 at 280 n 28. 
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Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women (African Women’s Protocol).14 All three states thus 
bear the distinct responsibility to honour their commitments under human right charters that give 
effect to key civil and political rights while struggling through an often painful and protracted 
process of nation-building and democratisation. And more often than not, experience has shown 
that political necessity often forces governments to embrace women’s rights to starve off 
political opponents, especially pro-nationalist movements. 
Furthermore, a careful inspection of the socio-economic conditions in Morocco, Tunisia and 
South Africa reveals that these three jurisdictions are more closely aligned that any other African 
states, sub-Saharan or otherwise. In fact, the socio-economic conditions in South Africa, 
Morocco and Tunisia are almost identical,15 thus enabling both a critical and nuanced assessment 
of the legal status of Muslim women in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned. And while 
both Morocco and Tunisia have, to a certain degree, codified Muslim personal law, their 
experiences may well hold valuable lessons for South Africa and this, in essence, is what 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 hope to uncover.16   
This chapter is thus the first of a critical and comparative trilogy. To this end, Chapter 3 will 
critically explore the rights, freedoms and status of women in Moroccan law and particular 
attention will be paid to secularism and the Moroccan legal system as well as recent reforms in 
marriage and divorce law. The Moroccan response to the international human rights system as 
well as the African human rights framework will also be examined critically against the 
backdrop of, amongst other, the African Decade of Women.  
A brief historical overview of the development of Moroccan family law follows next.   
 
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3.2   Historical Overview   
Despite a similar background that saw Morocco and Tunisia becoming colonies of France and 
achieving independence in the same year, the flight path of women’s rights and freedoms 
relating to marriage and divorce took a different route due to post-colonial legislation. 
Traditionally, Morocco has been ruled by various Islamic Berber dynasties.17 Although French 
law principles dominated certain sections of the Moroccan penal and commercial codes, personal 
status laws remained largely unaffected throughout the Protectorate.18 In 1956, Morocco gained 
political independence from France with Spain relinquishing most of its authority during the 
same period.19 After gaining independence, Morocco embraced a socially conservative Code of 
Personal Status in 1958.20 The mudawana, based on the Maliki school of thought, was left 
untouched during the French colonization of Morocco.21 The Code of Personal Status first 
developed as a set of royal decrees (zahir) released by the monarchy, without parliamentary 
debate, between 1957 and 1958.22 The Commission mandated to draft the new Code of Personal 
Status consisted of ten male religious scholars from the Maliki tradition, together with the 
Ministry of Justice and the monarchy.23 No women served on the Commission. The formulation 
of the mudawana could well be seen as ecclesiastical and as perhaps the most important initiative 
by the Moroccan government since gaining independence. By integrating under one set of family 
laws the many ethnic and tribal groups in Morocco, the mudawana has became a symbol of both 
 
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18
 See Dwyer DH “Law Actual and Perceived: The Sexual Politics of Law in Morocco” (1979) 13:3 Law & Society 
Review 739 at 741.  
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stick?” (2007) 5:2 Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights 181 at 202. 
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national unity and Islamic identity, entrenching the significance of the monarchy and the Maliki 
tradition.24 
The mudawana relates to the family unit, and as such regulates marriage, polygyny, divorce, 
inheritance, maintenance, and child custody.25 It could thus well be argued that the mudawana 
determines the status of a Moroccan woman throughout her entire life, commencing at birth and 
including her capacity to own, inherit, and manage property, her freedom to work, marry, 
divorce and remarry, as well as her relationship with her children.26 Under the 1950s version of 
the mudawana, a woman was considered to be a minor under the guardianship of her father and 
thereafter her husband, or other male guardian within the family.27 In close alliance to the Maliki 
school of thought, dominant sections of the mudawana address the right to compel a daughter to 
marry, the minimum age for marriage (fifteen years for girls and eighteen years for boys), the 
husband’s right to divorce by unilateral repudiation (including the practice of polygyny) and 
judicial divorce at the wife’s request for specific reasons as determined by the Maliki school 
(such as the lack of maintenance and harm).28 Furthermore, male supremacy was concretized in 
terms of the mudawana as the husband was regarded as the head of the family and as its 
provider.  
Repeated calls were made for the reform of the mudawana. Attempts at reform followed in 1961, 
1962 and 1965 with the establishment of an official commission to examine any shortcomings in 
the mudawana, and similar attempts were made throughout the 1970s.29  However, it was only in 
the 1980s that issues emerged concerning the status of women. The issues surrounding the rights 
of women that became a subject of public debate were, as a consequence, linked to a struggle for 
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the protection and promotion of women’s rights. As a result of the above a petition campaign 
was established consisting of a coalition of women’s groups. While some of these women’s 
groups aligned themselves with left-wing political parties, others adopted an independent 
stance.30 The particular demands articulated by the women’s groups included a call for the 
equality and complementarity between husband and wife relating to the family unit as well as 
affording legal competency to women upon reaching the legal age of maturity (eighteen years). 
The demands furthermore sought to afford women the right to marry without a guardian (wali), 
to raise the minimum age of marriage for girls from fifteen to eighteen years, to equalise the 
divorce process, and to place the divorce process in the hands of a judge. The prohibition of 
polygyny, extension of equal rights of guardianship over children as well as the recognition of 
the right to work and the right to an education, which the husband could not dispute, also 
garnered considerable attention.31  
King’s Hassan II’s decision in 1993 to reform the family law corresponded with the prevailing 
climate of controlling political reform and democratisation which distinguished the last decade of 
his reign of almost forty years.32 In 1992, the king, upon receiving women representatives at the 
palace, declared in a speech that he would not allow family law to be the object of a political 
struggle as this, he concluded, would divide the Moroccan people. He highlighted that in his 
capacity as Commander of the Faithful, it was his task and responsibility to determine the 
authoritative interpretation of Islam by means of legal reasoning (ijtihd).33 In 1993, the 
mudawana thus underwent reforms by royal decree (zahir), instead of reform through 
parliamentary processes.34  
The majority of the population, however, considered the 1993 reforms of the mudawana as 
inadequate, thereby failing short of the expectation of true reform.35 Sidiqi rightly points out that 
 
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the disappointment largely stemmed from the fact that the mudawana was still based on religious 
thought.36 The changes introduced in 1993 were paltry. The talaq is a good case in point. Under 
the 1993 reforms, notaries (adouls) were in charge or registering the talaq in the presence of both 
parties after the authorization of the judge.37 Repudiation could, however, take place in the 
absence of the wife if she has been notified or if the husband persisted. The authorization of the 
judge was thus a mere formality which did not create a barrier to the ability of the husband to 
repudiate his wife. The 1993 reforms did, however, expand the repudiated wife’s financial 
interest through the entitlement of alimony, the amount of which would be determined by taking 
into account her circumstances and the financial position of the husband.38 The judge was tasked 
to investigate whether the repudiation was unreasonable and if any prejudice was suffered by the 
wife.39 Disappointment with the reforms stemmed especially from within the sphere of liberal 
feminism since, at the time, other legal codes were based on civil law, including the Penal Code 
and the Constitution of Morocco.40            
Although, various legal systems influenced and developed most of Morocco’s legal system, the 
shari’ah courts continued to apply the Maliki school of thought to matters relating to the family 
unit. As a result of Morocco’s independence from France, many historical rules taken from the 
Maliki school of thought were reaffirmed, thereby re-enforcing the traditional patriarchal order.41 
The Code Napoléon of 1804 guaranteed that the nineteenth century France would become a 
citadel of patriarchy for it has been reported that Napoléon proclaimed on the issuing of his code: 
“[w]omen ought to obey us. Nature has made women our slaves”.42 The French civil and 
criminal law harshly punished women for sexual transgressions and therefore gender inequality 
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existed in both spheres of the French legal system.43 The formulation of the mudawana in 1957, 
with its strict adherence to the Maliki school of thought, critically restricted the rights and 
freedoms of Moroccan women in areas such as marriage, divorce and inheritance.44 The 
mudawana effectually shaped every aspect of a woman’s life.45 This led to growing 
dissatisfaction among women which, over time, produced an activism for the promotion of the 
rights and freedoms of Moroccan women.46 The core agenda was the struggle for gender 
equality. 
Various political and religious events contributed to making women more visible in Moroccan 
society and these, in turn, impacted on the formulation of the reformed mudawana. These events, 
which could be seen to act as a barometer to measure the political improvement of women in 
Moroccan society, were diverse in nature and included a public speech in August 1993 by Amina 
Mrini to mark the inauguration of Mosque Hassan II in Casablanca,47 the public role assumed by 
the wife of King Mohamed VI, especially during their wedding in 2002, the introduction of a 
quota system for women representatives in parliament in 2002,48 an increase in women’s 
associations and non-governmental organizations with a focus on promoting women’s rights, 
such as, reproductive health, and assisting victims of violence,49 and the formulation of a plan for 
the integration of women in sustainable human development with a view to combat socio-
cultural prejudices and attitudes. The latter served to reinforce the influence and promotion of 
women in juridical, political and institutional standards, furthered women’s formal and informal 
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education, promoted an egalitarian culture in the education, improved indicators of women’s 
health issues, especially concerning reproductive health, and integrated women into economic 
development.   
With the passing of King Hassan II in 1999, his successor, Mohamed VI, initiated substantial 
reforms to the mudawana under the guidance of the ulama which the Moroccan parliament 
ratified in 2004.50   
The impact of secularism on the reforms effected in Morocco will be examined next.  
3.3 Secularism and the Moroccan Legal System  
It could well be argued that Morocco opted for the middle ground in nation building, borrowing 
from what Esposito refers to as “Western-educated elites” as well as relying on foreign 
advisers.51In 2011, Morocco experienced an unprecedented political turmoil. Neighboring North 
African territories experienced the spectacular collapse of governments under the weight of 
popular pressure. Moroccan cities were filled with demonstrators who named the uprising after 
the day of the largest initial public gathering, namely February 20, and calls were made for 
greater reform.52 However, to gain a true understanding of Morocco’s political structure, it is 
useful to first examine the Constitution of Morocco of 1962.  
Under King Hassan II and during the early stages of Mohamed VI’s reign, the strategy of the 
monarchy was to establish political legitimacy based on the concept of the “supreme 
representivity” of the monarch. The Constitution of Morocco of 1962 did not originally contain 
any reference to the monarch as the supreme representative of the nation.53 Article 19 merely 
stated that:  
 
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“[t]he King is the Commander of the Faithful (amr al-mu’minn), representing a symbol of unity to the Nation, and 
guarantor of the durability and continuity of the State”.  
Reference to the king as a symbol of supreme representative of the nation was included later and 
thus Article 19 was amended to read:  
“[t]he King is the Commander of the Faithful and is the symbol of the unity of the Nation, and the guarantor of the 
perpetuation and continuation of the Nation. He is the protector of Islam, and ensures respect of the Constitution. He 
is the protector of rights and liberties of citizens, social groups and organizations and he is the guarantor of 
independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries”. 
The notion that the king was the supreme representative of the nation was met with considerably 
controversy, and yet this idea made repeated appearances in the Constitutions of Morocco of 
1972, 1992 and 1996.54   
The Constitution of Morocco thus appears to include two types of legitimacies. Article 2 of the 
Constitution of Morocco of 1962 encompasses the first type of legitimacy, which is of a civic 
nature, in that it declares that “[t]he sovereignty of the nation is exercised directly through a 
referendum and indirectly through the constitutional institutions”. The second type of legitimacy, 
found in Article 19, appears to be of a religious nature. Darif thus correctly argues that the 
Constitution of Morocco of 1962 created an uneasy and conflicting co-existence of legitimacies 
that has derived its authority from Islamic principles.55 However, the construction of political 
and religious legitimacy in Morocco, as articulated by King Hassan II, is at least partially derived 
from traditional religious practices.56 
The promulgation of the Constitution of Morocco of 1972 saw attempts by King Hassan II to 
expand the scope of the monarch’s legitimacy beyond the narrow religious conception. The king 
sought to resurrect the idea of civic legitimacy and linked it to the already existing religious 
legitimacy. The Constitution of Morocco of 1972 thus codified the monarchy’s rule in terms of 
Islam and based its ideas of legitimisation on tradition and religion. It could thus well be argued 
that the Constitution of Morocco of 1972, together with its merger of religious and civic 
legitimacy, rationally lead to the creation of a monarchy that favored authoritarianism instead of 
 
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a constitutional monarchy.57 The concept of the legitimacy of the monarchy of Morocco thus 
explains hitherto the lack of public uprisings and dissent. 
King Hassan II was adept at orchestrating both sides of the political front. After the collapse of 
colonial rule in Africa and the introduction of the concept of one-party rule, resulting in either 
repressive one-party systems or military dictatorships,58 King Hassan II was at pains to ensure 
that the concept of multi-partism was included in the Constitution of Morocco of 1962.59 Multi-
partism was orchestrated, however, through the creation of puppet parties (including the rigging 
of elections in their favour) to resist any opposition who may question royal supremacy. The late 
king also secured the election for charismatic oppositionist for their public-relations value as 
members of parliament.60 Yet despite such maneuvering, King Hassan II always insisted that he 
was a neutral arbiter placed well above any political disturbance.  
The notion of democracy was officially introduced by the Constitution of Morocco of 1962. 
Bendourou aptly refers to the Constitution of Morocco of 1962 (and those that followed in 1970, 
1972, and 1992) as designed by the king and ratified by popular vote.61 Each constitution 
affirmed the supremacy of the monarchy over other political institutions, whether legislative, 
executive or judicial.62 In order to maintain the legitimacy of the monarch, the Moroccan regime 
is founded on the sharifian principle which advocates Moroccan rulers to be the direct 
descendants of Muhammad (PBUH).63 This creates a type of psychological contract between the 
monarchy and the people of Morocco.64 Therefore, the relationship between the monarchy and 
its subjects is often referred to as paternal. The fact that the monarchy belongs to the al’awid 
dynasty, which in turn claims to be direct descendants of Muhammad, further entrenches the 
 
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monarchy’s position. By connecting himself to Allah, through his lineage, the king thus 
positioned any challenge to his divine right to rule as a challenge to Allah.65  
An analysis of the constitutional reforms of 2011 in Morocco reveals that the powers of the 
prime minister and parliament are to a certain degree enhanced.66 The prime minster would 
assume the title of the President of the Government and would be chosen from the party that won 
the greatest number of seats in parliament. The real power would, however, remain in the hands 
of the king.67 While the king is no longer defined as “sacred”, he remained the amr al-mu’minn, 
both as religious and political head of state, the symbol of the nation’s unity, guarantor of the 
states existence, supreme arbiter amongst institutions, as well as being beyond personal 
reproach.68  
The preamble to the Constitution of Morocco of 2011 describes the kingdom as a sovereign state. 
The preamble furthermore dictates the importance attached to the Muslim faith in the ethnic 
diversity of Morocco.69 The content of the Constitution of Morocco of 2011 espouses the belief 
that Morocco is conceived as a Muslim state in light of the fact that that the majority of its 
population is Muslim. In addition, Article 3 states that Islam is the religion of the state and also 
guarantees freedom of belief.70 However, the construction of Article 3 differs from that found in 
previous constitutions, which declares that Islam is the “source of legislation”, “sole source of 
legislation” or the “foundation of legislation”. An analysis of the concept of “religion of state” 
found in Article 3 thus seems to be less politically, legally and religiously burdened than that of 
“official state religion”, which was originally found in Article 4 of the Constitution of Morocco 
of 1962.  
To dismiss the recent reforms in Morocco as mere rubber stamping by the monarchy would not, 
however, be correct. Although these reforms may not be revolutionary they are, given the 
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historical and socio-political contexts, most certainly radical.71 Under King Hassan II’s reign 
constitutional reforms were superficial, varying between a bicameral and unicameral parliament, 
slightly increasing the prime minister’s powers with minimal semantic changes relating to the 
issues of human rights and citizenship.72 The recent constitutional changes, however, were 
effectively initiated from the top down even though very few of the reforms corresponded to the 
demands of the popular protests in the streets of Morocco. The amended constitutional text of 
2011, by contrast, has expanded from one hundred and eight to one hundred and eighty articles 
with very few of the previous provisions having withstood the current amendments.  
It may well be argued that the new constitutional amendments were the result of the demands 
from civic associations and street protesters.73 The bullet-form preamble to the new constitution 
defines Morocco as a “modern” state of “democratic rights” founded on the “principles of 
participation, pluralism and good governance”.74 The reforms introduce an independent society 
where all enjoy security, liberty, equality, respect, dignity and social justice. Of interest is the 
fact that democratic rights precede the stipulation that Morocco is an Islamic sovereign state, 
which had always been the first phrase found in all of the previous constitutions.75  
The 2011 constitutional document contains a new section, consisting of twenty two articles, 
titled “Liberties and Fundamental Rights”. It allows for the freedom of information (Article 27) 
and the press (Article 28), the rights to housing, health care, welfare, water, a clean environment 
and durable development (Article 31), as well as the rights of women, children and the disabled 
(Articles 32 and 34, respectively).76 These constitutional safeguards appear alongside the express 
prohibition of sexism (Article 21), torture (Article 22), racism (Article 23) and corruption 
(Article 36).   
Most of these provisions are in direct response to the 20 February movement and its various 
allies calling for a democratic order founded on the principles of human dignity, accessibility, 
respect and social justice.  
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The recent reforms in Moroccan law as these specifically pertain to marriage will be considered 
next.        
3.4 Recent Reforms in Marriage  
There exists general agreement that Muslim women in North Africa and the Middle East enjoy 
greater fundamental rights, perhaps second only to Tunisia.77 In the case of Morocco, Hursh 
attributes this phenomenon to its history as a cultural crossroads between Europe and Africa, 
Christianity and Islam, and Arab and Berber, allowing for more tolerance and a greater 
sensitivity to women’s rights and freedoms.78 Yet despite this cultural diversity, Morocco 
remains convincingly Islamic and the Constitution of Morocco of 2011 entrenches the family 
“founded on the legal bonds of marriage as the basic unit (cellule) of society”.79 The state is 
obligated “to guarantee by the law the protection of the family under the juridical, social and 
economic plans, in a manner to guarantee its unity, its stability and its preservation”.80 
  
Since political independence in 1957, there have been calls from various sectors of society for 
measures to improve the rights and freedoms of Moroccan women. These calls resulted in the 
promulgation of the Code of Personal Status. Some of the progressive Muslim scholars (ulama), 
such as Allal el-Fassi, proposed distinct reforms that did not, however, find their way into 
Morocco’s first Code of Personal Status of 1956. Despite several attempts at reform in 1957, 
1993 and 2004, the Moroccan monarchy has remained an active participant in determining the 
extent of change.81   
The clear purpose of marriage according to previous drafts of the Code of Personal Status was 
procreation. The Code of Personal Status thereby subscribed to the Maliki school of thought 
which considers marriage as a contract of legitimate sexual gratification.82 Cabré correctly 
argues that this concept of marriage implies a prior judgment that all women were compelled to 
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marry and, in so doing, women theoretically accepted their primary roles of that of wife and 
mother.83 In addition, any form of extra-domestic activity could be viewed as a distraction from 
the woman’s primary role which has been forced upon her, namely that of wife and mother.84  
In direct contrast, Article 4 of the Moroccan Code of Personal Status of 2004 defines marriage as 
a pact so as to differentiate between marriage and other contracts, such as those envisaged in the 
Code of Obligations and Contracts.85 Marriage is therefore based on consent and is defined as a 
long lasting union between a man and a woman, whose mutual obligations are purity, chastity 
and the establishment of a stable family, to be attained through mutual care following the 
provisions laid out in the Code of Personal Status.86 And yet Article 400 clearly stipulates that 
issues that are not foreseen by the Code of Personal Status of 2004 will be determined in 
accordance with the principles of the Maliki school of thought.87  
There is no exhaustive list of legal requirements for a marriage to be valid as some requirements 
are deemed non-essential. Articles 10 and 12, for example, stipulate that consent must be 
provided which must be consistent with the intention of both parties. In addition, Article 13 
stipulates that both parties should have the necessary legal capacity and there should be no 
intention or agreement to cancel the dowry. The dowry is an essential feature of marriage and 
has been prominent in all three (prior) versions of the Code of Personal Status. In some 
instances, the dowry constitutes the women’s wealth, which she has recourse to in case of 
economic difficulty or divorce.88 In addition, the dowry seems to seal the marriage pact and is 
owned by the wife.89 Article 13 also prescribes the presence of a marital tutor, where necessary, 
and two public notaries (adouls) at the moment when the offer and acceptance are pronounced 
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by the couple.90 It should be noted that not all of the above requirements are essential. The only 
essential requirements for a valid marriage are consent, legal capacity, dowry and the absence of 
impediments.  
In contrast to previous versions, the Code of Personal Status of 2004 authorises a marriage tutor, 
a type of guardian (wali), for the woman.91 The authority of the guardian is directly derived from 
the Maliki school of thought. The issue of guardianship has raised serious questions, not only in 
Morocco but throughout the Middle East. There is consensus amongst all the sunni schools of 
thought that a woman who already experienced married life and is subsequently divorced or 
widowed (thayyibay) is entitled to contract her own marriage without the aid of a guardian.92 
However, a woman who possesses legal capacity and who is a virgin appears not to be in a 
similar position. The Maliki school holds the view that such a woman cannot contract her own 
marriage without the intervention of a guardian who, under normal circumstances, would be her 
father.93 However, if the father was unavailable, the guardianship could be passed on to one of 
the other agnatic consanguineous relatives.94 Although the guardian could not force a woman 
into marriage without her consent, the woman could not contract her own marriage without the 
assistance of a guardian.95 Ur-Rahman explains that although the Maliki school consider the 
permission of a guardian necessary for the completion of the marriage contract, the validity of 
contract is not affected.96 A woman can never, however, act as a guardian.  
The Moroccan Code of Personal Status of 2004 requires the presence of two public notaries 
(adouls) at the moment when the offer and acceptance are uttered by the couple.97 This means 
that the provision of consent must be executed in the presence of the public notaries. However, it 
must be emphasized that the presence of the public notaries is not a requirement for the validity 
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of the marriage, but merely serves as proof of the solemnization of the marriage.98 The presence 
of the public notaries is thus seen as a formality in the issuing of a valid marriage certificate. The 
marriage certificate serves as a document of proof that the marriage has been concluded between 
the parties, again in line with the Maliki school of thought.  
The Maliki school of thought holds the view that the presence of witnesses in order to conclude a 
marriage is not necessary. However, what seems to be important is that the marriage is to be 
made public.99 The Maliki school asserts that it is the publicity which is a conditio sine qua non 
for the validity of the marriage. It could therefore be argued that the presence of the public 
notaries is to give effect to the Maliki school which calls for the marriage to be made public.100  
The previous versions of the Code of Personal Status stipulated that a girl may enter into 
marriage at the age of fifteen while the required age for boys was eighteen. According to Cabré, 
this arrangement was of significant importance for it established a system for early marriage.101 
In contrast, the Moroccan Family Code of 2004 now stipulates that a person gains legal capacity 
to contract marriage when they have reached the age of eighteen. The current reform provides for 
equity in terms of the ages at which men and women may get married.102 However, Articles 19 
and 20 states that a judge has the power to grant marriages in the case of minors.103 Although it is 
understood that there is no prescribed minimum age to impede the authorisation of a marriage, it 
is accepted that even though the couple may be young, they must, however, be post-pubescent.104  
While polygyny has generated much debate, it is not all that common in Morocco in practice. 
Under the previous versions of the Code of Personal Status a husband did not need judicial 
authorization if he sought to enter into a second marriage. The husband was not required to 
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notify his first wife of his intention.105 Polygyny is now subject to stringent legal conditions. 
Although the Moroccan parliament decided to retain the husband’s prerogative to enter into a 
second marriage, certain conditions had to be satisfied before a court in order for the second 
marriage to be authorised.106 The wife could, however, make it a pre-condition of marriage that 
her husband may not enter into a second marriage. If the husband proceeded to do so, the wife 
would be entitled to a divorce.107 In addition, the husband must notify the current wife that he 
would like to take another wife and must furthermore advise the proposed new wife that he is 
already married.108 If the first wife objects to the husband taking another wife the court must find 
exceptional and objective circumstances that justify the taking of a second wife. There must be 
sufficient resources to provide for both families so as to treat both families equally.109   
Previous versions of the Code of Personal Status stipulated that if any injustice between co-wives 
is feared, polygyny is not permitted.110 Abdullah correctly argues that this stipulation appears to 
be identical to what is stated in the Qur’an.111  Previous drafts of the mudawana do not require 
an inquiry by any authority into the husband’s capacity to do justice between co-wives. A court 
may therefore grant a judicial divorce to a wife who complains of injury as a direct result of the 
husband contracting a further marriage.112 The mudawana thus confirms the Qur’anic text that if 
a husband is unable to treat the co-wives equitably, then such a husband must, as a rule, confine 
himself to one wife.113 These stipulations are reiterated under Article 35 of the Code of Personal 
Status of 2004 which requires that the husband must treat his wives justly and fairly. The legal 
reforms that commenced in 1958 thus seem to constitute nothing more than a codification of 
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family issues into a modern form of legislation. The practice of polygyny was not amended and 
thus the position remained as found in the Qur’an.114  
The path to legal and constitutional reform in Morocco was characterised by socio-political 
unrest. The reforms initiated by King Hassan II during the 1990s were given an expected 
stimulus by the series of suicide bomb attacks in Casablanca in May 2003115 with Islamist 
protests in the streets accusing the King Mohamed VI of bowing to pressure from Europe and the 
United States of America. It was not the “rights of women”, as such, that seemed to cause the 
protests, but deep tensions that existed between the Moroccan monarchy and governmental 
organs. While some feared that external powers, such as France, the European Union and the 
World Bank, would interfere in Morocco’s internal politics, others were of the view that legal 
reform should instead focus on the treatment of political prisoners, freedom of speech and the 
challenges presented by youth unemployment.  
Sadiqi rightly points out that from the 1980s onwards, the Moroccan feminist movement was 
confronted by a new challenge, notably that of “Islamism”.116 This challenge was exacerbated by 
the fact that Islamist do not possess a broad theological or judicial knowledge and subscribe to a 
religious practice based on the literal reading of the founding texts of Islam, namely the Qur’an 
and sunnah.117 In its opposition to Western norms and principles, Islamism opposes modernity, 
and in so doing, engenders confusion between Western ideas and modernity. And as a 
consequence, western ideas which may be defined as an incomplete historical manifestation of 
modernity, 118 is taken for modernity itself. Yet in the midst of severe opposition, women’s 
associations, including some female members of parliament, remained steadfast, making a 
compelling argument that legal reform in Morocco would be “an initiative that would contribute 
 
114
 See Abdullah R “Inserting Stipulations Pertaining to Polygamy in a Marriage Contract in Muslim Countries” 
(2008) 46:1 Al-Jmi’ah 154 at 163. 
115
 The changes to the Code of Personal Status came nine months after a resurgence of radical Islamist violence with 
suicide attacks claiming numerous lives in the city of Casablanca: see “9 Imprisoned for Casablanca Blasts Escape” 
The New York Times 8 April 2008.  
116
 See Sadiqi F “The Central Role of the Family in Morocco Feminist Movement” (2008) 35:3 British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 330 at 331. Sadiqi explains Islamism as “a social movement or organization based on the 
exploitation of Islam for political aims and would include any such organization that tries to exercise power in the 
name of religion only”. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
		

to the enlightenment of a modern and democratic society”.119 Progressive Moroccans joined the 
debate for legal reform, arguing that previous attempts at reform were lagging behind social 
attitudes and social realities.120 It was imperative that the mudawana should be brought in line 
with international human rights norms and that provisions promoting gender equality were 
included in the new Moroccan constitutional text. These demands outraged the conservative 
religious scholars (ulama) and Islamists who dogmatically opposed the feminist and progressive 
agendas.121   
The mudawana was thus at the centre of a vicious debate; it was examined, dissected and 
crtitiqued. The calls for legal reform forced issues concerning the rights of women into the public 
conscience. For Sidiqi, the biggest success of the feminist movement is thus rightly its ability to 
bring an almost “sacred” religious document into the public sphere.122 But in a context where all 
important religious questions are decided by a conservative monarch, claiming to be the defender 
of the faithful,123 it should come as no surprise that the eventual constitutional reforms were far 
from impressive. And yet the amendment of the Constitution of Morocco in 2011 too is seen as a 
symbolic victory for the feminist movement.124  
Women’s activism thus had a significant impact on the reform of family law in Morocco, and 
this led, in no small part, to the adoption of an entirely new Code of Personal Status in 2004. 
Moghadam and Fahimi argue that the new Code of Personal Status is consistent both with the 
 
119
 See Sadiqi F “The Central Role of the Family Law in the Moroccan Feminist Movement” (2008) 35:3 British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 325 at 334. 
120
 See Mayer AE “Reforms of Personal Status Laws in North Africa: A Problem of Islamic or Mediterranean 
Laws?” available at http://www.wluml.org [accessed 27 July 2011]. 
121
 Ibid. 
122
 See Sadiqi F “The Central Role of the Family in Morocco Feminist Movement” (2008) 35:3 British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 330 at 333. 
123
 Ibid.     
124
 Constitutional amendments worth mentioning include: (a) the guardian’s control was limited and it was 
emphasised that the women should give her consent and sign the marriage contract; (b) women over the age of 
twenty one who did not have a father were allowed to contract their own marriage without a guardian; and (c) before 
taking a second wife, a husband needed to inform his first wife. In addition, the mother was given the right to legally 
represent her children if their father was deceased, although she could not dispose of the property. However, the 
critique levelled against the amended Constitution was that the mudawanna continued to treat women as subordinate 
to men and double standards continued to apply in areas of child custody and divorce proceedings. See also 
Moghadam V “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship and Justice Tunisia” available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org [accessed 26 February 2012]. 
 
 
 
 
	


spirit of Islam and the notion of equal rights for both men and women.125 The fact that the 
feminist campaign succeeded in altering the mudawana in a country where the law is based on 
Islamic principles shows how effective women’s activism can be when linking social and 
economic development to the notion of women’s rights. 
The Code of Personal Status of 2004 commences with a preamble which unifies the eleven 
fundamental reforms which King Mohamed VI presented to parliament. The eleven reforms 
include: (a) the adoption of a modern form of wording and the removal of degrading and 
devaluing terms pertaining to women; (b) the freedom of women to arrange their own marriage 
(thereby prohibiting the mandatory intervention of a wali or guardian); (c) equality between men 
and women with respect to the minimum age for marriage; (d) allowing for polygyny only under 
the most strict conditions; (e) the simplification of marriage procedures for Moroccan’s living 
abroad; (f) making divorce equally available to men and women; (g) the expansion of a women’s 
right to divorce when the husband does not fulfill the conditions of the marriage contract; (h) the 
protection of children’s interest with respect to custody; (i)  the acknowledgement of the 
paternity of children born out of a registered marriage; (j) equality in matters of inheritance; and 
(k) and the possibility to make arrangements for property acquired during the marriage.126  
Men and women are now declared “equal before the law” in recognition of the dignity of women 
as human beings.127 Whereas previously the family was the sole responsibility of the husband, 
the Code of Personal Status of 2004 makes the husband and the wife jointly responsible for the 
family.128 This amendment echoes the words of Muhammad, who, upon delivering his farewell 
sermon near Mount Arafat, instructed:  
“[t]reat your women well and be kind to them for they are your partners and committed helpers”.129  
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The recognition of equality between the spouses aligns with the spirit of Islam as expressed in 
the basic concepts and principles of the faith. In fact, any law premised on the foundational 
values of Islam ought to promote equality between the sexes.  
The new Code of Personal Status recognises the freedom of women to arrange their own 
marriage.130 Under the previous Code of Personal Status, a woman, no matter how old, was 
under the guardianship (wali) of her father (or male relative) until marriage. A marriage thus 
required at least the indirect consent of the woman. Once married, a woman was under the 
guardianship of the husband.131 In event of death of the husband, the woman reverts to the 
guardianship of her father or, if the eldest son has reached the age of manhood, under the 
guardianship of the son. Should the widow choose to remarry, she would have to request her son 
to conclude a second marriage on her behalf.132 Guardianship unquestioningly denies a woman 
her independence and autonomy while the same does not apply to men.133 The 2004 Code of 
Personal Status is thus to be welcomed as it recognises a woman’s agency and independence to 
exercise the freedom to enter into marriage. It is still, however, possible for a woman, who so 
wishes, to delegate tutelage to her father or to a male relative.134 
In keeping with equality between men and women, the minimum age for marriage in the Code of 
Personal Status of 2004 has been set at eighteen years of age for both men and women. 
Previously, girls were legally permitted to marry at the age of fifteen135 and it still remains 
permissible for a girl between the ages of fifteen and eighteen to enter into marriage. In such 
instances, the permission of the Family Affairs Judge is required and a medical certificate is 
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required.136 This represents a significant reform as the traditional position in Islam, although it 
stipulated no suitable age for marriage, assumed boys and girls to have attained puberty at the 
ages of twelve and nine, respectively.137 The Code of Personal Status of 2004 now declares the 
marriage of a minor to be contingent on the consent of his or her legal tutor. In the event that the 
minor’s legal tutor withholds consent, the Family Affairs Judge must rule on the matter.138 The 
fact that a minimum age is set for marriage is to be welcomed as this renders it unnecessary to 
deal with the question of puberty. In addition, the requirement of a medical certificate is to be 
welcomed as this requirement will ensure that the physical well-being of a young girl is given 
due consideration.  
Under the Code of Personal Status of 2004, a wife is no longer legally obliged to obey her 
husband, contrary to widely-held custom which regards obedience as an absolute duty of a 
Muslim woman. The new Code of Personal Status thus, in fact, corresponds to the core sources 
of Islamic law which call on couples to engage in consultation, dialogue and understanding in the 
fulfillment of their mutual obligations. This is also underscored, in particular, by the Qur’anic 
injunctions of fair treatment, consultation and dialogue,139 and the instruction calling on all 
Muslims to disobey illegal commands, including those issued by parents and husbands.140   
Recent reforms concerning divorce in Moroccan law will be examined next. 
3.5 Recent Reforms in Divorce  
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Divorce is discouraged in Islam and may only be resorted to as the last option. In the words of 
Muhammad, “of all permitted things, divorce is the most abominable with Allah”.141 But since 
marriage is regarded as a contract, ways to dissolve a failed marriage do exist under Islam.142  
In terms of the Code of Personal Status of 2004, divorce is made a prerogative that can be 
exercised by both the husband and the wife, in accordance with legal conditions set for each 
party and under judicial supervision.143 Therefore, divorce is made conditional upon the court’s 
permission. Under the previous legislation the husband had a virtually unrestricted right to 
repudiate his wife.144 The recent reforms have placed a considerable limitation on the husband’s 
right to unilaterally divorce his wife under Moroccan law.  
Article 79 of the Code of Personal Status of 2004 introduces a new procedure for divorce.145 In 
terms of the new procedure, the spouse who wishes to repudiate must petition the court 
accompanied by two public notaries (adouls). The purpose for appointing the two public notaries 
is to certify the repudiation of the spouse. In addition, the repudiation must take place either in 
the district of the conjugal domicile or in the wife’s domicile or place of residence, or in the 
place where the marriage contract was issued. 
In terms of Article 80, the petition for the authorization to certify repudiation must specify the 
identity of the spouses, their professions, ages, state of health, educational status, addresses and 
the number of children. In addition to the above, the petition must be accompanied by the 
marriage record (certificate of marriage) and evidence of the husband’s material situation and 
financial obligations.146  
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Article 81 of the Code of Personal Status of 2004 grants the court the authority to subpoena the 
spouses to attend a reconciliation period. This period allows the spouses to attempt to reconcile 
their marriage. Where the husband receives the summons relating to repudiation and fails to 
appear on the due date, failure to appear is viewed as a withdrawal of the petition of repudiation. 
The situation seems to be different where the wife receives the summons. Article 81 states that if 
the wife receives the summons and does not appear or submits a written response, she will be 
notified through the Public Prosecutor that if she fails to appear, the case will be decided in her 
absence. Article 81 clearly differentiates between the spouses and could well be said to be 
discriminatory. While the husband’s failure to attend proceedings it interpreted as a withdrawal 
of proceedings, failure by the wife to appear allows proceeding to continue and to be decided in 
her absence. Should the wife fail to attend due to inaccurate information provided by the 
husband, the husband will incur penalties as stipulated by Article 361 of the Penal Code of 
1962.147 
Under Article 83 of the Code of Personal Status of 2004, a divorce may not be duly registered 
until all monies owed to the wife and children have been settled in full by the husband. Article 
83 only comes into operation if all attempts by the spouses to reconcile have failed. The court 
will require that the husband deposits all monies that are due to the wife and children within 
thirty days.  
In terms of Article 84, the amount due to the wife includes the delayed dowry (if the dowry is 
outstanding), maintenance for the legal waiting period (iddah) and a consolation gift. The 
amount due is assessed with reference to the length of the marriage, the financial means of the 
husband, the reason for the repudiation and the degree to which the husband has abused this 
right. Article 84 can be traced to the Qur’an, which instructs:  
“Let the women (in iddah), live in the same style as ye live, According to your means: Annoy them not, so as To 
restrict them”.148 
The position of the wife during the waiting period often evokes uncertainty. Does the wife stay 
in the marital home or will the husband force her to move out? In terms of the Code of Personal 
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Status of 2004, the wife has a choice.149 She can either remain in the conjugal home, or if need 
be, in a suitable home based on her and the husband’s financial position.150 This provision 
likewise finds application in the Qur’an, which states:  
“And turn them not out Of their houses, nor shall They (themselves) leave”.151  
Yusuf Ali therefore points out that: 
“Islam treats the married women as a full juristic personality in every sense of the term, a married women has the 
right, in the married state, to a house or apartment of her own”.152 
Providing for a house or an apartment implies the inclusion of all reasonable expenses for its 
upkeep and for the maintenance of the children. This obligation appears sensitive to the fact that 
the waiting period is often a trying period for the woman. Yusuf Ali, however, cautions against 
the wife leaving of her own accord as this may negatively impact on the likelihood of 
reconciliation.153  
Should the parties fail to come to an agreement relating to the amount which is due, the court has 
the authority, in terms of Article 84, to set an amount to cover housing expenses. The amount 
stipulated must be deposited with the court and will be part of the rights which are due to the 
wife. If the husband does not deposit the amount of money referred to in Articles 83 and 84 
within the prescribed period, his failure to do so will be considered as a renunciation of his 
intention to repudiate and court will certify accordingly.154  
The Code of Personal Status of 2004 allows the husband to assign his right of repudiation to his 
wife.155 The wife would be entitled to exercise this right by petitioning the court in terms of 
Articles 79 and 80. The court is required to verify that the conditions for assigning the right of 
repudiation, as agreed upon by the two spouses, are fulfilled. The court is required to attempt 
reconciliation as stipulated in Articles 81 and 82. If the reconciliation attempt fails, the court 
shall authorise the wife to petition for the certification of repudiation and will rule on her vested 
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rights and, if appropriate, those of her children, in accordance with Articles 84 and 85. It is to be 
welcomed that the Code of Personal Status of 2004 bars the husband from attempting to prevent 
his wife from exercising the right of repudiation that he has previously assigned to her. 
In the remainder of this chapter, Morocco’s response to the international and regional (African) 
human rights frameworks will be examined critically.   
3.6 Human Rights and Legal Reform in Morocco  
3.6.1 Morocco’s response to the international human rights system  
Mahoney rightly asserts that the history of the struggle for human rights is and has been the 
struggle of man to assert his dignity and common humanity against oppressive state structures 
and practices.156 The struggle of women who are dominated by men in every sphere, including 
marriage, divorce, religion, sexuality and employment is of a far more recent origin. The struggle 
has been, for most part, for equal treatment and the eradication of all forms of discriminatory 
practices.157   
The reign of King Hassan II is generally regarded by the international community as a period 
characterized by internal strife and the perpetration of gross human rights violations.158 Campbell 
thus holds the view that the measure of the success of Hassan II is to be found in the extent of his 
efforts to democratise Morocco is his human rights record.159 Despite strong relations between 
the United States of America and Morocco, the State Department’s State Country Report for 
1998 highlighted Morocco’s questionable human rights record.160 Although some improvement 
were noted, concern was expressed over the use of torture and abuse of detainees by security 
forces, harsh prison conditions, illegal detentions, faulty judicial procedural procedures, a 
judiciary corrupted by the Interior Ministry, media censorship, restrictions of demonstrations and 
child labour. Other areas of concern that were highlighted included restrictions on the freedom of 
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speech, assembly, association, religion and movement, discrimination against women and the 
underreporting and under-investigating of domestic violence against women.161  
Although the political reforms undertaken by Hassan II and Mohamed VI could at face value be 
regarded as impressive in their scope and openness, they concealed the fact that no real change 
occurred. This is evident from the fact that no authentic institutional change occurred affecting 
the constitutional monarchy of Morocco. The monarch retains full decision-making and policy 
powers and parliament serves mainly as an advisory body. Furthermore, the government 
(monarchy) wields significant control over the media and enforces punitive measures against the 
few independent newspapers that exist.162 In addition, independent newspapers are also subject 
to self censorship. The independent newspaper Le Journal is a case in point. By insisting on 
reporting on sensitive issues, the newspaper has been fined or shut down and its editors have on 
occasion been imprisoned.163  
King Hassan II did, however, introduce significant reforms towards the end of this reign. These 
included a reconciliation process with measures such as freeing political prisoners in 1991, 
enacting constitutional amendments in 1996, establishing a bicameral parliament with expanded 
powers, and the introduction of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate human 
rights abuses and the make recommendations for the release of prisoners.164  
Mohamed IV expanded on the (political) reforms of his predecessor, which included the issuing 
of two amnesties and the release of certain political prisoners. The process which received the 
most international attention, however, was the establishment of the Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission (ERC) with a mandate to investigate human rights abuses that occurred during the 
period 1956 to 1999. The head of the ERC was the former political prisoner and leader of the 
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opposition, Benzeki.165 Both the nature of the ERC and its assessment of compensation gave 
impetus to a number of changes, the most notable of which was government support for several 
international human rights instruments.  
Cook rightly points out that significant developments in the global sphere of state accountability 
and responsibility can be applied to ensure a more effective protection of international human 
rights, especially in so far as women’s rights are concerned.166 The preamble to the Constitution 
of Morocco of 1996 expressly claims respect for the principles, rights and obligations set out in 
applicable charters and treaties. It reaffirms Morocco’s resolution to abide by the universally 
recognised human rights and to continue its progress towards the safeguarding of international 
peace. The monarch of Morocco accredits representatives of international organizations and 
bears the authority to sign and ratify treaties.167  
Morocco has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),168 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)169 
and the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
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(CEDAW).170 Surprisingly Morocco has, to date, not become a signatory to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),171 even though Muslim states have been active 
participants in the advancement of international human rights.172 Morocco, together with Muslim 
states such as Libya and Pakistan, sent female delegates to the UN to contribute to the drafting of 
the ICCPR.173 And it could well be said that the sentiment expressed in the UDHR that rights 
“derive from the inherent dignity of the human person” runs like a golden thread through the 
various provisions of the ICCPR.174 
To this end, Article 3 of the ICCPR refers to the recognition of “equal rights of men and women” 
to ensure the full enjoyment of all rights contained therein.175 Article 18 expressly refers to the 
rights of the individual and groups in both the private and public sphere.176 Furthermore, the 
ICCPR places a limitation on freedom of religion which is comparable to the idea of a general 
limitation clause contained in the South African Constitution,177 thus reinforcing the idea that 
freedom of religion is not absolute.178 Furthermore, no person will be coerced into choosing a 
belief system or a religion.179  
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to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”. 
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General Comment 22 of the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), the body that monitors 
the implementation of rights contained in the ICCPR, explains that Article 18(1):  
“necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s religion or belief 
with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religious belief”.180  
The issue relating to coercion to ensure religious conformity is clearly prohibited. According to 
General Comment 22:  
“Article 18 (2) bars … the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to 
adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert. Policies or 
practices having the same intention or effect, such for example, those restricting access to education, medical care, 
employment or (other rights) … are similarly inconsistent with Article 18(2)”.181  
The UNHRC has explained that there are narrow situations where a state which agreed to the 
ICCPR may be allowed to restrict the freedom of religious belief or practice under Article 18(3). 
Furthermore, restrictions are permissible  
“only if limitations are prescribed law (by state party), and the limitations are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”.182  
No Arab state has ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (OPICCR).183  
The preamble to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)184 expressly recognises that the rights contained therein “derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person”, and that in accordance with the UDHR, the idea of free human 
beings can only be achieved if everyone may enjoy their cultural rights.  
 
180
 See UNHRC General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40 Paragraph 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights P5, UN Doc ICCPR/C/21Rev.1/Add.4 27 September 1993 on 
“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes the freedom to hold beliefs” available at 
http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc. [accessed 12 May 2012]. 
181
 Ibid.  
182
 Ibid. 
183
 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 21/2200A GAOR 21st 
Session Supp 59 UN Doc A/6316 (1966) UNTS 302 entered into force on 23 March 1976. See also Artz DE “The 
Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States” (1990) 12:2 Human Rights Quarterly 202 at 218. 
184
 See International Covenant to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GAOR 21st Session 
Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 993 UNTS 3 adopted on 16 December 1966. 
 
 
 
 


In addition, the ICESCR expressly recognises the family as “the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society” and requires states to “award it the widest possible protection and assistance”.185 
Other substantive rights recognised by the ICESCR that are of particular relevance to this 
doctoral thesis include the special protection of mothers,186 children187 and cultural life.188 
Although the ICESCR concedes that some rights may be challenging to attain, it nevertheless 
requires that states must take steps “to the maximum of its resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization” of rights “by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures”.189 Therefore, a positive obligation is placed on states to move 
as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards realizing the listed objectives and to 
implement measures and programmes designed to assist individuals in realizing their rights 
enshrined under the ICESCR. 
Morocco’s response to CEDAW warrants special attention. While most multilateral treaties 
contribute towards the recognition and protection of women’s rights, CEDAW190 is the most 
significant international legal instrument for accomplishing gender equality.191 The term 
“discrimination against women” is defined in Article 1 to include:  
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing    or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field”.192  
 
185
 See Article 10 of the ICESCR of 1966. 
186
 See Article 10(2) of the ICESCR of 1966. This protection should be accorded to mothers during and after 
childbirth. 
187
 See Article 10(3) of the ICESCR of 1966. This protection relates to the social and economic exploitation of 
children and the prohibition on child labour. 
188
 See Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR of 1996 which recognises the right of “everyone to take part in cultural life”. 
In addition, Article 15(2) of the ICESCR of 1966 calls for the conservation and development of culture. 
189
 See Article 2(1) of the ICESCR of 1966. 
190
 See the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women GA Re 34/180 UN GAOR 
34th Session Supp No 46 UN Doc A/34/36 (1980) adopted for signature on 1 March 1980 and entered into force on 3 
September 1981 following receipt of the twentieth ratification. 
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 Compare Article 1 of CEDAW of 1979 with Article 1(f) of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003 which defines 
“discrimination against women” as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction based on sex, or any differential 
treatment whose objective or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise of women 
regardless of their marital status, or human rights and fundamental freedom in all spheres of life”. 
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Morocco made declarations to Article 2193 and Article 15(4) 194 and reservations to Article 
9(2),195 Article 16196 and Article 29197 upon ratifying CEDAW in 1993.198 These reservations 
deal with legal and constitutional equality between men and women, equality within the family, 
the right of women to pass on their nationality to their foreign-born spouses and children, 
women's right to freedom of movement and disputes arising between States Parties. Although 
Morocco’s decision to ratify CEDAW is to be welcomed, the reservations and declarations made 
by Morocco noticeably weakened the intended effect of CEDAW. 
 
193
 The declaration to Article 2 reads: “[t]he Government of the Kingdom of Morocco express its readiness to apply 
the provisions of this article provided that: (a) They are without prejudice to the constitutional requirement that 
regulate the rules of succession to the throne of the Kingdom of Morocco; (b) They do not conflict with the 
provisions of the Islamic Shariah. It should be noted that certain of the provisions contained in the Moroccan Code 
of Personal Status according women rights that differ from the rights conferred on men may not be infringed upon or 
abrogated because they derive primarily from the Islamic Shariah, which strives, among its other objectives, to 
strike a balance between the spouses in order to preserve the coherence of family life”. 
194
 The declaration to Article 15(4) reads: “[t]he Government of the Kingdom of Morocco declares that it can only 
be bound by the provisions of this paragraph, in particular those relating to the right of women to choose their 
residence and domicile, to the extent that they are not incompatible with articles 34 and 36 of the Moroccan Code of 
Personal Status”. 
195
 The reservation to Article 9(2) reads: “[t]he Government of the Kingdom of Morocco makes a reservation with 
regard to this article in view of the fact that the Law of Moroccan Nationality permits a child to bear the nationality 
of its mother only in the cases where it is born to an unknown father, regardless of place of birth, or to a stateless 
father, when born in Morocco, and it does so in order to guarantee to each child its right to a nationality. Further, a 
child born in Morocco of a Moroccan mother and a foreign father may acquire the nationality of its mother by 
declaring, within two years of reaching the age of majority, its desire to acquire that nationality, provided that, on 
making such declaration, its customary and regular residence is in Morocco”. 
196
 The reservation to Article 16 reads: “[t]he Government of the Kingdom of Morocco makes a reservation with 
regard to the provisions of this article, particularly those relating to the equality of men and women, in respect of 
rights and responsibilities on entry into and at dissolution of marriage. Equality of this kind is considered 
incompatible with the Islamic Shariah, which guarantees to each of the spouses rights and responsibilities within a 
framework of equilibrium and complementary in order to preserve the sacred bond of matrimony”. It continues: 
“The provisions of the Islamic Shariah oblige the husband to provide a nuptial gift upon marriage and to support his 
family, while the wife is not required by law to support the family. Further, at dissolution of marriage, the husband 
is obliged to pay maintenance. In contrast, the wife enjoys complete freedom of disposition of her property during 
the marriage and upon its dissolution without supervision by the husband, the husband having no jurisdiction over 
the wife’s property. For these reasons, the Islamic Shariah confers the right of divorce on a woman only by decision 
of a Shariah judge”. 
197
 The reservation to Article 29 reads: “[t]he Government of the Kingdom of Morocco does not consider itself 
bound by the first paragraph of this article, which provides that ‘Any dispute between two or more States Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration;”. The reservation continues to state: “The Government of the 
Kingdom of Morocco is of the view that any dispute of this kind can only be referred to arbitration by agreement of 
all the parties to the dispute”.  
198
 See “CEDAW, Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW” available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm [accessed 18 October 2013]. 
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Article 2 of CEDAW is a case in point. This article sets out how states should enforce CEDAW 
domestically.199 It requires, amongst other, that states “adopt appropriate legislative and other 
measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against 
women”200 and that “all appropriate measures, including legislation” be taken so as to “modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women”.201 The essence of Morocco’s reservation to Article 2 is that no measures will be 
implemented at the domestic level which is in conflict with Islamic law (shari’ah), thereby 
limiting its commitment to the full implementation of Article 2.202 
Article 5 of CEDAW places a positive obligation on the state “to modify the social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men and women”.203 Furthermore, the upbringing of children is expressly 
conceived of as the responsibility of both men and women. Thus Article 5 enumerates, in broad 
terms, the important role of the family and the special interest of children. The recent legal 
reforms in Morocco seem to encapsulate Article 5. To this end, Article 4 of the Code of Personal 
Status of 2004 expressly stipulates that the supervision of the family is the responsibility of both 
spouses.204  
In terms of Article 9 of CEDAW, women are granted equal rights with men to acquire, change or 
retain their nationality.205 This provision extends to the sphere of marriage, including the 
 
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 See Article 2 of CEDAW of 1979. 
200
 See Article 2(b) of CEDAW of 1979. 
201
 See Article 2(f) of CEDAW of 1979. 
202
 See Jansen Y “Muslim Brides and the Ghost of the Shari’a: Have the Recent Reforms in Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco Improved Women’s Position in Marriage and Divorce, and Can Religious Moderates Bring Reform and 
Make it Stick?” (2007) 5:2 Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights 181 at 196. 
203
 See Article 5 of CEDAW of 1979 which reads: “State Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify 
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices 
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women, (b) To ensure that the family education includes a proper understanding of 
maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children is the primordial consideration in all cases”. 
204
 See Article 4 of the Code of Personal Status of 2004 which reads: “[m]arriage is a legal contract by which a man 
and a woman mutually consent to unite in a common and enduring conjugal life. Its purpose is fidelity, virtue and 
the creation of a stable family, under the supervision of both spouses according to the provisions of this 
Moudawana”. 
205
 See Article 9 of CEDAW of 1979 which reads: “1. State Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to 
acquire, change, or to retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor 
change of nationality by the husband during the marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, 
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requirement that all marriages must be registered. As a token of King Mohamed VI’s special 
concern for Moroccans residing abroad, and in order to reduce the administrative burden to get 
marriage contracts processed, the registration of marriages has been simplified. The new 
procedure merely requires that the marriage contract be drawn up in the presence of two Muslim 
witnesses, in accordance with the procedures in force in the country of residence, where after the 
marriage must be registered with the relevant Moroccan Consular or judicial authorities.206  
Morocco opted to make an interpretative declaration to Article 15(4) of CEDAW which 
stipulates that: 
“States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to movement of 
persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile”.207 
 Hursh explains that since Morocco insisted on the supremacy of the mudawana, it considered 
itself bound only to the extent that the provisions of Article 15(4) were not incompatible with 
Articles 34 and 36 of the Moroccan Code of Personal Status.208 In addition, this declaration has 
the effect of maintaining strict limitations on the freedom of movement that women were subject 
to before the reforms introduced in 2004.209 The right to choose where one resides is one of the 
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render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. 2. State Parties shall grant women equal rights 
with men respect to the nationality of their children”. 
206
 See Ennaji M “The New Muslim Personal Status Law in Morocco: Context, Proponents, Adversaries and 
Arguments” available at http://www.yale.edu [accessed 15 May 2011]. Article 14 of the Code of Personal Status of 
2004 reads: “Moroccans living abroad may conclude their marriage according to the local administrative procedures 
of their country of residence, provided that the conditions of consent, capacity, and the marital tutor if required are 
fulfilled, and that there are no legal impediments to the marriage nor cancellation of the dowry, and this in the 
presence of two Muslim witnesses and subject to the provisions of Article 21 below”. See also Article 15 which 
reads: “Moroccans who have concluded their marriage according to the laws of their country of residence must 
submit a copy of the marriage contract within three months of its conclusion to the Moroccan consular section of the 
consular district where the marriage contract was concluded. In the absence of a Moroccan Consulate, the copy must 
be sent within the same deadline to the appropriate department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The appropriate 
department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will transmit this copy to the Civil Status Officer and to the Family 
Court at the birthplaces of both spouses. If both or one of the spouses was not born in Morocco, the copy will be 
transmitted to the Family Court of First Instance in Rabat”. 
207
 See Article 15(4) of CEDAW of 1979. 
208
 See Hursh J “Advancing Women’s Rights through Islamic Law: The Example of Morocco” (2010) 27:2 Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law and Justice 252 at 285. 
209
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most basic human rights, and Morocco’s declaration to Article 15(4) has the intention and effect 
in denying women this most basic human right.210 
Within this context, Article 16 is likewise of importance in so far as it relates to issues 
accompanying marriage. The rights of women in Muslim marriages has been a contentious issue 
and it is thus to be welcomed that CEDAW provides some guidelines in this regard.211 Article 16 
lays down the equal freedom of men and women to enter into marriage and choose a spouse212 as 
well as the equal duties during marriage and divorce.213 Therefore, should the marriage be 
dissolved, both parties have rights and responsibilities towards their children. The well-being of 
the child shall thus be of paramount importance. Article 16(2) grants both parties the right to 
decide on the number of children and the spacing thereof. It follows, therefore, that women (and 
men) may use contraceptives in the planning of the family.214  
Article 16(f) of CEDAW refers to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption, and places 
an obligation on state members to include or enact provisions to give effect to this Article, 
bearing in mind the best interests of the child.215 While Article 16(2) deals with child 
marriages,216 CEDAW does not specify a minimum age for a child to enter into marriage. It is 
thus left to governments to decide and to enact legislation addressing a minimum age 
requirement. Although CEDAW is expansive in so far as it deals with the rights and 
responsibilities of partners to marriage and in prioritising the rights of children, the failure to 
introduce a minimum age requirement for the marriage of the child can rightly be construed as a 
serious drawback. 
Morocco’s primary concerns regarding Article 16 related to the equality of men and women in 
respect of the rights and responsibilities in marriage and divorce. Equality as envisaged by 
 
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 See Article 16 of CEDAW of 1979 which reads: “1. State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and the family relations and in particular shall 
ensure, on the basis of equality of men and women”. 
212
 See Article 16(1)(a) of CEDAW of 1979 which reads: “[t]he same right to enter into marriage, (b) The same right 
to freely choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent”. 
213
 See Article 16(1)(c) of CEDAW of 1979 which reads: “[t]he same rights and responsibilities during marriage and 
at its dissolution”. 
214
 See Article 16(1)(e) of CEDAW of 1979. 
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 See Article 16(1)(f) of CEDAW of 1979. 
216
 See Article 16(2) of CEDAW of 1979. 
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CEDAW was considered to be incompatible with the shari’ah which guarantees to each of the 
spouses distinct and complementary rights and responsibilities. Thus the shari’ah obliges the 
husband to provide a nuptial gift upon marriage and to support his family, while the wife is not 
required by law to support the family financially. Moreover, at dissolution of marriage, the 
husband is obliged to pay maintenance. In contrast, the wife enjoys complete freedom of 
disposition of her property during the marriage and upon its dissolution without supervision by 
the husband, the husband having no jurisdiction over her property.  
Article 29 stipulates that any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of CEDAW, which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request 
of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. Morocco insisted that any dispute of this kind can 
only be referred to arbitration by agreement of all the parties to the dispute.  
The reservations and declarations made by Morocco to CEDAW demonstrate a certain 
unwillingness to subject the mudawana to the standards contained in international human rights 
instruments.217 But Morocco is far from unique in favoring one legal system above another. 
Bonthuys and Domingo rightly point out that the almost universal ratification of CEDAW is 
undermined by the number and extent of state reservations, to the degree that these could even be 
said to jeopardise the integrity of CEDAW.218 As in the case of Morocco, these reservations 
often preserve patriarchal culture and religious norms within states which serve to place 
significant restrictions on the enforcement policy of CEDAW.219  
Yet in 2008, Morocco withdrew all reservations to CEDAW. King Mohamed VI, in celebrating 
the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,220 argued that: 
“our reservations have become obsolete due to the advanced legislation that has been adopted by our country”.221  
 
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 See Hursh J “Advancing Women’s Rights through Islamic Law: The Example of Morocco” (2010) 27:2 Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law and Justice 252 at 286.  
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 See Bonthuys E and Domingo W “Constitutional and International Law Context” in Bonthuys E and Albertyn C 
(eds) Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 51 at 59-63.  
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Hursh rightly argues that the withdrawal of reservations made to CEDAW were not, however, 
primarily due to the fact that Morocco decided to embrace contentious issues relating to certain 
aspects of international treaty law.222 And yet the decision to lift the reservations to CEDAW, 
coupled with the constitutional amendments in 2011 to confirm the supremacy of international 
gender norms over national laws,223 remain an immensely important part of Morocco's efforts to 
improve and strengthen women's rights. The lifting of reservations serve as a potent example for 
states in the region that still maintain reservations to core articles of CEDAW. By ratifying the 
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, Morocco can likewise set a significant example in the region 
for states which have yet to ratify this important human rights instrument. 
3.6.2 Morocco’s response to the African human rights framework  
Morocco is not a member of the African Union (AU).224 It withdrew from the AU in 1985 
following the admittance of the disputed state of Western Sahara as a member in 1984.225 As a 
consequence, Morocco has neither signed nor ratified the African Women’s Protocol of 2003,226  
nor has Morocco endorsed the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (AU 
Solemn Declaration)227 of 2004.228 Nor has Morocco voiced support for the either the African 
Decade of Women or for the AU’s Women, Gender and Development Directorate229 which seeks 
to promote gender equality through gender mainstreaming within the organs of the AU, 
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including member states, to ensure compliance by policy agents and national human rights 
instruments.230 
At the time of the adoption of the African Women’s Protocol, the only other human rights 
instruments relating to the protection and promotion of women’s rights in Africa were the 
African Charter and CEDAW, which enjoyed universal and near-universal ratification, 
respectively, in Africa.231 While the African Women’s Protocol seeks to address gender equality 
and violence against women, the AU Solemn Declaration resulted from the First Conference of 
African ministers responsible for Gender and Women Affairs held in Dakar, Senegal, which 
sought to realize women’s rights and gender equality in Africa.232 The AU Solemn Declaration 
incorporates a non-binding commitment by African states to ensure progress towards to the 
protection and promotion of women’s rights in a number of distinctly marked areas, including 
HIV and AIDS, conflict prevention and management, gender-based violence and 
development.233 And while Viljoen correctly argues that the African Women’s Protocol should 
not be viewed essentially as correcting normative deficiencies in international human rights law 
dealing with human rights, but should instead be seen as a response to the lack of 
 
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 See Joala R “Africa: Is the AU’s Women’s Decade a Pipedream?” available at http://www.allafrica.com.stories 
[23 October 2012]    
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 Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary 
Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of a “preliminary draft on an African 
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 Heads of States and governments of the African Union, during the third ordinary session of the Assembly in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa in July 2004 in order to 
reaffirm their commitment to the principle of gender equality as enshrined in Article 4(1) of the Constitutive Act of 
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implementation of these norms,234 the AU Solemn Declaration called on states to ratify the 
African Women’s Protocol to ensure its entry into force in 2005. 
All AU member states have committed themselves to reporting annually at meetings of the 
African Heads of State and Government about progress made in fulfilling the promises made 
relating to the AU Solemn Declaration.235 This obligation is placed on all AU member states 
irrespective of the treaties they have ratified.236 
The idea of an African Decade of Women stems from the notion of a Women’s Decade 
formulated by the United Nations at the First World Conference held in Mexico City in 1975.237 
The aim of the African Decade of Women is the advancement of gender equality by accelerating 
the implementation of the Dakar, Beijing and AU Assembly Decisions on Gender Equality and 
Women’s Empowerment.238 The implementation of the African Decade of Women will occur in 
two phases (2010 to 2015 and 2015 to 2020) so as to allow for the AU to monitor and review 
each period effectively.239    
The objectives of the African Decade of Women are based on ten thematic areas, some of which 
include fighting poverty and promoting economic empowerment of women and 
entrepreneurship; women’s health, maternal mortality and HIV and AIDS; peace, security and 
violence against women; women in decision making positions; and mentoring and promoting the 
youth (women and men) movements. 
The AU’s Women, Gender and Development Directorate monitors whether national ministries 
for women and children implement various initiatives and develop applicable programmes. An 
analysis carried out by the AU Commission in 2010 found that approximately seventy percent of 
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Rights of Women in Africa” (2009) 16:1 Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 11 at 17. 
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237See “Make Every Women Count” African Women’s Decade available at http://www.makeeverywomancount.org 
[accessed 23 October 2013]. 
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 At an extra-ordinary meeting of Ministers of Gender and Women Affairs in Maseru, Lesotho in December 2008, 
the AU Ministers for Gender and Women’s Affairs called on the AU to declare 2010 to 2020 as the African 
Women’s Decade and to undertake wide consultations to ensure the success of this initiative. 
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 See Women, Gender and Development Directorate African Union Commission “African Union, The Road Map 
for the African Women’s Decade: 2010-2020” October 2009 available at http://www.african-union.org [accessed 23 
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the AU member states have official policies in place to address the protection, promotion, 
interest and needs of women, particularly in development.240 Morocco sadly stands to benefit 
from none of the AU initiatives aimed at achieving gender equality in Africa, leading some 
commentators to argue that Morocco could be considered as the least accountable of African 
states in so far as the realization of the rights of women is concerned.241 
3.7 Concluding Observations  
This chapter has traced the various legal and constitutional reforms introduced in Morocco to 
alleviate the legal status of women particularly in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned. 
It was shown how King Mohamed VI continued the reforms begun by his predecessor in the 
promotion and protection of women’s rights.  
Pertinent legal reforms facilitated the allotting of equal rights to both husband and wife, the 
making of divorce more accessible, and even paved the way for women to sway more political 
influence through occupying at least thirty seats in parliament. Today women in the Moroccan 
parliament hold more than eleven percent of the seats, compared to the United States of America 
where women occupy fourteen percent of the seats. Moreover, women occupy thirty out of the 
three hundred and twenty five members of the bicameral parliament’s Chamber of 
Representatives. The 2002 elections brought thirty five women members to parliament, 
increasing Morocco’s ranking in Africa from one of the last to among the first in terms of 
women’s political participation. 
The legal reforms that Morocco introduced to assist in the eradication of discrimination against 
women with a view to improve gender equality are to be welcomed. Yet there still remains room 
for Morocco to improve its record on women's rights. The reform of the mudawana in 2004 
produced one of the most advanced legislative frameworks in the Middle East and North Africa 
for the promotion of gender equality. Yet the Code of Personal Status of 2004 expressly provides 
 
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 See Mujuzi J “The Protocol to the African Charter on Human Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: 
South Africa’s Reservations and Interpretative Declarations” (2008) 12:2 Law Democracy and Development 41 at 
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that in case of doubt, a judge shall take recourse to the Islamic (Maliki) tradition,242 thus 
affirming the primacy of the shari’ah as a source of law. The effect of Article 400 of the Code of 
Personal Status of 2004 may thus well be to (re-) introduce interpretations of marriage and 
divorce that are discriminatory and bias in nature, thereby depriving women of their autonomy 
and freedom.243  
This would be an ironic consequence as the various amendments to the mudawana discussed in 
this chapter have shown a sustained desire to fashion equal rights and responsibilities for 
husbands and wives and to grant women more rights in divorce matters, including the right of 
Moroccan women married to foreign-born men to pass on their nationality to their spouses and 
children. The issue of nationality remains a significant challenge for women in other parts of the 
Middle Eastern and North African region who have yet to gain full citizenship rights. And yet 
women who are Moroccan nationals still cannot pass on their nationality to their children if their 
husbands are not Muslims and this may well render children born from such a marriage stateless.  
Morocco’s endorsement of the international human rights system and subsequent withdrawal of 
the reservations made to CEDAW is testament to the successful alignment and integration of 
religious principles and human rights imperatives. However, Morocco’s decision not to endorse 
the African human rights framework remains a pressing cause for concern. Key civil and 
political rights specifically tailored to address the unique needs of women in Africa, particularly 
those enshrined in the African Charter and the African Women’s Protocol, cannot, therefore, be 
used as a compelling legal basis to argue for fundamental human rights and/or constitutional 
reform in Morocco.  
The position of Morocco in relation to the African Union is regrettable, particularly as this 
chapter has demonstrated that the legal reforms introduced in Morocco have, to some degree, 
been a matter of political expedience, alliance and survival, rather than a strong desire to enhance 
women’s rights and freedoms per se as these pertain to marriage and divorce.      
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The next chapter will assess the rights, freedoms and status of women under Tunisian law. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Rights, Freedoms and Status of Women in Tunisian Law  
“Tunisia has one of the most modern and equitable systems of family law in the Muslim world and rivals 
most western countries for its equal treatment of the sexes in family matters ... Tunisia has understood that 
Islam must adjust in accordance with time, place, and circumstance, and in doing so has embraced the 
concerns of Muslim women.”1 
 “For the last fifty years, the rights of Tunisian women have been guaranteed by law, thanks to Tunisia’s 
first president, Habib Bourguiba, in 1956. Not only were women given the right to vote and divorce, but 
abortion was also legalized and polygamy outlawed. Now, these very rights have been called into question 
as the country continues to move through its democratic transition at a rather slow pace under the 
leadership of moderate-Islamist party Ennahda. While indications are that after much back and forth and 
many protests the legal status of women will remain intact, but the mood on the ground has definitely 
shifted. Women in Tunisia are fighting for their rights – and winning.”2  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Women in Tunisia have, for a considerable time, been regarded as the most liberated in 
comparison to women in Arab and Middle Eastern states.3 Although Morocco and Tunisia share 
many cultural characteristics, their paths to legal reform differ.  
Tunisia has been at the vanguard of the Arab and Middle Eastern world where family law is 
concerned and has made great strides to enhance and protect women’s fundamental rights.4 
Tunisia has been credited with drafting the first constitution in the Arab world almost one 
hundred and fifty years ago.5 Women occupy key judicial positions in Tunisia with the first 
 
1
 See Morse AD, and Sayeh LP “Tunisia: Marriage, Divorce, and Foreign Recognition” (1995) 29:3 Family Law 
Quarterly 701 at 701. 
2
 See Blume M “Women in Tunisia are Fighting for their Rights and Winning” available at 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/54901/women-in-tunisia-are-fighting-for-their-rights-and-winning [accessed 2 
February 2014]. 
3
 Ibid. Arab and Middle Eastern states have demonstrated diversity in the shaping of legal codes and their relation to 
women’s everyday lives.   
4
 See Wing AK and Kassim H “The Future of Palestinian Women’s Rights: Lessons from a Half-Century of 
Tunisian Progress” (2007) 16:4 Washington and Lee Law Review 1551 at 1552. 
5
 See Pickard D “The Current Status of Constitution Making in Tunisia” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (2012) 1 at 4 available at http://carnegieendowment.org [accessed 29 October 2013]. 
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woman appointed as a judge as early as 1968.6 Currently, twenty seven percent of all judges and 
thirty one percent of all lawyers are women.7  
The position of women during the period of French colonisation was, however, characterised by 
marginalisation and seclusion with little or no access to education. Economic activity was largely 
confined to the household, the wearing of the veil was widespread and the participation of 
women in the public sphere was non-existent. These conditions were interpreted as an expression 
of Islamic identity and, in particular, were thought to represent Tunisian culture.8 
As explained in the previous chapter, Chapter 4 is the second in a critical comparative trilogy 
exploring the rights, freedoms and status of women in Tunisian law as these pertain to marriage 
and divorce. In particular, attention will be paid to secularism and the Tunisian legal system as 
well as recent reforms in marriage and divorce law. The Tunisian response to the international 
human rights system as well as the African human rights framework will be examined critically 
against the backdrop of, amongst other, the African Union’s Solemn Declaration on Gender 
Equality (AU Solemn Declaration) and the African Decade of Women.  
The most significant historical developments in Tunisian family law will be considered next.  
4.2 Historical Overview   
Towards the end of the tenth century of the Christian Era (CE) the Tunisian population largely 
converted to Islam.9 The inhabitants of the North African region were of Arab-Berber descent, 
speaking either Arabic or a Berber dialect.10 Modern day Tunisia was under the French 
 
6
 See Wing AK and Kassim H “The Future of Palestinian Women’s Rights: Lessons from a Half-Century of 
Tunisian Progress” (2007) 16:4 Washington and Lee Law Review 1551 at 1552.  
7
 Ibid. See also Tunisia Mena Gender Equality Profile Status of Girls and Women in the Middle East and North 
Africa (2011) UNICEF Unite for Children available at http://www.unicef.org/gender/files/tunisia-Gender-Equality- 
Profile-2011.pdf  [accessed 20 October 2013].  
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. It is therefore comes as no surprise that the spread of Islam included the Arabic language which was 
influenced by the various dialects as practiced by the indigenous people that inhabited Tunisia before the Roman 
occupation. 
10
 See Catroux G “France, Tunisia and Morocco” (1954) 9:4 International Journal 282 at 282.  
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protectorate from 1881 until 195611 and, together with Algeria and Morocco, shared a sense of 
solidarity in their relationship with France, a foreign and non-Muslim state.12  
4.2.1 Islamic family law   
The family law practiced by the Tunisian society in the 1930s was essentially the shari’ah as 
interpreted by the Maliki and, to a lesser extent, the Hanafi schools of thought. These practices 
included adherence to all restrictions impacting on the legal status of women.13 There was no 
minimum age for marriage, except for the stipulation that marriage should take place after 
puberty. In addition, the actual ceremony that confirmed the marital contract was attended by the 
father, or in his absence the male guardian, who uttered the consent to the marriage.14 Divorce 
was essentially a private matter and the husband possessed the unilateral right to terminate the 
marriage by repudiating his wife without any judicial interference. This meant that the wife had 
no legal recourse. Polygyny was allowed and the husband could be married to as many as four 
wives at a time.15 Although, in reality, only a small minority of men could afford having more 
than one wife at a time, the legality of polygyny threatened women and pressured them into 
compliance with the husband’s wishes.  
The type of Islam developed by the Tunisian society was based on kin groupings that allowed 
male members of the group to have almost complete control over the status of women. The 
shari’ah, as inspired by the Maliki and Hanafi schools of thought, was particularly evident of 
this type of control. These two schools of thought also sanctioned a special bond amongst 
especially the male members of the extended kin group. The combined power of the husband and 
male kin over women’s lives, referred to by Charrad as “kin-based patriarchy”,16 represented a 
particular form of subordination and control that women experienced, not only in Tunisia, but 
also in most Arab and Middle Eastern states. 
 
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 See Angrist M “The Expression of Political Dissent in the Middle East: Turkish Democratization and 
Authoritarian Continuity in Tunisia” (1999) 41:4 Comparative Studies in Society and History 730 at 748.  
12
 Ibid. In 1953, the Moroccan Sultan was deposed, an event that stirred religious sentiments and a sense of 
solidarity in both Algeria and Tunisia.   
13
 See Charrad MM “State and Gender in the Maghrib” (1990) 163 Middle East Report 19 at 20. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 See Buskens L “Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Politics in an Emerging 
Public Sphere” (2003) 10:1 Islamic Law and Society 70 at 75.  
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The French colonial officials refrained from interfering with the prevailing Islamic law, although 
other laws, such as those pertaining to contracts and property, were amended for economic and 
political reasons.17 The French were only too aware that any interference with Tunisia’s Islamic 
family law could lead to social disorder, particularly as Tunisians viewed Islam as the 
cornerstone which both separated and distinguished their identity from the French. As a result, 
Islamic family law in Tunisia was left intact, serving as a point of differentiation between 
Tunisia and France.   
The Tunisian government eliminated all the special jurisdictions and consolidated all litigation 
before the national (secular) courts. Apart from the modification of shari’ah law, the government 
had to reconcile legal disputes which arose among the Muslim citizens. While the Hanafi and 
Maliki judges (qadis) continued to exist side by side during the Ottoman Empire, these two 
competitive jurisdictions could no longer be justified. To satisfy both schools of thought, a new 
law had to be produced on the basis of selective adaptation.18 As the new family law was to be a 
combination of the Hanafi and Maliki schools of thought, the Tunisian government thought it 
prudent to rely on codification instead of the old scholarly works of either of the two schools of 
thought. This created a path for the introduction of the Code of Personal Status (majallat al-
ahwal al-shakhsiyah) that had the flexibility of being applied by Western-trained judges in the 
national courts.19  
Once Tunisia gained independence from France it thus soon moved away from the Hanafi and 
Maliki schools of thought with the adoption of the Code of Personal Status of 1956. The 
promulgation of the Code of Personal Status was viewed as instrumental to Tunisia’s legal 
reform programme and the intention to build a modern state, thereby reducing tribal links, rather 
than as part of a feminist movement intended to secure women’s fundamental rights and 
freedoms.20 Consequently the shari’ah is mentioned neither in the Code of Personal Status of 
 
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 See Charrad MM “State and Gender in the Maghrib” (1990) 163 Middle East Reports 19 at 20. 
18
 This necessitated a codification of the family law: see Bonderman D “Modernization And Changing Perceptions 
of Islamic Law” (1968) 81 Harvard Law Review 1169 at 1185.  
19
 Ibid. Bourguiba believed that traditional clothing encouraged traditional thinking not required by Islam. In the 
words of Charrad “[i]n 1929, the prominent nationalist leader Habib Bourguiba urged Tunisian women to wear the 
veil. In 1957, Bourguiba, as president of Tunisia, called the veil ‘an odious rag’ and asked Tunisian women to drop 
it”: see Charrad MM “Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s” (1997) 4:2 Social Politics 
284 at 284.  
20
 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 


1956, nor in the Constitution of Tunisia of 1959, nor in the general rules of interpretation in the 
Code of Obligations and Contracts of 1906, including their subsequent amendments.21   
After independence Tunisia, in fact, enacted what could be described as a double reform in 
which the state not only abolished the shari’ah courts, but also made other significant 
substantive changes in family law.22 Although these reforms were quite advanced, they 
nevertheless preserved the distinctly Islamic influence. The Tunisian judicial system thus 
consisted of an elaborate melting pot influenced by the former Hanafi and Maliki shari’ah 
courts, a rabbinical tribunal for the Jews applying mosaic law, a small native community of 
Christians subject to the French Civil Code as applied by the Tunisian national courts, and 
finally, as per agreement with the French during negotiations, special “mixed” and “foreigners” 
courts responsible for the handling of disputes involving non-Tunisians.23     
4.2.2 Political independence and totalitarian rule 
It has been argued that the desire for independence stirs powerful emotions amongst those 
subjected to a foreign trusteeship or a colonial regime. These emotions transform into a 
collective stimulation of which the first manifestation is the arousal of a stream of nationalist 
aspirations among the elite.24 Tunisia is no exception. The Tunisian elite pursued the idea of 
political independence for three distinct reasons. First, preceding the French protectorate, Tunisia 
possessed a distinct national civilization and history. Secondly, the elite engrossed themselves in 
the notion of democracy and the democratic principles taught at school. France, contradictory to 
its proclaimed respect for civil liberties and freedom of the person, was perceived not to have the 
desire to introduce democratic principles in Tunisia.25 In the final instance, the Tunisian elite 
viewed the French protectorate as an instrument to further France’s own political dominance.26   
Not all states under French control displayed the same political characteristics. Whereas Algeria 
was under a special system of administrative sovereignty and, as such, formed an integral part of 
 
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 See, in general, Voorhoeve M “The Interaction between Codified Law and Divine Law: The Case of Divorce for 
Disobedience in Tunisia” (2009) 204 Revue de l’Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes 269 at 272.
22
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 See Catroux G “France, Tunisia and Morocco” (1954) 9:4 International Journal 282 at 284.   
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France, Morocco and Tunisia were tribal kingdoms. Morocco and Tunisia thus each possessed a 
distinct national personality as states, having accepted France’s protectorate as a result of 
committing to treaties concluded in 1881 and 1912, respectively.27 Although Tunisia remained 
sovereign, it abandoned its exterior jurisdiction, international relations, defence and security to 
France. France thus proceeded to institute reforms to the existing state institutions by means of 
legislative acts which incorporated the seals of the Tunisian sovereign.28  
Tunisia’s Destourian Socialist Party rose to prominence in the 1930s amid a boisterous period, 
characterised by a rise in nationalist movements in the Middle East and North Africa.29 The aim 
of the nationalist movements was to gain political independence and to bring about reform. In 
Tunisia there existed a great deal of dissatisfaction with the remedial progress of the nationalist 
movements and disillusionment with the intention of the colonial power. These conditions led to 
the rise of revolutionary indigenous forces wanting to distance themselves from traditional 
groupings and the creation of new institutions and practices. The latter did not necessarily wish 
to alienate themselves from their colonial master’s cultural heritage.30  
Following independence from France in 1956, Habib Bourguiba, a nationalist, acceded to power 
in Tunisia.31 Bourguiba was regarded as enlightened and dynamic, yet also as highly 
authoritarian. The creation of Tunisia’s Destourian Socialist Party was seen as a personal 
creation of Bourguiba whose aim was to exercise the French liberal democratic philosophy 
acquired through his education in France.32 The Destourian Socialist Party thus associated with 
French politics and ideas. Although careful not to descend into a civil war,33  Bourguiba was 
nevertheless willing to employ military, guerilla and terrorist tactics to ensure the complete 
 
27
 See Angrist M “The Expression of Political Dissent in the Middle East: Turkish Democratization and 
Authoritarian Continuity in Tunisia” (1999) 41:4 Comparative Studies in Society and History 730 at 748.  
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 Ibid.  
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 See Entelis J “Reformist Ideology in the Arab World: The Case of Tunisia and Lebanon” (1975) 37:4 The Review 
of Politics 513 at 517. 
30
 See Brown L “Bourguiba and Bourguibism Revisited: Reflections and Interpretation” (2001) 55:1 Middle East 
Journal 43 at 44. 
31
 See Mashour A “Islamic Law and Gender Equality: Could There Be a Common Ground?: A Study of Divorce and 
Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt” (2005) 27:2 Human Rights Quarterly 
562 at 584.  
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 See Sanchez A “Tunisia: Trading Freedom for Stability May Not Last – An International Security Perspective” 
(2009) 9:1 Defence Studies 85 at 85. 
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withdrawal of France from Tunisia. In 1959, the Constitution of Tunisia was ratified and 
Bourguiba elected president with over ninety nine percent of the votes.34 While it may well be 
argued that the legitimacy of his presidency was suspect, seeing that he was the only candidate, 
Bourguiba quite masterfully created a persona inextricably linked to the independence of 
Tunisia. Bourguiba, who assumed the title of supreme combatant (al-mujahid al-akbar) ruled as 
a de facto dictator for twenty eight years.35 
During its fifty years of independence from France, Tunisia thus had only two presidents, namely 
Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the former minister of the interior who seized power 
after a bloodless coup d’état against Bourguiba.36 In 1987 Ben Ali unseated an aging Bourguiba 
with promises of democratic reforms in Tunisia. Ben Ali’s regime soon tightened its grip over 
Tunisia, however, which resulted in a dictatorship worse than that of his predecessor. But since 
Ben Ali lacked Bourguiba’s historical legitimacy as the founding father of Tunisia who won 
independence from France,37 he compensated by expanding the security forces fourfold, thereby 
confirming Tunisia’s position as the most heavily policed state. 
In 2009, just two years before the Tunisian uprising, the then president, Ben Ali, was re-elected 
for a fifth term by an astonishing, albeit fraudulent, voter percentage in excess of eighty nine 
percent of the total voter turnout on the day of elections.38 Ben Ali’s party, the Rassemblement 
constiutionnel démocratique, held a strong position within the National Assembly and could 
boast members in the millions, quite a noteworthy achievement in a population of slightly over 
ten million. The opposition in Tunisia was composed of a limited number of small, personalised, 
 
34
 See Entelis J “Reformist Ideology in the Arab World: The Case of Tunisia and Lebanon” (1975) 37:4 The Review 
of Politics 513 at 518. 
35
 The life and work of Bourguiba is essential to understand contemporary Tunisia. Bourguiba led Tunisia to 
independence and ruled as a dictator for more than thirty years. The policies that Bourguiba initiated, including 
political suppression, female empowerment and government economic growth, continued largely unchanged during 
the rule of Ben Ali. The Arab uprising that forced Ben Ali from power caused this system of government to 
collapse. 
36
 Bourguiba’s reign ended because of old age and a bungled re-trail of suspect Islamist terrorists. This corroborated 
speculation that Bourguiba, already eighty four years old, was becoming senile and unfit for office. Executions were 
also viewed as too hash a sentence in a state that typically imprisoned or exiled Islamist dissenters. Ben Ali 
effectively forced Bourguiba into retirement. 
37
 See Wing AK “International Law, Secularism, and the Islamic World” (2009) 24:3 American University 
International Law Review 407 at 423. 
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 See Murphy E “The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy” (2011) 16:2 Mediterranean 
Politics 299 at 299. 
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largely localised, and for all intended purposes, co-opted political parties.39 Co-option ensured 
the eradication or forced exile of any effective parties and/or persons. With a large and 
intimidating internal security force at the disposal of the president, including his own family and 
wife, coupled with a persistent influence over the economic resources of Tunisia, the Ben Ali 
family seemed untouchable. Such was the control of the seventy four year old Ben Ali over the 
political and economic sphere of Tunisia that any deliberations relating to succession were 
confined to suitable candidates from within his own family. Little therefore came of Ben Ali’s 
promises of democracy upon seizing power in 1987, in fact, his absolutist rule ensured that the 
door on any democratic reform was firmly shut and locked.40  
The impact and significance of secularism on the Tunisian legal system will be considered next. 
4.3 Secularism and the Tunisian Legal System   
Tunisian family law is often referred to as “secular”. It applies to all Tunisians regardless of their 
religion and deviates considerably from traditional interpretations of classical Islamic law by the 
Maliki and Hanafi schools of thought.41  
Prior to the December and January uprisings of 2011 and 2012, Tunisia was considered to have a 
stable, authoritarian government that placed a higher priority on economic growth than on 
political liberalisation. During the early parts of 2011, the international community observed a 
series of changing events starting in North Africa and spreading to the Middle East,42 commonly 
referred to as the Arab uprisings.43  
4.3.1 A democratic revolution 
Tunisia’s presidential family, commonly referred to as the Royal Family or the Family, dealt 
with competitors through continued harassment, including imprisonment.44 The alleged extortion 
 
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 See Voorhoeve M “The Interaction between Codified Law and Divine Law: The Case of Divorce for 
Disobedience in Tunisia” (2009) 204 Revue de l’Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes 269 at 272. 
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 See Murphy E “The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy” (2011) 16:2 Mediterranean 
Politics 299 at 299. 
 
 
 
 


of public and private ownership of land, including bank loans and shares in certain business 
enterprises, marked the final decade of power of the presidential family.45 This was confirmed in 
2006 by the ambassador of the United States of America who confidentially reported that more 
than half of Tunisia’s commercial elite were personally associated with the former president 
through his three adult children and several siblings, including children from a previous 
marriage.46 
Women’s rights activists argued that their work in the promotion and protection of women’s 
rights was severely restricted by the insistence of the first lady, Leila Ben Ali, to play a leading 
role in various women’s rights organisations. The first lady apparently used her husband’s 
women’s rights advocacy to secure positions of leadership in various national and regional 
organisations, such as the Arab League of Women, the Arab’s Women’s Commission for 
International Humanitarian Law, the World Association of Women Entrepreneurs as well as the 
Association for Employment of the Handicapped.47  
Although the level of political corruption was alarming, Tunisian governmental institutions 
remained relatively stable.48 But in December 2010, an unemployed Mohammed Bouazizi, tried 
to set up a market stall selling fruit. Lacking a permit, his wares were confiscated by the police 
and reports surface that Bouazizi was slapped and beaten.49 In an act of total despair and 
humiliation, Bouazizi protested by dousing himself in paint thinner and set himself alight. This 
immediately sparked local riots in his hometown, Sidi Bouzid.50 Within weeks, social unrest 
spread rapidly from Tunisia to states across the Middle East and North Africa region. 
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 See Anderson L “Demystifying the Arab Spring” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com [accessed 29 
September 2013]. 
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The unrest which Tunisia experienced has been intertwined with a technological and digital 
explosion through social media networks such as Facebook,51 Twitter52 and You Tube.53 The 
proliferation of internet penetrations sites, social media activity and mobile phones played a 
significant role in the Arab uprising,54 as social media has the ability to facilitate dialogue 
amongst a network of activists who instigate calls for reform. Social media undoubtedly played 
an important role in attracting regional, national and international attention to the plight of the 
protesters, gathering support and even swaying international opinion.55 A more politically 
contextualised approach would be needed, however, to assess how state run Arab media served 
to legitimise their respective political regimes and how the international media played a less than 
critical role when reporting on these events,56 including their own governments’ trade and arms 
initiatives and conciliatory diplomatic relations with politically oppressive regimes.57  
As the unrest progressed in Tunisia, it became apparent that the police and army were not in a 
position to curb the spread of the protestors. Ben Ali employed the presidential guard to counter 
the protesters58 and General Ammar, the army chief of staff, was ordered to deploy the army. 
This order was rejected by Ammar which resulted in saving the revolution and forcing the 
president into exile.59 Although Bourguiba deliberately kept the army out of politics during his 
three decades as president and barred members of the armed forces from joining the ruling 
party,60 Ben Ali initially enjoyed the endorsement of military.61 The opinion of the military 
 
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changed, however, when Ben Ali and his family were implicated in corruption and became an 
obstacle to development and political reform.62 
4.3.2 Constitutional reform and the rise of an Islamist movement  
Post-revolution Tunisia was at a crossroads as it encountered a daunting transition towards a 
more democratic form of government. In August 2011, the transitional authorities embarked 
upon a number of initiatives, commencing with Fouad Mebazza, the President of the Chamber of 
Deputies, assuming the role of acting president. Ben Ali’s long-serving prime-minister, 
Mohamed Ghannouchi, regarded by many as an efficient technocrat, was retained.63 Ghannouchi 
established various commissions mandated to lead the process of constitutional reform, to 
liberate the media, to investigate crimes perpetrated by the ancient régime during the uprising 
and to expose corrupt practices. Fears that Ghannouchi were too close to the old order led to the 
appointment of Beji Caid Essebsi as interim prime minister.64 Essebsi expanded the 
constitutional reform commission to consist of various political parties, civil society 
organisations, professional and labor unions and independent personalities.65   
The constitutional reform commission, headed by Yadh Ben Achour, was hailed as an effective 
consensus-building body.66 The constitutional reform commission was charged with the 
consolidation of democracy in Tunisia (as this pertained to voting rules and free and fair 
elections) on the basis of public consensus and agreed that the first popular vote to be held would 
be to elect the members of the National Constituent Assembly. The National Constituent 
Assembly would be responsible for the drafting of a new constitution for voter approval that 
would introduce either a presidential, semi-presidential or a parliamentary system of 
government.67 The decision to elect the members of the National Constituent Assembly by 
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popular vote was deferred, however, as it was argued that a directly elected president should 
have the power to shape the process of constitutional reform in Tunisia.68  
The members of the constitutional reform commission were in agreement that the National 
Constituent Assembly should be afforded the status of a legitimate elected body and should 
possess powers similar to those of parliament, including a vote of no confidence. The 
constitutional reform commission proposed a system of proportional representation.69 Stepan 
rightly points out that had a Westminster-style system of plurality elections in single-member 
districts been opted for, the Islamist party, Ennahda (also referred to as al-Nahda)70 would have 
won nine of every ten seats, instead of the four in ten seats it was able to acquire under the 
system of proportional representation.71 To ensure the strong participation of women in the 
process of constitutional drafting, the constitutional reform commission agreed on male-female 
parity on candidate lists. The first party to accept this gender-parity provision was Ennahda.72  
To ensure free and fair elections, Tunisia’s first independent electoral commission was 
established and provision was made for the participation of as many international electoral 
observers as possible.73 It was agreed that Ben Ali’s official party should be banned and that 
some of its leaders should refrain from standing as candidates in the first election. Ben Ali’s 
former party members were, however, free to form new political parties to contest the 
elections.74 In April 2011, members of the constitutional reform commission voted on these 
proposals to create a democratic transition. Surprisingly, only two members of the constitutional 
reform commission walked out and two more abstained from voting.75A formal basis for a 
successful transition to democracy had thus been created providing the platform for the elections. 
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In October 2011, Tunisia held its first free elections since gaining independence from France in 
1956. The Tunisian people choose a two hundred and seventeen-member National Constituent 
Assembly, whose largest single party (with forty one percent of the seats) was Ennahda. 76 The 
party, which was previously banned and which did not play a prominent role in the uprising,77 
formed a coalition government headed by Hamadi Jebali, a former political prisoner.78 Serious 
concerns exist that Ennahda will erode Tunisia’s secularist approach to governance, thereby 
reversing the progress made by women over many decades in promoting and protecting their 
fundamental rights.79 Now free from dictatorship, Tunisians are eager to re-appropriate their 
cultural and religious identity. Gray rightly argues that Tunisians now feel free to explore and 
pursue different religious expressions of which the wearing of headscarves and the growing of 
beards are the most common.80  
Conservative religious ideas find resonance with Ennahda and, to a lesser extent, with extremist 
fringe parties such as Hizb Ut Tahrir.81 The influence of Ennahda appears to extend beyond the 
debate on women’s rights, however. The celebration of martyrs, such as Bouazizi, has been 
condemned by Ennahda activists who have expressed the view that suicide is a sin in Islam and a 
person who commits suicide should neither be revered nor be regarded as a national hero.82 
Dalacoura argues that this sends a clear signal to the people of Tunisia that Ennahda intends to 
follow a moderate form of Islam condemming violence, even if directed at oneself and even if 
the purpose is to attain a political objective.83   
It is to be welcomed that a range of Ennahda party officials, such as the co-founder and leader 
Ghannouchi and Jebali, including members of the executive committee and regular party 
affiliates at different levels of decision-making, are unanimous that the progress made in 
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advancing the rights of women would not be jeopardised.84 Tunisia is thus once more engaged in 
the process of constitution making, albeit outside the influence of dictatorship and colonial 
rule.85 Since the National Constituent Assembly began discussions in February 2012, the role of 
religion in the new constitutional dispensation, in particular whether any reference should be 
made to the shari’ah, has become a sensitive issue. In March 2012, Ennahda declared its 
opposition to the inclusion of the shari’ah in the preamble to the constitution, fearing that a 
vague or imprecise reference in the preamble would unavoidably require judicial interpretation.86 
Moreover, Ennahda wanted to make the point that the inclusion of the shari’ah, or any reference 
thereto, is not to be regarded as a precondition for establishing a democratic dispensation that is 
compatible with Islam.87 This all but guaranteed that the new constitution would contain nothing 
more than a reference to Islam similar to Article 1 of the Constitution of Tunisia of 1957 which 
read:  
“Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state. Its religion is Islam, its language is Arabic, and its government is 
the Republic”. 
One of the most pressing questions confronting the National Constituent Assembly concerns the 
choice between a parliamentary and a presidential system of government.88 Ennahda supports a 
parliamentary system, believing it to limit executive power. By contrast, Ennahda’s ally, the 
Congress for the Republic, as well as most secular parties, support a presidential system of 
government. Parties such as the Republican party, comprising primarily of the Progressive 
Democratic Party and Afek Tounes, which is considered to be the second largest parliamentary 
group behind Ennahda, supports a mixed system where the executive power is shared between an 
elected president and a prime minister elected by parliament, as is the case in France.89  
The decision surrounding the question of which type of government will best suit Tunisia will 
undoubtedly affect other structural questions, such as the balancing of power, within a 
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constitutional context. The drafters of the new constitution understandably desire to move away 
from the Bourguiba and Ben Ali political eras whose governments had a stranglehold on the 
power of the executive. The National Constituent Assembly thus proposed to enforce the balance 
of power, first, by ensuring that the new constitution strengthens the legislative oversight of the 
executive, thereby reinstating parliamentary control of the budget and providing parliament with 
greater transparency90 and, secondly, by establishing a constitutional court, a first for Tunisia. 
Currently Tunisian courts follow the French system in which the Court of Cassation (Cour de 
cassation) is the highest court of appeal, also adjudicating constitutional matters. Thirdly, the 
National Constituent Assembly seeks to include a flexible, but consensus based amendment 
procedure which allows for limited executive interference, in stark contrast to the Bourguiba 
era’s manipulation of constitution reforms that only required a two-thirds majority by the 
Chamber of Deputies, a body ultimately controlled by the president.91  
Civil groups have vigorously campaigned for the inclusion of broad human rights provisions in 
the constitution that can hold the security machinery accountable, especially in so far as the 
practice of harsh interrogations is concerned.92 Officials in the Interior Ministry have, for 
example, called for the separation of the domestic intelligence services from the national police 
as well as for the decentralisation of the police force. The issue of decentralisation is a key 
challenge as centralisation was instrumental in fostering corruption under the Ben Ali regime. 
Central planning privileged export-oriented firms over domestic markets and thus benefitted the 
coastal regions, while leaving behind the interior.93The question of centralisation may well be 
dealt with through the medium of legislation or under the banner of the Interior Minister, rather 
than through the constitution.  
While the National Constituent Assembly was tasked to attend to various technical issues, it also 
had to respond to the increasing impatience of Tunisians on the perceived slow progress on 
legislative, economic and security sector reforms deemed to be a priority. Economic reform 
presented a serious challenge for the drafters of the constitution as Tunisians were demanding 
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jobs and economic growth, while none have been forthcoming. Consequently, some have sadly 
begun to lose interest in the process of constitutional reform. 
The mission to adopt a new constitution within one year was disrupted by bitter divisions 
between Ennahda and the secular opposition, coupled with jihadist violence and persistent social 
unrest. Months of political deadlock led to an intolerable situation. Ennahda eventually agreed to 
relinquish power, thus allowing technocrat prime minister-designate, Mehdi Jomaa, to form a 
government of independents to lead Tunisia to new elections. These events created the necessary 
political climate conducive for the National Constituent Assembly to conclude its mandate.  
The new Constitution of Tunisia was signed by outgoing Islamist premier Ali Larayedh, Speaker 
Mustapha Ben Jaafar and President Moncef Marzouki during a ceremony at the National 
Constituent Assembly in January 2014. Hailed as a historic document, Marzouki stressed in his 
speech to the National Constituent Assembly that: 
“[w]ith the birth of this text, we confirm our victory over dictatorship … [but] much work remains to make the 
values of our constitution a part of our culture”.94 
The Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 divides the executive power between the prime minister, 
who will have the dominant role, and the president, who retains important prerogatives, notably 
in defence and foreign affairs.95 The new constitution will enter into force in stages after its 
official publication and in the run-up to parliamentary and presidential elections expected to take 
place in October 2014, the official dates still to be decided by the electoral body set up in 
January 2014.  
The protracted, and at times heated, debate on issues concerning women’s rights and the role of 
Islam in the new constitutional order produced a compromise which some observers have 
warned is at times incoherent and/or vague. Chapter 2 of the Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 sets 
out the fundamental “Rights and Liberties” and expressly guarantees equality between men and 
women. To this end, Article 20 provides that: 
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“[a]ll citizens, male and female alike, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any 
discrimination. The state guarantees to citizens, male and female, individual and collective rights, and provides them 
with conditions for a dignified life”. 
The Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 furthermore addresses the rights and equal representation of 
women and mandates the state to eliminate violence against women. Article 45 expressly 
provides that: 
“[t]he state commits to protecting women’s achieved rights and seeks to support and develop them. The state 
guarantees equal opportunities between men and women in the bearing of all the various responsibilities in all fields. 
The state seeks to achieve equal representation for women and men in elected councils (parity). The state takes the 
necessary measures to eliminate violence against women”. 
Tunisia is declared a “civil” state in Article 2 founded on “citizenship, the will of the people, and 
the supremacy of law”. Article 2 furthermore expressly states that “[t]his article cannot be 
amended”. The rule of law is thus explicitly recognised and the state is mandated to fulfil the role 
of the “guardian of religion” and “protector of the sacred”.96 As anticipated, shari’ah is not 
mentioned as a source of legislation, although Islam is recognised as the national religion of 
Tunisia in Article 1 which likewise cannot be amended.97 The state is mandated in Article 6 to 
“protect religion” and to: 
“guarantee freedom of belief and conscience and religious practices, protect sanctities, and ensure the neutrality of 
mosques and places of worship away from partisan instrumentalisation. The state is committed to spreading the 
values of moderation and tolerance, and to protect the sacred and prevent it from being attacked, and is also 
committed to prohibit charges of apostasy (takfir) and incitement to hatred and violence, and to combat them”. 
Moreover, Article 30 guarantees “freedom of opinion, thought, expression, media and 
publication” and expressly stipulates that “[t]hese freedoms shall not be subject to prior 
censorship”. Since the formulations of Article 6 and Article 30 are rather vague and open to 
interpretation, it remains to be seen whether freedom of religion and conscience will be 
threatened and whether mosques and other places of worship will indeed be placed out of the 
bounds of political activity.   
The most significant recent reforms in Tunisia concerning marriage will be considered next. 
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4.4 Recent Reforms in Marriage  
Continuous reforms of the Code of Personal Status to attain gender equality has earned Tunisia 
the title as the most progressive state in North Africa and the Middle East in so far as the 
promotion and protection of women’s rights are concerned. Tahar Haddad, a progressive scholar 
of the Zitouna Great Mosque, is often credited in Tunisian history as the inspiration for a 
religious, social and political discourse that influenced development and guaranteed the 
promotion and protection of women’s rights.98 He called for the formal education of women and 
held the view that Islam has been misinterpreted to such an extent that women were unaware of 
their rights and the advantages due to them.99 Haddad rightly argued against any abuse and 
affirmed that Islam ought not to be seen as an obstacle in the promotion and protection of 
women’s rights. In fact, he argued that Islam must thus be seen as a medium for the advancement 
of women.100  
The Tunisian Code of Personal Status is based on the shari’ah and, as such, has derived its 
legitimacy from a modern interpretation of Islamic law. Upon its creation, the drafters used a 
process referred to as takhayyur to establish principles which would suit the best interest of the 
Tunisian people within the context of the dominant schools of thought.101  
Before political independence, Tunisia employed a broad notion of the family in which the 
individual’s extended family was regarded as a source of life, identity and, to a large degree, 
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social legitimacy. The notion of the extended family was decidedly patriarchal and this idea was 
transferred from the private domain into Tunisia’s political system and labour force. This created 
a patriarchal hierarchy in which individual liberty was sacrificed to a senior member of the 
family, government or workplace while the individual relied on and trusted the latter to make 
significant decisions on his or her behalf.102  
The Code of Personal Status of 1956 signaled a drastic shift in the interpretation of Islamic law 
within the context of the family.103 The Code of Personal Status embraces the concept of the 
nuclear family, comprising of husband, wife and children. This resulted in a break away from the 
model of the old extended family and served to lessen the stranglehold of patriarchy on women 
who, in particular, bore the brunt of the old family model. The objective of the Code of Personal 
Status was to redefine the status of women within the context of the family, rather than 
redefining Islamic laws dealing with the family as such. The unshackling of rights and freedoms 
due to women under the Code of Personal Status of 1956 was hitherto unprecedented.  
The Code of Personal Status of 1956 requires the personal consent from both spouses to the 
marriage.104 This requirement brought arranged marriages to an end.105 The prescribed minimum 
age for marriage was set at seventeen and twenty years for women and men, respectively. In 
2007, however, the marital age was amended to eighteen years for both spouses in an apparent 
attempt to lessen the influence of both the family and the extended family.106 Statistics gathered 
by Betgeorge illustrate a steady increase in the average age of women entering into marriage 
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since the adoption of the Code of Personal Status in 1956.107 The raising of the marital age could 
be seen to provide women with an opportunity to further their education, thereby creating a civil 
society that adds value to economic growth and the general emancipation of women.  
Women with a higher degree of learning are statistically more likely to conclude a marriage 
outside of her kin thereby ensuring greater autonomy from the family.108 And yet a Muslim 
woman is not permitted by law to marry a non-Muslim man and should the couple enter into 
marriage in another state to circumvent this prohibition, the marriage will not be recognised in 
Tunisia. A Muslim man is, however, permitted to marry a woman who does not subscribe to his 
faith. This prohibition confirms that traditional conceptions and stereotypical assumptions about 
roles in the family have not been entirely dismantled in Tunisian family law. Women are still 
regarded as, and confined to the status of, the primary caregiver, while men are still deemed to be 
the moral compass of the family, the assumption being that children who have a non-Muslim 
father will not be raised in the faith of their mother.  
Article 32 of the Code of Personal Status of 1956 stipulates five requirements for a valid 
marriage contract. The marriage contract must include: (a) the names, professions, ages, dates 
and places of birth, domiciles, residences, and the nationalities of the spouses; (b) the names, 
professions, domicile, and nationalities of the parents; (c) a declaration by the witnesses that 
neither spouse has an existing marriage commitment; (d) the names of any previous spouse of 
the parties, with the date of death or divorce which terminate the previous marriage; and (e) the 
consent or permission of both spouses and a specific dower in favor of the wife. The 
transparency required by Article 32 is to be welcomed and the explicit insistence on the consent 
or permission of both spouses may well alleviate fears of duress exerted by the family. By 
ensuring the free and full consent of the parties, the Code of Personal Status of 1956 insists on 
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the presence of the bride and that she expresses her opinion directly. A certificate delivered by 
the civil registry or by two notaries constitutes proof of the marriage.109 Although a marriage 
contract which does not conform to the abovementioned formalities will be considered void, the 
union will nevertheless bear legal consequences. In particular, children born from the marriage 
will be deemed legitimate, the wife will still be required to observe the waiting period (iddah) 
from the date that the contract was pronounced void, and the prohibited degrees of affinity will 
remain applicable.110 
A certificate of good health must be produced by both spouses, thus further ensuring 
transparency and freedom of choice.111 The prospective spouses both have the right to include 
stipulations in the marital contract which may include provisions relating to the division of 
property upon divorce or the right of the spouses to complete their education. In terms of Article 
12 of the Code of Personal Status of 1956, the dower shall consist of anything that is lawful 
which has a monetary value attached to it.112 The dower is the property of the woman which she 
may dispose of as she wishes. Article 13 states that the husband shall not in default of payment 
of the dower force the wife to consummate the marriage. After consummation of the marriage, 
the dower shall constitute an unsecured debt of which only the wife may claim payment. Finally, 
refusal to pay the dower shall not be a cause for divorce. 
 
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fasid include instances where the marriage occurred without witnesses, where a woman remarried under her iddah 
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Of particular significance is the fact that the Code of Personal Status of 1956 eliminates the legal 
prerogative of the father or the guardian to give a woman in marriage against her free will. In the 
words of President Bourguiba: 
 “this change in law, represented in our minds a choice of progress … the end of a barbaric age and the beginning of 
an ear of social equilibrium and civilization … we must fight anachronistic traditions and backward mentalities”.113  
Furthermore, Article 153, which was amended in 1993, grants a married woman who is a minor 
the right to manage her own affairs as she is deemed emancipated through marriage. Tunisian 
women married to a foreign national may now pass on their nationality to their children, 
provided that the father consents to this arrangement. It remains unclear why children born from 
such a marriage may not simply qualify for dual nationality. The strong patriarchal undercurrent 
is underscored by the fact that the children born from the marriage of a Tunisian man and a 
foreign national will automatically bear their father’s nationality. 
The practice of polygyny has been proscribed in Tunisia since 1956.114 Article 18 of the Code of 
Personal Status of 1956 explicitly states: 
“[p]olygamy is prohibited. Marrying more than one woman shall incur a punishment of one year’s imprisonment 
and a fine of 240,000 francs or either of them”. 
Bourguiba spearheaded the barring of polygyny, arguing that the Qur’anic verse requiring the 
equal treatment of wives was an impossible ideal.115 In addition, Bourguiba motivated that 
polygyny, like slavery, should be prohibited as the practice was revealed in a special context at 
the time of its revelation. Properly interpreted, the Qur’anic the verse thus, in fact, supports 
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monogamy.116 The true intention of Muhammad (PBUH)117 was thus to both strengthen and 
guard the institution of marriage, given the conditions prevailing in seventh-century Arabia.118 
Not surprisingly, the traditionalists were deeply unsatisfied with this particular interpretation and 
argued that the Qur’anic verse requiring the equal treatment of wives had always been regarded 
as a moral suggestion.119 The traditionalists argued that the verse clearly referred only to the 
financial treatment of wives and other similar equalities subject to human competence. 
Bourguiba’s understanding was thus deemed to be in direct conflict with the traditional 
interpretation of the practice of polygyny.120 And although some have argued that Article 18 of 
the Code of Personal Status of 1956 had not rendered polygynous marriages invalid, but merely 
instituted secular sanctions,121 the Minister of Justice, Al Snousi, stood firm in the conviction 
that the equal treatment of wives was impossible.122  
Mashhour argues that actions that are permitted in Islam, but that are not mandatory or 
recommended, can be regulated or restricted for the sake of public welfare. As the practice of 
polygyny was permitted, but not mandatory or recommended, polygyny could be regulated and 
even prohibited. Public sentiment on the prohibition of polygyny in Tunisia was surprisingly 
muted,123 even though a religious decree (fatwa) was issued by the religious scholars (ulama) 
declaring the prohibition intolerable.124 Tunisia is to be commended for remaining steadfast in its 
decision to proscribe the practice of polygyny. By recognising that the equal treatment of a 
plurality of wives is impossible, Tunisia has indirectly condemned the idea that women are to be 
deemed possessions and/or symbols enhancing the social, economic or political status of men. 
By outlawing polygyny, Tunisia may well also have ensured a degree of psychological comfort 
 
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and stability for women who may otherwise live in fear that their husbands marry a second, third 
or fourth wife. 
 
The marital duties of the spouses are set out in Article 23 of the Code of Personal Status of 1956. 
Article 23 stipulates that the wife must fulfill her matrimonial duties “in conformity with usages 
and custom”. Article 23 thus implies acceptance of pre-modern Islamic jurists’ thinking that a 
wife must accede to the husband’s sexual demands in the absence of a valid excuse. Mayer 
correctly points out that there is no stipulation that mutual affection should be the foundation for 
marital attachment or that cohabitation could be interpreted as the spouses’ mutual obligation.125 
Subsequent to the amendment of the Code of Personal Status in 1993, Article 23 now includes a 
provision requiring the wife to contribute to the family financially if the she has the means to do 
so, while retaining the jurists’ interpretation that it is the wife’s unilateral duty to cohabit.126  
 
Article 23 thus promotes the (modern) idea that the spouses should share the responsibility 
relating to the upkeep of the family, which one could argue deviates from the position in 
traditional Islamic family law. The contribution of women in marriage as a generator of 
economic resources is thus now explicitly recognised. The parties are jointly obliged to manage 
the home, raise the children and to provide for the needs of the children. 
 
The introduction of modern principles on an ad hoc basis by the Code of Personal Status of 1956 
does not, however, mean that the wife always stands to benefit from such principles. Article 23 
also admonishes the husband to treat his wife with “respect” (prior to the 1993 amendment the 
term “benevolence” was used) and to live in good relations with her, instructing him to avoid 
doing her any “harm”.127 This could perhaps be interpreted as a reflection of the uneasiness of 
the legislator when contemplating the lack of mutuality in the spousal relationship.128 By 
admonishing the husband not to harm the wife, legislators were effectively admitting that they 
 
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had given the husband unrivalled powers that would put him in a position where there was room 
for abuse at the expense of the wife. 
 
Although Article 23 restates the principle that the husband is still the “head of the family”, this 
provision could be interpreted to mean that the husband retains his decision making prerogatives 
to which the wife should accede or that the husband carries the primary responsibility to provide 
for the family.129 Yet due to the imprecise and vague nature of the terms “respect” and “harm”, 
the retention of the husband as the “head of the family”, as well as the express reference to 
“usages and customs”, will leave a judge with almost no alternative but to resort to the shari’ah 
as a guide to interpretation. The shari’ah will thus in effect be used as a subsidiary source of law. 
Article 23 is thus a clear example of a provision which contradicts the highly acclaimed secular 
character of Tunisian law.130        
In terms of Article 6 of the Code of Personal Status of 1956, a mother exercised no rights and 
could not intervene in decisions concerning the marriage of the minor children. The amendment 
of this provision in 1993 brought this inequality to an end. Article 6 now enjoins the mother to 
authorise the marriage of all minor children.131 Joint parental authority has accordingly been 
established. Article 6 now clearly stipulates that the marriage of a minor shall be subject to the 
consent of his or her guardian, as well as the consent of the mother. The new provision thus 
obliges the redistribution of responsibilities within the sphere of the family by aiming to enhance 
a degree of gender equality.132 And yet Article 6 does not vest the mother with the authority of a 
guardian as only the father or his (male) representative could bear this status. So although it is to 
be welcomed that the mother’s consent is required in so far as the marriage of minor children is 
concerned, Article 6 still entrenches male privilege. 
In recognition of the innovative reforms concerning the status of women, Tunisia chaired the 
sub-commission on the “Sharing of Family Chores and Responsibilities” at two sessions of the 
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women held in New York in 1997 and 1998, 
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respectively, to assess the implementation of national action plans and strategies emanating from 
the Bejing Conference of 1995.133   
The recent legal reforms pertaining to divorce will be examined next. 
4.5 Recent Reforms in Divorce   
The reforms pertaining to divorce may at first appear less impressive when compared to those 
concerning marriage, however, their implications are far reaching and relate to gender roles and 
the dynamic of the family.  
The Maliki school of thought is of the view that the only requirement for repudiation is the 
presence of two witnesses and requires no judicial intervention for the termination of the 
marriage by the husband.134 The Hanafi school of thought, in turn, endorses a decidedly relaxed 
approach displaying an almost unreserved bias towards the husband.135 No formal proceedings of 
any sort were necessary as the divorced wife was often entitled neither to support nor to the 
custody of the children. Although a wife could petition a court for divorce, the husband could 
still affect a divorce at any time by pronouncing the correct formula. 
The Code of Personal Status of 1956 insists that a divorce may only be granted by the national 
courts. Article 30 forthrightly declares: 
“[n]o divorce shall take place save before the court”.  
Article 30 thus effectively restricts the right of the husband to unilaterally repudiate his wife. 
This serves to curb male privilege and could be said to protect a wife against a protracted and 
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133
 The Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace was held in Beijing, 
China, on 4 to 15 September 1995. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted on 15 September 
1995 and embodies the commitment of the international community to the advancement of women and to the 
implementation of the Platform for Action, ensuring that a gender perspective is reflected in all policies and 
programmes at the national, regional and international levels. The Platform for Action sets out measures for national 
and international action for the advancement of women over the five years until 2000. 
134
 See Charrad MM “Family Law Reforms in Morocco in The Arab World: Tunisia and Morocco” (2014) Report 
for the United Nations “Good Practices in Family Policy Making: Family Policy Development, Monitoring and 
Implementation: Lessons Learnt” Convened as part of the preparations for the twentieth anniversary of the 
International Year of the Family 1 at 5.  
135
 Under the Hanafi school of thought there are several different expressions that are acceptable to indicate divorce, 
including the pronouncement under compulsion, while the husband was drunk or temporarily insane, or even where 
the husband intended the pronouncement as a threat. 
 
 
 
 
	

uncertain process.136 Article 32 stipulates that a divorce can be initiated by both parties, but a 
judicial reconciliation process is compulsory in all instances.137 In 1993 the legislator delegated 
these types of proceedings to the office of a family magistrate specialising in personal status.138 
The function of the court is thus to designate a family magistrate to oversee the process of 
reconciliation as a means to ensure that the legal proceedings run smoothly.139 The divorce 
proceedings will not, for example, be stalled should the respondent fail to appear at the 
reconciliation hearings.  
The mandatory judicial reconciliation process is to be welcomed as it bears distinct benefits. Of 
particular importance is the fact that the involvement of the families of the respective spouses is 
curtailed, thus avoiding possible bias and increased strained relations among the extended 
families. A certain stigma is still attached to divorce, especially in Arab and Middle Eastern 
countries, and the family may exert pressure on the couple to remain married to uphold the 
family name. By insisting on a formal judicial reconciliation process, domestic violence and 
physical abuse, that may otherwise have remained hidden, can be detected.  
Article 31, as amended in 1993, sets out the three primary grounds for divorce. First, divorce 
may be obtained by mutual consent (b-al-taradi). Divorce by mutual consent does not require the 
court to determine which party is at fault, and neither party is entitled to receive compensation.140  
Secondly, divorce may be obtained on the basis of prejudice (darar). Although “prejudice” is not 
defined, four main grounds have crystallised through judicial interpretation. These include 
instances where the husband fails in his obligation to render maintenance (‘adam al-infaq or 
ihmal), on the basis of the infidelity of the spouses (zina), or in the instance of (domestic) 
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violence (‘unf).141 If the wife fails to obey and respect her husband (nushuz), the latter would also 
be entitled to seek a divorce.142 This ground of disobedience is not found directly in statutory 
provisions as it was removed from the Code of Personal Status of 1956 by the 1993 amendment. 
Voorhoeve thus argues that what judges conceptualise as “disobedience” actually relates to 
instances where the wife refuses to follow the husband when he relocates. By confirming the 
position of the husband as the “head of the family”, the Code of Personal Status of 1956 seems to 
suggest that the husband, as the principal breadwinner, has the ultimate right to decide where the 
family resides. The “prejudice” thus consists in the wife’s violation of the duty to cohabitate. 
While nushuz is interpreted broader in Islamic law than the violation of the obligation to 
cohabitate and would, for instance, include the refusal to have sexual intercourse, the Tunisian 
courts do not refer to the latter as nushuz.143 
Thirdly, divorce may also be obtained without a motive. In this instance both parties may obtain 
a divorce without the need of proving fault. This type of divorce is similar to oral repudiation as 
evidence or a legal ground is not required for such a divorce.144 In contrast to repudiation, 
however, divorce without legal motive can only be granted by the court.145  
The amendment in 1993 to the Code of Personal Status of 1956 establishes a fund for alimony 
and divorce annuity that ensures payment of pensions and annuities, as established by the court, 
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when the husband refuses to honour his financial commitments.146 To this end, a fund has been 
established to pay fixed amounts of divorce alimony to the wife. In addition, the amendment also 
allows for the criminal prosecution of the husband in case of an abandonment of the family. 
However, in practice the payment of compensation has been minimised by the somewhat 
formalistic nature of the compulsory judicial reconciliation process with the courts’ refusal to 
assess anything more than nominal compensation.147 Nevertheless, for the first time the wife 
enjoys equality with the husband, in theory at least. From a procedural point of view, the 
provisions rendering all extra judicial divorces invalid is particularly novel, for many of the more 
radical reforms in the Near East which have criminal penalties but have not made the prohibited 
act legally invalid.  
Once again Tunisia justified innovation on traditional grounds, conceptualising legal reform as 
an implementation of the Qur’anic suggestion that arbitrators be used in certain cases of marital 
discord. Irrespective of the validity of the Qur’anic justification, the change in practice required 
by the reforms is nothing short of revolutionary.148 The legal reform introduced by the Code of 
Personal Status of 1956 (as amended) could be seen as a synthesis of the Hanafi and Maliki 
schools of thought. And as many provisions are not definitive in nature, judges will be compelled 
to make reference to the traditional law in deciding specific cases. However, since the abolition 
of the shari’ah courts, no particular school of thought is dominant in Tunisia. This presumably 
means that the judges will have considerable freedom in applying any “source” of law when 
deemed necessary by the court.149  
In what follows next, Tunisia’s response to the international human rights system will be 
examined critically. 
4.6 Human Rights and Legal Reform in Tunisia  
Although the international concern relating to the elimination of discrimination against women is 
not a new occurrence, discrimination against women remains endemic despite the adoption of a 
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plethora of conventions and declarations.150 And while the standards in international human 
rights law are perceived to be gender neutral, this neutrality in practice often amounts to a 
derogation of women’s rights.151 In what follows below, Tunisia’s response to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),152the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)153 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)154  will be examined.    
4.6.1 Tunisia’s response to the international human rights system  
Tunisia is a party to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR and ratified both instruments without 
reservations in 1969.155 Tunisia thus bears a distinct obligation to respect, protect and fulfill all 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the two instruments without 
discrimination on the grounds of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.156 In terms of Article 26 of the ICCPR, 
Tunisia has an additional obligation to ensure that “the law shall guarantee to all persons equal 
and effective protection against discrimination on any of the enumerated grounds”, thus 
providing an autonomous, stand-alone right to non-discrimination in all fields. Article 19 of the 
newly adopted Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 expressly stipulates that international agreements 
“shall be superior to laws and inferior to the Constitution”. This confirms the elevated status of 
international treaty law in and Tunisia’s ensuing obligations under the new constitutional 
dispensation. 
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A number of United Nations treaty bodies, including the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights157 and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW Committee)158 have recognised that giving effect to the rights to equality and non-
discrimination requires states to take the appropriate action. The state thus carries a three-fold 
obligation, notably to respect the right to non-discrimination, both in law and through the actions 
of its agents, to ensure that a legal framework is both in place and is enforced to provide 
protection from discrimination, and to take such measures, including positive action, as are 
necessary to address substantive inequalities.159 
Tunisia signed CEDAW in 1980 and ratified this instrument five years later, while issuing an 
interpretative declaration stating that: 
“[t]he Tunisian Government shall not take any organizational or legislative decision in conformity with the 
requirements of this Convention where such a decision would conflict with the provisions of Chapter 1 of the 
Tunisian Constitution”.160  
As permitted by Article 28 of CEDAW, Tunisia made reservations to Article 9(2) regarding the 
right of a woman to pass her nationality to her children,161 Article 15(4) regarding the right of a 
woman to choose her own domicile,162 several sub-paragraphs of Article 16, notably Article 
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16(c),(d),(f),(g) and (h) relating to marriage and divorce,163 and Article 29(1) regarding 
arbitration of disputes arising from CEDAW.164 
In contrast to Libya, Egypt and other Middle Eastern states embroiled in the Arab uprising, the 
interim government of Tunisia proceeded to remove almost all of its reservations to CEDAW in 
2011.165 The majority of these reservations state that a treaty binds a government only so far as it 
does not conflict with local customs and religion thereby effectively limiting the practical 
purpose of the treaty.166 The decision by Tunisia must be applauded even though the general 
declaration that no legislative action would be taken in conflict with Chapter 1 of the 
Constitution of Tunisia of 1959, which declares Islam as the national religion, has been retained. 
This means that the potential exists that the national religion could be used to enhance religious-
based arguments against reform for the promotion and protection of women’s rights. Although 
Tunisia has hitherto not used Chapter 1 as a justification for maintaining laws or practices that 
violate CEDAW and, given the constitutional reforms that are taking place in Tunisia, there 
exists a good chance that obligations under CEDAW will be met, thus providing an impetus for 
other religious-based reforms.167  
In 2008 Tunisia became only the second Arab state after Libya to accede to the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(Optional Protocol to CEDAW).168 By ratifying the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, Tunisia has 
 
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acknowledged the competence of the CEDAW Committee to hear complaints from individuals 
and groups of individuals who believe their rights under the instrument has been violated by the 
state. However, since the CEDAW Committee is only able to issue non-binding opinions the 
impact of this restriction is as yet unclear.  
Tunisia’s response to the African (regional) human rights framework will be examined next. 
4.6.2 Tunisia’s response to the African human rights framework  
Tunisia acceded to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) without 
reservations in 1983, thereby endorsing the particular human rights framework envisaged for the 
African continent.169  
A close reading of the African Charter reveals that this instrument possesses key features that are 
both unique and essential to promoting fundamental rights and freedoms in a regional context. 
The emphasis on “third generation rights or rights of solidarity”170 renders this instrument rather 
unique. While first generation rights place the individual at the centre of human rights discourse, 
the African Charter’s focal point is to expand and cater for the collective rights of the 
community. The term “peoples” thus signifies a legal entity with actionable rights as 
contemplated in Article 19 of the African Charter. Although the African Charter text leaves the 
term “peoples’ rights” open, it could well be said to aid the recognition of ethnic diversity.171 The 
African Charter is also unique in compartmentalising rights. While on the one hand civil and 
political rights are brought together with economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand, 
individual and collective rights are viewed in tandem and not in isolation.172 The African Charter 
is also more instrumental about the implementation of rights when compared to other human 
rights instruments by forthrightly stating both the rights and duties of the individual.173 Not 
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surprisingly, the African Charter places a specific emphasis on development, decolonisation and 
racial discrimination. The African Charter could thus greatly aid the protection of minority rights 
not only in a political context, such as the right to self-determination, but within a national 
context where states, such as Tunisia, are confronted with an ethnically diverse and pluralistic 
society. 
The African Charter expressly recognises the right to equality and respect174 and the freedom to 
practice one’s religion.175 The rights and freedoms articulated in the African Charter are 
expressed in decidedly communitarian and gender insensitive terms.176 Dersso explains that the 
standing of the individual in African society cannot be separated from the community to which 
she belongs, and the individual largely exists through and by her relationship through and with 
the group from birth.177 The report of the Organisation of African Unity Rapporteur likewise 
echoes this sentiment:  
“[n]oting that in Africa, man is part and parcel of the group, some delegations conclude that individual rights could 
be explained and justified only by the rights of the community. Consequently, they wished that the draft charter 
made room for people’s rights”.178 
This is in direct contrast to the individualistic view of other (Western) international human rights 
instruments as well as the particular formulation of rights and freedoms in the South African 
Constitution. The golden thread that runs through the African Charter is that the group plays a 
critical role in society and a considerable amount of political, economic and social recognition is 
accorded to the group through the concept of peoples’ rights.  
In so far as gender discrimination is concerned, Article 18(3) of the African Charter stipulates 
that:  
“the state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of rights 
of the women and child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions”.179  
 
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Beyani rightly observes that Article 18(3) places a gender-specific obligation upon African states 
to eliminate discrimination against women, and not merely on the grounds of sex, thereby 
directly incorporating the application of international standards into the African Charter.180  
And yet the notion of discrimination against women is addressed within the specific context of 
the family as custodian of traditional values181 and the state’s obligation to assist the family in its 
custodial duties.182 Article 18 of the African Charter thus appears completely oblivious to the 
fact that the private domain is a seat of male oppression and that family life could create a 
harmful environment for women.183 Moreover, the clumping together of women and children in 
the same sub-article flies in the face of a rich body of feminist scholarship dedicated to the 
dismantling of stereotypical assumptions about women’s role and status in the family.  
Article 27 of the African Charter is a further case in point. By setting out the duties of the 
individual towards her family and society, a positive obligation is placed on the individual to 
adhere to certain codes which could be seen to place a restriction on the freedom of the 
individual in the exercise of her fundamental rights. Wodzicki thus correctly argues that many of 
the civil and political rights enumerated in the African Charter contain a so-called “drawback 
clause”184 that allow States Parties to justify limitations on individual rights and freedoms by 
reference to domestic laws which may be restrictive. Furthermore, none of the clawback clauses 
in the African Charter stipulate any further conditions under which a state’s restriction on 
individual rights must also be justified. This is unlike the derogation mechanism contained in 
Article 4 of the ICCPR.185  
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Sadly, Tunisia has neither signed nor ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol). Out of fifty four 
African states, only thirty three have thus far ratified the African Women’s Protocol. States that 
have not signed or that have not ratified the African Women’s Protocol, apart from Tunisia, 
include Botswana, Egypt, Eritrea and South Sudan.186   
The African Women’s Protocol presents a guiding policy that the human rights of women and 
the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights, in 
accordance with Paragraph 18 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at 
the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993.187 The African Women’s Protocol must 
therefore be assessed against the broader contemporary and evolving political, legal and social 
contexts.188  
Although the African Women’s Protocol is silent on the issue of reservations,189 the instrument 
outlines bold goals that may be difficult for some African states to implement. One of these 
particular goals requires states to embark on a process of integration of the African Women’s 
Protocol into their national constitutions. However, experience has shown that a strong 
possibility exist that some member states may not be in a position to comply with this 
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requirement. This is particularly worrying as a host of key provisions, notably Articles 1,190 2,191 
3,192 5,193 6,194 7,195 20196 and 21,197 relate to core aspects of both marriage and divorce.  
Article 3 of the African Women’s Protocol unequivocally states that “every individual shall be 
equal before the law and shall be entitled to equal protection before the law”. The Constitution of 
Tunisia of 1959 recognises women as full citizens. Of particular importance is Article 6 that 
stipulates that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and obligations, they are equal before the law”. 
Tunisia has accordingly argued that women enjoy the right to exercise fully all their political, 
economic as well as social rights.198 The unavoidable tension between women’s fundamental 
human rights and religious rights has been somewhat alleviated by the adoption of a progressive 
Code of Personal Status in 1956 which has been amended in 1993 and 2007, respectively, to 
address specific matters pertaining to marriage and divorce.  
The Code of Personal Status of 1956 and subsequent legal reforms seem to assimilate the 
provisions of the African Women’s Protocol. The minimum age for both parties to marriage, for 
example, is eighteen years which conforms to Article 6 of the African Women’s Protocol.199 In 
addition, Tunisia has ratified the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 
Marriage and Registration in 1968.200 Parties below the prescribed age limit can only marry with 
the consent of both parents and with special permission from a judge. Such authorisation can 
only be obtained in extreme cases and must be in the best interest of the parties. A certificate 
issued by the civil registry, or by two notaries after they have performed the marriage, becomes 
 
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proof of marriage. Marriage in any other form is deemed invalid under Tunisian law.201 These 
reforms meet the criteria set out by the African Women’ Protocol in Article 6(d).202 Moreover, 
Article 18 of the Code of Personal Status proscribes the practice of polygyny, thus striving for 
formal equality between men and women.203  
In so far as separation, divorce and annulment of the marriage is concerned, Tunisian women and 
men enjoy the same options for divorce as contemplated in Article 7(b) of the African Women’s 
Protocol which reads:  
“in the case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage, women and men shall have reciprocal rights and 
responsibilities towards their children”. 
In an effort to enhance equality, Tunisian mothers who have been granted the custody of children 
have a right to child support. An alimony fund was established in 1993 by the state which 
ensures payments to divorced women for their children in the event that the husband neglects to 
honour his financial commitments.204 Although a woman may be granted custody of the children 
subsequent to divorce, the father remains the guardian. In 1993, however, the law was amended 
to increase the guardianship rights of custodial mothers so that they have a say in decisions 
relating to their children and, in particular, mothers can also be granted guardianship of their 
children, but only if the father is unable to fulfill his obligations.205  
Some discriminatory practices remain in Tunisia within the realms of marriage and divorce. In 
many instances, these are subtle, but none the less serve to entrench male privilege. It is, 
however, to be welcomed that Tunisia has purposefully addressed discriminatory practices found 
in both marriage and divorce which stem from custom, patriarchal behavior and societal patterns 
embedded over many centuries.  
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4.6.2.1 Tunisia and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa 
The AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (AU Solemn Declaration)206 is a non-
binding commitment by states to gain momentum towards the promotion and protection of 
women’s rights in clearly marked spheres including HIV and AIDS, conflict prevention and 
management, gender-based violence and development.207  The AU Solemn Declaration urged 
states to ratify the African Women’s Protocol in order to ensure its entry into force in 2005.  
When the call was made in 2004, only three states had ratified the African Women’s Protocol. 
Tunisia has to date neither signed nor ratified this instrument. This sadly means that Tunisia has 
not formally committed itself, as an UA member state, to report annually at meetings of Heads of 
State and Government about progress made towards fulfilling the promises made under the AU 
Solemn Declaration.208 
4.6.2.2 Tunisia and the African Decade of Women  
The assembly of the AU has called on African member states and other leadership bodies to 
participate and implement programmes for women.209 The underlying theme of the African 
Decade is “a grassroots approach to gender equality and women empowerment” to tackle ten 
keys areas, including “fighting poverty and promoting economic empowerment of women 
entrepreneurship”. The African Decade of Women is divided into short term (2010 to 2011) and 
medium term (2012 to 2020) goals. 
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The foundation of the African Decade of Women is the African Women’s Protocol and the AU 
Solemn Declaration. The short-term goals call on African states to sign and ratifying the African 
Women’s Protocol, including international instruments dealing with the promotion and 
protection of women’s rights. The measures that are enshrined in the African Decade of Women 
must not be viewed in isolation as these measures build on those contained in the African Charter 
and in the African Women’s Protocol in particular. In short, the measures contained in the 
African Decade for Women are guidelines that states must implement within the government 
structure where women’s rights are blurred and underrepresented.  
In as early as 1958, reforms in Tunisia introduced the idea of generalised and free education 
from ages six to fourteen years for all, thereby setting the platform for the massive schooling of 
girls.210 One year earlier, women became full citizens with the right to vote and, by virtue of the 
Constitution of Tunisia of 1959, both men and women were granted the right to seek election for 
public office.211 The 1959 Constitution of Tunisia introduced the principle of equality which has 
subsequently been incorporated into other legal texts such as the Code of Nationality of 1957. As 
a direct result of these reforms, women have obtained the right to work, to move freely, to open 
bank accounts, to establish businesses and, most importantly, to work without the permission of 
their fathers, brothers and/or husbands. 
Article 6 of the Constitution of Tunisia of 1959 affirms the equal rights of all citizens, men and 
women alike. The preamble calls upon the Tunisian people to “consolidate national unity and 
remain faithful to human values which represent the common heritage of peoples’ link to human 
dignity, justice and liberty”. The constitutional amendments introduced in 1997 consolidated the 
principle of equality among citizens and in 2002, further amendments focused on guaranteeing 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, pluralism, human dignity, and the free exercise of 
beliefs. These constitutional commitments are reaffirmed in the newly adopted Constitution of 
Tunisia of 2014.212 
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The introduction and fundamental purpose of the Women’s Affairs Ministry in Tunisia is to 
ensure the equality of the sexes. It coordinates the activities of various government institutions in 
an effort to promote and protect the status of women and the family, and to encourage women to 
assume a major role in the development process. The concerns relating to women’s rights are 
also part of the mandates of organisations such as the National Union of Tunisian Women, the 
Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, including more than twenty other women’s groups. 
The Women and Development Committee, founded in June 1991, examines different 
development plans through their various stages to ensure that gender equality is respected.213  
The National Council of Women and Family established in 1992 was strengthened in 1997 with 
the creation of three commissions, notably the Commission on the Image of Women in the 
Media, the Commission on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities for All and for the Application 
of the Law, and the Commission of National and International Deadlines Pertaining to Women 
and the Family.214 The Center for Research, Documentation, and Information on Women as well 
as the National Office of the Family and Population Affairs have been created with the latter 
primarily watching over the health and reproductive rights of women. In addition, the Center for 
Arab Women Training and Research, based in Tunis, carries out comparative studies among 
Arab states and promotes gender equality through advocacy and workshops.  
However, very few new laws that favor women have been promulgated since 2000. The 
inequality which exists within the confines of inheritance law has, to this day, not prompted legal 
reform. Conflicts continue to exist within the judiciary in so far as Article 1 of the Constitution 
of Tunisia of 1959, which declares Islam as the national religion, and the more secular corpus of 
substantive law, as found in the Code of Personal Status of 1956 (as amended) and international 
instruments ratified by Tunisia, are concerned. This tension is likely to continue subsequent to 
the adoption of the new Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 which likewise confirms Islam as the 
national religion.  
Tunisia is thus called upon to walk an uneasy path whereby dominant conservative values have 
to be balanced with a spirit of innovation in an effort to realize the principles of equality, non-
discrimination and liberty.   
 
213
 See Salem LB “Tunisia” (2010) available at http://freedomhouse.org [accessed 29 November 2013]. 
214
 Ibid.  
 
 
 
 


4.7 Concluding Observations  
Family life has the tendency to shape men and women and to determine both where and how 
they live. Chekir astutely observes that to organise the family is to organise society, and to 
democratise the family is to democratise society.215 Compared to Morocco, Tunisia has chosen a 
decidedly secularised approach to promote and protect women’s rights in a state that boast a 
Muslim population of almost ninety eight percent.216 Tunisia can also be trumpeted as one of a 
handful of Middle East and North African states that is widely secularised. But as Charrad 
ironically observes: 
“[t]his is unquestionably the freest country for women in the Arab world. But the irony is that is not women who 
fought for their rights in this country. It was men who gave them to [women]”.217 
This chapter has shown that after political independence, Tunisia promulgated legislation to 
address the status of women within the context of the family. The Code of Personal Status of 
1956 and the Constitution of Tunisia of 1959 were instrumental to address the emancipation of 
women.218 And yet while the rights of women within the context of the family were interrogated, 
male privilege, although now slightly hidden, remained entrenched. Women also remained 
excluded from the political sphere, thus depriving women of the right to vote for members of the 
National Constituent Assembly, the body responsible for the drafting the constitutions.  
This chapter has explained that the Code of Personal Status of 1956 not only enhanced women’s 
status in marriage, but also served to protect the wife from abuse by the husband. The fact that 
polygyny has been proscribed since 1956 rivals most Arab and Middle Eastern states where 
polygyny is still allowed, based on a narrow interpretation of the Qur’anic text. The Code of 
Personal Status of 1956 forbids marriage to more than one wife at a time and includes legal 
sanctions which may vary from imprisonment to the payment of a fine.219 Divorce is also now 
available to both parties, while before 1956 the husband had the unilateral right of repudiation. 
The Code of Personal Status of 1956 rendered divorce a legal matter. The involvement of the 
 
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 See Chekir H “Women, the law, and the family in Tunisia” (1996) 4:2 Gender and Development 43 at 43. 
216
 See Wing AK and Kassim H “The Future of Palestinian Women’s Rights: Lessons from a Half-Century of 
Tunisian Progress” (2007) 64:4 Washington and Lee Law Review 1551 at 1552. 
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 See Charrad MM “Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1030s-1990s” (1997) 4:2 Social Politics 
284 at 284. 
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national courts is compulsory, shari’ah courts have been abolished and a woman may institute 
divorce proceedings. Moreover, the rights of women are protected in terms of acquiring and 
disposing of assets without the consent of the husband.220  
Despite these legal gains, however, Tunisia continued to face a serious threat from Islamist 
movements. Social unrest and mass demonstrations in December 2010 culminated in President 
Ben Ali’s declaration of a state of emergency in January 2011, followed by his flight from 
Tunisia.221 During October 2011, elections were held to choose members of the National 
Constituent Assembly charged with the rewriting of the Tunisian constitution and the shaping of 
a new coalition. The Islamist party, Ennahda, which was expelled under the previous 
government, won forty one percent of the votes and thus enjoyed the most significant influence 
in the formation of the new state.222  
Even though Ennahda eventually agreed to relinquish power in a bid to reconcile bitter divisions 
and to end months of political deadlock, allowing a government of independents to lead Tunisia 
to elections in October 2014, many Tunisians fear that in spite of Ennahda’s public assurances 
that its aspirations are to establish a moderate society in which all citizens have equal rights, the 
party will exploit its powerbase and seek to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law should it 
(re)gain political power. 
Although Ennadha has thus far adopted a moderate tone, there have been reports of increased 
efforts to publicly adopt a more conservative interpretation of Islam, including the forced veiling 
of women and enforced prayers. It is strongly hoped that the progress that has been made since 
1956 and, in particular, with the singular achievement of having adopted a new constitution in 
2014, will not be threatened with a reverting to practices sanctioned predominantly by the Hanafi 
and the Maliki schools of thought. Although the new Constitution of Morocco of 2014 
entrenches Islam as the official religion,223 similar to the Constitution of Tunisia of 1957, it is to 
be welcomed that the new constitution does not import the shari’ah as a basis for legislation or 
 
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favor any one religion over another. Freedom of belief and conscience is thus expressly protected 
in Tunisia.224 At this stage it remains unclear, however, whether or not any religious laws will be 
passed in the future. 
The outlook for Tunisia is thus positive, even though the threat of a conservative interpretation of 
legal and constitutional provisions always remains which is undoubtedly a cause for concern. 
And as Gray wryly observes, even though there has been a plethora of scholarly publications on 
the political uprising in North Africa and its aftermath, sadly none have been dedicated 
exclusively to an analysis of these tumultuous events on the rights and freedoms of women in 
Tunisia.225 
The next chapter will conclude the comparative trilogy and will critically assess the status of 
Muslim women under South African law.
 
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CHAPTER 5 
Legal Status of Muslim Women in South Africa  
“The affirmation of human dignity as one of the founding values of the Constitution is significant. The 
interim Constitution emphasized the values of democracy, freedom and equality. Although dignity is 
imminent in these values and in the rights entrenched in the Interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights, its role as 
a foundational value of the constitutional order was not acknowledged in specific terms until the adoption 
of the 1996 Constitution”. 1    
 “The interaction between cultural communities within a political system has for a considerable time been 
one of the most important causes of social problems. As a result of historical developments and the diverse 
nature of the South African society, deep legal pluralism is a reality. While the executive, legislature and 
legal scholars struggle to come to terms with this phenomenon, the courts have to deal on a daily basis with 
the harsh consequences of people still adhering to the legal rules of their ‘unrecognised’ legal system.”2 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters provided a critical overview of the status of Muslim women 
concerning marriage and divorce in two (African) jurisdictions, namely, Morocco and Tunisia. It 
became apparent that although various reforms were introduced through the medium of the law 
to address inequality, many of these attempts did not secure the effective realization of women’s 
rights and freedoms as these reforms merely concealed entrenched patterns of male privilege in 
marriage and divorce. 
The objective of this chapter is to critically examine recent developments in South African law 
affecting the rights and freedoms of Muslim women. This will be done through a brief historical 
account and a careful consideration of some key judgments on marriage and divorce, including 
applicable provisions of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, against the backdrop of the South 
African constitutional democracy. And as was the case in the previous two chapters, this chapter 
will conclude with an assessment of South Africa’s response to the applicable international and 
regional human rights frameworks.  
 
1
 See Chaskalson A “Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 193 at 193. 
2
 See Rautenbach C “Celebration of Difference: Judicial Accommodation of Cultural and Religious Diversity in 
South Africa” (2010) 10:2 The International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, Communities & Nations 117 at 
129. 
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To this end, key human rights instruments will be examined to ascertain whether South Africa 
had made any interpretative declarations or reservations to their provisions. In particular, 
attention will be paid to South Africa’s position on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),3 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),4 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)5 as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)6and 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (African Women’s Protocol).7 The latter discussion will take place against the backdrop 
of the African Union Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (AU Solemn 
Declaration) and the African Decade of Women.  
The legal consequences of Muslim marriages in South Africa will be examined next. 
5.2 Muslim Marriages and the South African Courts 
5.2.1 Brief historical overview 
The legal consequences of a polygynous marriage in South African law were first highlighted in 
Ebrahim v Essop.8 The court was explicit in its condemnation when it held that “if this marriage 
were a polygamous one it would not be recognised in this country, no matter whether it were 
recognised as valid in another country or not”.9 Similar sentiments were expressed in Seedat’s 
Executors v The Master (Natal).10 Although the main issue concerned the amount of succession 
 
3
 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GOAR 21st Session Supp No 16 
UN Doc A/6316 (1996) 999 UNTS 171 adopted on 16 December 1966. 
4
 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GOAR 21st Session 
Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 993 UNTS 3 adopted on 16 December 1996. 
5
 See the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women GA Re 34/180 UN GAOR 
34th Session Supp No 46 UN Doc A/34/36 (1980) adopted on 18 December 1979, opened for signature on 1 March 
1980 and entered into force on 3 September 1981 following receipt of the twentieth ratification. 
6
 See the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU) Doc. CAB/LEG/6/7/3 rev. 5 21 ILM 58 
(1982) adopted on 27 June 1981and entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
7
 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 1999 
DOC/OS (XXXVII) adopted on 15 November 1999 and entered into force on 11 July 2003. 
8
 1905 TS 59. 
9
 Ibid 59 at 61. 
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duty payable under the Estate Duty Tax Act,11 the court discussed the validity and consequences 
of Muslim marriages within the existing South African law.12 The court stated that polygyny 
affects the nature of the most important relationship that human beings can enter into,13 and that 
based on grounds of morality and religion, it is not justified to recognise a polygynous union as a 
valid marriage.14 In addition, the court described polygyny as repugnant in policy and legal 
institutions that are to be found in England and Holland. In fact, the court knew of no country 
that will give effect to a foreign polygynous marriage or recognise the resulting status of either of 
the parties.15 Thus a valid marriage can only be defined as the union of one man with one 
woman, to the exclusion while it lasts of all others.16 And as a consequence, no union would be 
regarded as a marriage in South Africa, even though it would be recognised as a marriage 
elsewhere, if it were allowed for the parties to legally marry a second time during its existence.17 
The judgment handed down in the matter of Seedat represented the view of the judiciary for a 
considerable period of time due to the stare decisis rule.18 Moreover, Parliament was sovereign 
and racial groups were segregated, thus providing fertile ground for a complete disregard of 
human rights and freedoms.19  
The (in)validity of Muslim marriages in South Africa will be examined next. 
5.2.2 (In)validity of Muslim marriages 
The extent of the difficulty experienced by women married in terms of Islamic rites has been 
accentuated in a number of prominent judgments handed down by a range of superior courts in 
South Africa, including the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. The legal 
consequences emanating from the non-recognition of Muslim marriages has therefore been 
 
11
 In terms of Act 35 of 1905 a duty of one percent is levied in all cases where the successor is the “lineal 
descendant” of the testator. Where he is a stranger in blood the tax is five percent, while a successor who is a 
surviving spouse is entirely exempted from estate duty tax. 
12
 1917 AD 306. 
13
 Ibid at 307.  
14
 Ibid at 308. 
15
 Ibid at 308. 
16
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 See, in general, Rautenbach C “Celebration of Difference: Judicial Accommodation of Cultural and Religious 
Diversity in South Africa” (2010) 10:2 The International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, Communities & 
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challenged across the hierarchy of the South African judicial system. This is of particular 
significance as an Islamic marriage cannot be regarded solely as a private contractual matter, but 
must also be viewed as an institution bearing social and economic consequences, albeit that the 
parties may protect themselves by way of inserting certain conditions for the operation of the 
marriage contract as well as for the termination thereof. 
The judgments examined below illustrate that South African courts were decidedly reluctant to 
become embroiled in religious doctrine, thus leaving Muslim women with no effective legal 
recourse. And although the adoption of an Interim Constitution in 199320 significantly altered the 
legal landscape, the Constitution Court’s interpretation of the right to freedom of religion, belief 
and opinion enshrined under section 15 of the South African Constitution,21 for the most part, 
still displays a distinct reluctance to engage with religious doctrine. While endeavouring to make 
a finding on the facts alone, the Constitutional Court appears to echo the judgments of the lower 
courts of South Africa during the heyday of institutionalised racial oppression in the mid-1980s 
by steering well clear of religious doctrine.22 And yet it proves extremely challenging to separate 
the purely religious from the secular. This is in no small part due to the significant impact of 
religious doctrine on the everyday lives of believers. 
The legal question confronting South African courts in the early 1980s centred upon whether a 
woman married in terms of Islamic rites could be regarded as a “spouse”. The precise meaning 
of the word “spouse” in South African law was accordingly considered in Davids v The Master.23 
In this instance, the applicant applied for an order declaring the sale of certain immovable 
property concluded between the second and third respondent to be void in terms of section 49(1) 
of the Administration of Estates Act,24 or at common law, and for certain ancillary relief. The 
application was opposed by the second and third respondent, and the second respondent had 
brought a counter-application for confirmation of the sale by the court. The court held that the 
Administration of Estates Act contained no definition of the word “spouse”25 and thus the 
 
20
 See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
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 See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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 See, in particular, Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC). 
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 1983 (1) SA 458 (C). 
24
 Act 66 of 1965. 
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judgment of the Appeal Court in Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal)26 is decisive.27 The 
court therefore agreed that Muslim marriages are potentially polygynous, and as such, repugnant 
to South Africa’s mores and institutions. A Muslim marriage would not, therefore, as such be 
recognised as a marriage.28 
The legal definition of marriage in South African law was carefully scrutinised in Ismail v 
Ismail.29 In this instance, the Appellate Court had to determine an action arising out of a 
termination of marriage to the respondent. The marriage was celebrated and terminated 
according to the tenets of the Muslim faith.30 The appellant claimed maintenance, delivery of a 
deferred dowry, and two sets of gold jewellery which was given to the respondent for safe 
keeping. The court observed that the union of the parties could not be regarded as a valid civil 
marriage, as two requirements were lacking.31 The concept of marriage according to South 
African law is the “legally recognised voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others while it lasts”.32 Moreover, the union was not solemnized according to 
South African law and the bride had not been present when the marriage was being concluded.33 
Of particular significance is that the court referred to the recognition of Black customary unions 
and that the legislature had refrained from recognising customary unions of other ethnic or 
religious groups, such as the Muslim community.34 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that it 
had not found any indication in any of the statutory provisions that the legislature either 
expressly or impliedly approves of polygyny. Not surprisingly, the court referred to the Seedat 
 
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 1983 (1) SA 458 (C) at 460 para H and at 461 paras A-B. 
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 The court also made reference to Brey v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1978 (4) SA 439 (C) at 443 where the court 
observed: “I am accordingly of the opinion that the word ‘spouse’ in section 49(1) of the Administration of Estates 
Act does not include a women married according to Muslim rites”. Once again the judiciary decided to follow the 
stare decisis rule. 
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case and observed that the existence of statutes in which polygynous unions were recognised 
could not be seen as “the tolerance of polygamy as part of the general South African system”.35  
As a consequence, the court was not prepared to deviate from the long line of decisions in which 
the courts have constantly refused, on grounds of public policy, to recognise, or to give effect to 
the consequences of, polygynous unions contracted in South Africa, statutory exceptions 
notwithstanding.36 The court was thus of the opinion that the concept of marriage in South 
African law is embedded as a monogamous union, and that the recognition of polygyny would 
undoubtedly prejudice or undermine the concept of marriage.37 The fact that most of the South 
African law relating to marriage, family law and, to a certain degree, the law of succession, were 
primarily designed for monogamous relationships, were found to support the court’s reasoning.38   
The legal consequences were clear: all Muslim marriages were thus to be regarded as putative 
marriages. In Moola v Aulsebrook NO39 the Full Bench of the Natal Provincial Division was 
called upon to re-examine the requirements of a so-called “putative marriage”.40 The court 
summarised the requirements for a putative marriage as follows: (a) there must be bona fides in 
the sense that both or one of the parties must have been ignorant of the impediment to the 
marriage; (b) the marriage must be duly solemnized; and (c) the marriage must have been 
considered lawful in the estimation of the parties, or of that party who alleges the bona fides.41 
The court expressly held that a putative marriage is not a marriage42 and the recognition by the 
court of such a union does not convert such a union into a valid marriage.43 Moreover, the parties 
to such a union are not, and do not, become “husband and wife” within the legally recognised 
meaning of those words.44  
 
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A further noteworthy case examining the legal status of Muslim marriages under South African 
law is Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund.45 In this instance the appellant 
instituted an action against the respondent for payment of damages suffered by her as a result of 
the death of her husband in a motor vehicle accident.46 The appellant and the deceased were 
married in terms Muslim rites and the marriage was not registered as a civil marriage in terms of 
the Marriage Act.47 The issue the court a quo had to decide was whether the respondent was 
bound to compensate the appellant in view of the fact that the appellant and the deceased had not 
entered into a civil union.48 The court a quo answered the question in the negative. The 
arguments put forward by the respondent’s counsel was that the action would fail because the 
marriage between her and the deceased, being potentially polygynous, did not enjoy the status of 
a civil marriage, and any legal duty to support was thus a contractual consequence of the union 
and not an ex lege consequence of the marriage. Counsel for the respondent did, however, 
concede that the appellant’s claim for support against the deceased was not excipiable in law and 
thus the necessary implication was that the claim was legally enforceable.49  
The court examined the historical origins and evolution of the defendant’s action in relation to 
the common law and found that the death of a breadwinner, who has a duty to support 
dependants, did create a loss to such dependants. The dependants should, in the interest of 
equity, be able to recover such loss from the party who has unlawfully caused the death of the 
breadwinner by any act of negligence or other wrongful conduct.50   
The requirements espoused in Santam Bpk v Henry51 to assess the validity of a dependant’s claim 
for loss of support were found to be particularly instructive.52 The requirements include that: (a) 
the claimant for loss of support resulting from the unlawful killing of the deceased must have 
established that the deceased had a legal duty to support the dependant; (b) this had to be a 
legally enforceable duty; (c) the right of the dependant to such support had to be worthy of the 
 
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49Ibid at 1326 para G. 
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protection of the law; and (d) the preceding element had to be determined by the criterion of the 
boni mores of society. The court found that the first and second requirement had been satisfied in 
the present instance.53  
The approach adopted by the court was not to inquire whether the marriage was lawful at 
common law, but rather to investigate whether the deceased had a legal duty to support the 
appellant, and if so, whether it deserved protection. The court stated that the criterion of boni 
mores was inconsistent with the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom which 
had consolidated itself in the community even before the formal adoption of the Interim 
Constitution.54 The appellant thus had a good cause of action, a conclusion reached by the court 
without reliance on either section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution or section 39(2) of the Final 
Constitution which instruct a court to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights 
when interpreting legislation and when developing the common law or customary law.  
In 2004, the Constitutional Court was called upon to examine the constitutionality of provisions 
of the Intestate Succession Act55 and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act56 in Daniels v 
Campbell NO.57 The matter before the Constitutional Court concerned an application for 
confirmation of an order made by the Cape High Court declaring certain provisions of the two 
statutes in question unconstitutional and invalid for failing to include persons married according 
to Muslim rites as spouses. The court a quo strikingly summarised the plight of widows who 
were married in terms of the Muslim faith. In the words of Van Reenen J: 
“the widows of such marriages will be discriminated against solely because of the exercise by their deceased 
husbands of the rights accorded them by the tenets of a major faith to marry more than one woman. Such 
discrimination would not only amount to a violation of their rights to equality on the basis of marital status, religion 
(it being as aspect of a system of religious personal law) and culture but also infringe their right to dignity”.58 
 
The Constitutional Court confirmed that word “spouse”, if used in its ordinary meaning, would 
include parties to a Muslim marriage. Furthermore, this would correspond to the way the word is 
generally understood and used. It would thus be awkward from a linguistic point of view to 
 
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exclude parties to a Muslim marriage from the word “spouse”.59 And since discriminatory 
interpretations were no longer sustainable in the present democracy, the constitutional values of 
equality, tolerance and respect for diversity pointed strongly in favour of giving the word 
“spouse” a broad and inclusive construction. Such an interpretation would correspond with the 
ordinary meaning of the word and thus a contextual approach in the present instance was 
justified.60  
In explaining the purpose of the two statutes, the court held that the aim of the statutes was to 
provide relief for a vulnerable section of the community, notably widows. There was no reason 
why equitable principles underlying the statutes should not apply in the case of Muslim widows 
as they would apply in respect of widows whose marriages had been solemnized in terms of the 
Marriage Act.61   
The pressing question in this matter for the Constitutional Court to investigate was not whether 
the applicant was lawfully married to the deceased, but whether the protection which the two 
statutes clearly intended for widows should be withheld. It must be considered whether in terms 
of the values underlying the South African Constitution would be best served by including or 
excluding the applicant from the protection provided. The court held that the answer had to be in 
favour of the underlying constitutional values and the interpretation of the word “spouse” should 
be determined within the ordinary meaning thereof.62 The majority of the Constitutional Court 
thus concluded that both statutes had to be interpreted so as to include a party to a monogamous 
Muslim Marriage as a spouse. The order of the Cape High Court could not, therefore, be upheld 
and a declaration had to be made indicating to all interested parties that the applicant was a 
“spouse” and a “survivor” under both the Intestate Succession Act63 and the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act.64   
 
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61
 Ibid. Act 25 of 1961. 
62
 See, in particular, Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) at 345 para 25. 
63
 Act 81 of 1987. 
64
 Act 27 of 1990. Ibid at 349 paras A-G. 
 
 
 
 


In Hassam v Jacobs NO,65 the primary issue was whether upon the death of the husband, the 
surviving spouses of a polygynous marriage, contracted in accordance with Muslim rites, were 
entitled to the benefits expected by the Intestate Succession Act.66 The court thus had to 
determine what a widow’s portion on intestacy would be and what would constitute a claim for 
reasonable maintenance in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.67   
The applicant instituted proceedings in the court for an order declaring that she is the spouse of 
the deceased, and furthermore, that the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act and the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act fail to be interpreted to the effect that the surviving 
spouses of polygynous Muslim marriages are accorded the same benefits as those enjoyed by 
surviving spouses of de facto monogamous Muslim marriages. Alternatively, the applicant 
sought an order that the provisions in question be declared unconstitutional.68 From the facts of 
the case it appeared that the deceased’s marriage was in fact polygynous for the deceased had 
been married to two wives at the same time.   
Because the marriage of the deceased was polygynous, the court distinguished the present 
instance from the matter in Daniels v Campbell NO69 where the provisions of the Intestate 
Succession Act and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act were interpreted to include a 
spouse to a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage. However, in the Daniels judgment the 
Constitutional Court specifically refrained from extending the operation of the two statutes to 
polygnous Muslim marriages.70 The view of the Constitutional Court was that there appeared no 
justification for excluding the widows of polgynous Muslim marriages from the provisions of the 
Intestate Succession Act or the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act. Considerations which 
apply to a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage thus urged the Constitutional Court to opt for 
an extensive interpretation of the concept “spouse” and “survivor” to apply, with equal force, to 
widows in polygynous Muslim marriages. Polygyny as practiced in African customary law has, 
after all, received increasing legislative and judicial recognition in South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy. In addition, the content of public policy must now be determined with reference to 
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the founding values underlying the South African constitutional democracy, including human 
dignity and equality. With reference to the majority judgment in Daniels, the court referred to a 
“new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom” that would inform the assessment of 
the prevailing boni mores of society. This new ethos stands in direct contrast to the rigidly 
exclusive approach of the pre-constitutional era which was based on the values and beliefs of a 
small minority71 that was still so evident in Ismail v Ismail.72    
The court expressed appreciation for the shift in legislative and judicial policy in South Africa, as 
a reflection of public policy, which has manifested itself in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
legislature has enacted the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.73 Secondly, the legislature 
has implicitly recognised the shift in policy in a number of statutes which define, without any 
qualification, marriage to include Muslim marriages. Thirdly, the South African Law Reform 
Commission has given recognition to polygnous Muslim marriages in its report on Islamic 
Marriages and Related Matters.74 Fourthly, South African customary law, which recognises 
polygyny, has now been given its rightful place as an integral part of South African law to the 
extent that its rules and principles are compatible with the South African Constitution and Bill of 
Rights.75 And finally, it appears from a number of reported cases that it is now judicial policy to 
give recognition to polygynous marriages and their legal consequences.76 
In terms of section 39(2) of the South African Constitution, a court, when interpreting legislation 
and developing the common law or customary law, is obliged to promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights and, where possible, in a manner that gives effect to the fundamental 
values therein contained. The court found no justification for excluding the widows of 
polygynous Muslim marriages from the provisions of the two statutes in question and held that 
the continued exclusion of parties in a Muslim polygynous marriage would be unfairly 
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discriminatory against them and thus be in conflict with the provisions of section 9 of the South 
African Constitution.  
The court accordingly held that the application had to succeed, and issued a declaration that the 
word “survivor” as used in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act includes a surviving 
partner to a polygnous Muslim marriage. Certain provisions contained in the Intestate Succession 
Act were also found to be inconsistent with the South African Constitution, to the extent that 
provision was made for only one spouse in a Muslim marriage to be an heir in the intestate estate 
of their deceased husband.77  
The courts’ understanding of the legal implications of divorce, including related matters such as 
maintenance and inheritance, will be considered next.   
5.2.3 Legal implications of divorce 
It becomes apparent from the case law discussed in the previous paragraph that the South 
African courts are reluctant to become involved in religious matters. Yet in Ismail v Ismail,78 the 
Transvaal Provincial Division was called upon to explain the concept of divorce in the Muslim 
faith. The court found that the custom relating to the termination or annulment of such a 
marriage is by the utterance of “three talaaqi by the husband”.79 According to the court, should 
the husband utter the word talaq three times to the wife, such communications are irrevocable 
and the marriage is terminated. As far as annulment is concerned, the marriage is terminated by 
the moulana (who, according to the court, is a high ranking office bearer of the Muslim faith 
who acquired his title and powers by studying and passing an examination at a recognised 
Muslim ecclesiastical institution)80 in the event that the husband be guilty of certain matrimonial 
misconduct, and/or refusing (or failing) to divorce the wife by the issue of talaq.81 In the present 
instance, the parties underwent a ceremony of marriage in accordance with the tenets of the 
Muslim faith.82 At all material times there existed a tacit consensus between the parties that their 
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marriage would be monogamous. The parties agreed that a deferred dowry would become 
payable by the husband in event of death, termination or annulment of the marriage.83  
The court a quo held that ex facie the pleadings, the marriage was a polygynous one that, apart 
from statutory exceptions, have persistently been refused recognition by the courts on the basis 
of public policy.84 Furthermore, to entertain the plaintiff’s claim would be tantamount to 
recognising the illegal union entered into by the parties. This, the court held, would fly in the 
face of all legal authority in South Africa.85   
Counsel for the plaintiff argued from the outset that it was not part of the plaintiff’s case that the 
alleged conjugal union between the parties constituted a valid civil marriage. Yet the court was 
of the opinion that any claim that arose could not be viewed in isolation, and thus the tenets of 
the Muslim faith governed all aspects of the marriage relationship.86 In particular, a claim 
relating to a deferred dowry flowed from, and was by its very nature intrinsic to, the conjugal 
union entered into between the parties. The court thus came to the conclusion that it would not be 
justified to deviate from the long line of decisions in which the courts have consistently refused, 
on the grounds of public policy, to recognise, or to give effect to the consequences of, 
polygynous unions contracted in South Africa, statutory exceptions apart.87   
It is significant to note that the court recognised the growing recognition of complete equality 
between the marriage partners. Thus, in the court’s view, the recognition of polygynous unions 
solemnized under the tenets of the Muslim faith may well be regarded as problematic.88 Of 
further concern was the fact the Muslim bride does not participate in the marriage ceremony and 
that the husband has the right to terminate the marriage unilaterally by the simple utterance of 
three talaaqi without showing good cause.89 The only avenue available to the wife was to obtain 
an annulment of the marriage if she can satisfy the moulana that the husband had been guilty of 
 
83
 Ibid at 1018 paras G-H.  
84
 Ibid at 1019 paras E-F. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Ibid at 1020 paras D-G. 
87
 Ibid. 
88
 Ibid at paras G-H. 
89
 Ibid at para H. 
 
 
 
 



misconduct. Although these practices may be consistent with the tenets of the Muslim faith, they 
are entirely foreign to the South African notion of a conjugal relationship.90  
In passing the court also mentioned that the non-recognition of polygynous marriages would not 
cause any real hardship, save for isolated cases. Based on the pleadings, the court noted that only 
two percent of all Muslim males in South Africa have more than one wife.91 The court was thus 
of the opinion that the Muslim community had the right for many years to convert their de facto 
unions into de jure monogamous unions.92 The court therefore came to the conclusion that the 
polygamous union between the parties in this case must be regarded as void on the grounds of 
public policy.   
In terms of the claim for the deferred dowry, the court argued that if the claim was based on 
custom or a contract which arose directly from, and was intimately connected with, the 
polygamous union entered into by the parties, the custom or contract which flowed from that 
union would also be vitiated on grounds of public policy.93 Both the custom and the contract in 
question would thus be unenforceable and would be regarded as contra bonos mores.94 Although 
the phrase conta bonos mores is normally associated with conduct which is regarded as immoral 
or sexually reprehensible, a far wider meaning could be accepted. A polygynous union 
solemnized under the tenets of the Muslim faith, and customs relating thereto, would be contra 
bonos mores in the narrow sense in which the expression is ordinarily used. But when the phrase 
contra bonos mores is used in the broader sense, it may be contrary to the accepted customs and 
usages which are morally binding on society as a whole.95 In this instance the court relied on the 
judgment of Innes CJ in Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal)96 in which a polygynous 
Muslim marriage was found to be “fundamentally opposed to our principles and institutions”.97  
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In Ryland v Edros,98 the plaintiff was married to the defendant by Muslim rites and instituted an 
action against her (i.e. wife) claiming eviction from the property they shared during the 
subsistence of the marriage. Amongst all the issues that were presented in this case, special 
attention will be paid to the issue of arrear maintenance in which the defendant approached the 
court to make a ruling. The plaintiff pleaded that the portion of the defendant’s claim for arrear 
maintenance, which accrued more than three years prior to the delivery of her claim, has 
prescribed.99  
Before proceeding to address the issue, the court made reference to Ismail v Ismail.100 The 
question that faced the court in the present instance was whether the court was precluded from 
enforcing the terms of a contractual agreement between the parties because of the decision of the 
Appellate Division. The Appellate Court held that claims for maintenance and deferred dowry 
brought by a woman against a man to whom she had been married by Muslim rites were not 
enforceable, because they were intrinsic to a conjugal union between the parties which, being 
potentially polygynous, was void on the grounds of public policy.101 The issue thus arose 
whether the court ought to get involved in doctrinal issues.  
The court held that prior to the adoption of the Interim Constitution,102 the court “would not 
adjudicate upon a doctrinal dispute between two schisms of a sect unless some propriety or other 
legally recognised right was in involved”.103 According to the court’s interpretation of section 14 
of the Interim Constitution,104 the position may well change and the involvement of courts in 
doctrinal issues may well become part of South Africa’s law. Therefore, the court was satisfied 
that section 14 of the Interim Constitution did create an impediment to decide the issues arising 
in this case. Besides, both parties agreed that the particular issues did not require any 
interpretation of religious doctrines.105   
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Thus the court was of the opinion that it would be difficult to find that there had been such a 
change in the general sense of justice of the community to justify a refusal to follow the Ismail 
judgment, had it not been for the Interim Constitution. Within this constitutional context, the thus 
court based its decision on the fundamental values upon which South African legal policy was 
based.106 In the court’s view it was clear that if the spirit, purport and objects of Chapter 3 of the 
Interim Constitution and basic values underlying it are in conflict with the public policy 
considered and applied in the Ismail case, then the values underlying Chapter 3 of the Interim 
Constitution must prevail.107    
One of the questions posed by the court in the Ryland matter was whether a contract entered into 
between parties, which arose as a consequence of a monogamous marriage relationship 
according to the parties’ religion, was “contrary to the accepted customs and usages which are 
regarded as morally binding upon all members of society” or “fundamentally opposed to our 
[constitutional] principles and institutions”.108 The court held that a contract should only be 
considered offensive to public policy if it was offensive to those values which were shared by the 
community at large. It should not, therefore, be left to one group to dictate a common value 
system, and it was clear to the court that the views expressed in Ismail v Ismail were not 
representative of the values of a plural society.109  
In closing the court held that it must be accepted that the enforcement of the contractual promise 
made by the plaintiff in this case, particularly in light of the acceptance by our society of the 
values underlying Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution, will not detrimentally affect the interest 
of the community. Therefore, the court was satisfied that decision in Ismail no longer operated to 
preclude a court from enforcing claims such as those brought by the defendant.110   
In October 2013, the Cape High Court handed down judgment in the matter of Faro v Bingham 
NO.111 In this instance, the applicant, who was married to the deceased, was appointed as 
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executrix of the deceased’s estate. The parties were married in accordance with Islamic rites in 
2008 after a relationship of two years which produced a son. The deceased was diagnosed with 
lung cancer in 2009. Subsequent to an argument between the parties, the deceased requested an 
imam to pronounce a talaq. The latter gave the deceased a talaq certificate without speaking to 
or informing the applicant. The applicant was pregnant with the couple’s second child at the 
time. The waiting period (iddah) expired when the applicant gave birth. The parties resumed 
sexual relations in August 2009 which revoked the talaq. No further talaq was pronounced 
before the deceased passed on in March 2010. 
In April 2010, the applicant’s daughter from an earlier marriage approached the Muslim Judicial 
Council (MJC) to obtain a certificate annulling the marriage between the applicant and the 
deceased.112 This course of action was apparently prompted by the talaq pronounced by the 
imam. In light of the annulment certificate, the Master informed the applicant that the deceased’s 
estate could not be wound up until the dispute concerning her marital status was resolved.113 This 
prompted the applicant to submit an affidavit, corroborated by affidavits from a social worker 
and the deceased’s son from a prior marriage, to the MJC confirming the parties’ reconciliation 
in August 2009. The MJC issued a letter stating that the parties appeared to be husband and wife 
at the time of the decease’s death.114  
In light of the above development, the applicant’s daughter approached an attorney (the first 
respondent) who requested the removal of the applicant as the executrix of the deceased’s estate 
based on the annulment certificate of April 2010. The attorney was presumably unaware of the 
letter issued by the MJC. Upon learning of this later development, the attorney approached the 
deceased’s son who made two further affidavits in which he denied the reconciliation. These two 
affidavits were presented to the MJC who subsequently withdrew the letter of April 2010 and 
confirmed the talaq.115 In October 2010, the applicant was forced out of the family home by her 
daughter and the deceased’s son. The applicant was forced to live in shelters or on the street and 
her two minor children were taken into care. 
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The Master was of the view that the applicant was not the deceased’s surviving spouse and thus 
required the applicant to furnish security for the administration of the estate. The Applicant had 
no known address and was unaware of a meeting between the attorney and the MJC which 
resulted in the Master removing the applicant as executrix in terms of section 54(1)(v) of the 
Administration of Estates Act.116  
In April 2012, the attorney of the applicant’s daughter was appointed as executrix. The applicant 
filed a notice shortly thereafter, requesting, amongst other, the court to declare that the marriage 
subsisted at the time of the deceased’s death and that the applicant was the “spouse” for purposes 
of the Intestate Succession Act117  and a “survivor” for purposes of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act.118  
The court experienced little difficulty in finding in favour of the applicant. The court was 
satisfied, based on the evidence before it, that the applicant was entitled to be recognised as the 
deceased surviving spouse. Clearly shocked by the perilous position of women married in terms 
of Islamic rites, the court observed: 
“[t]he vulnerability of women in Islamic marriages does not arise from evidential problems peculiar to their 
situation. In the present case, for example, the question whether the Islamic union had been dissolved depended on 
whether there was a resumption of sexual relations between the parties during the Iddah period. That is a sensitive 
but not particularly difficult evidential question … The vulnerability of women in Islamic marriages arises primarily 
from the ease and relative informality with which an Islamic union may be dissolved at the instance of the 
husband.”119 
 
The need to formalise matters in South African law pertaining to marriage and divorce has 
clearly reached a critical stage. The Draft Muslim Marriage Bill will accordingly be examined 
next.  
5.3 Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
The legal status relating to Muslim marriages in South Africa dating back to the judgment 
handed down in the matter of Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal)120has been quarrelsome. 
Muslim marriages are viewed as invalid, because they are potentially polygynous and are not 
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solemnized in terms of the Marriage Act.121 Rautenbach correctly points out that besides 
customary marriages, only monogamous marriages of Roman-Dutch Law, referred to as civil 
marriages, are deemed to be valid.122 Therefore, the mood of the judiciary towards the validity of 
Muslim marriages has until recently been invalidating.123 Muslim marriages concluded abroad 
were viewed as contra bones mores.124  
The case of Kalla v The Master125 is instructive in this regard. In this instance, the court rejected 
the argument that a Muslim widow, who had married in India, was entitled to maintenance under 
the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.126 The court followed the approach that Islamic 
marriages were ab initio invalid because of being potentially polygynous. The South African 
legal and political contexts changed with the adoption of an Interim Constitution in 1993127 and 
the subsequent adoption of the final South African Constitution in 1996.128 These events acted as 
a springboard for renewed efforts to recognised the marriages of Muslims. Although there have 
been several attempts since 1994 for the official recognition of Muslim marriages, sadly to date 
no official recognition has occured.  
In July 2003 the South African Law Reform Commission released the Draft Bill on the 
Recognition of Muslim Marriages (the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill), followed by an adapted 
version in 2010.129 The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill was met with mixed responses within the 
Muslim community, and significantly, a large number of prominent Muslim scholars (ulama) 
criticised it on the basis that the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill amounts to state interference in 
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matters of religion as well as a distortion of the true nature of Islamic law in the name of 
Islam.130  
The seven key objectives of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill are contained in twenty two 
sections. To this end, the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill seeks to make provision for the 
recognition of Muslim marriages131 and to specify the requirements for a valid Muslim 
marriage.132 It furthermore seeks to regulate the registration of Muslim marriages133 and to 
recognise the status and capacity of spouses in Muslim marriages.134 The regulation of the 
proprietary consequences of Muslim marriages,135 as well as the termination of Muslim 
marriages and the consequences thereof,136 also receive special attention. And as is the case with 
most proposed bills, the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill also seeks to provide for the making of 
regulations, and to provide for matters connected therewith.137  
Specific aspects of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill as these relate to marriage and divorce will 
now each be considered.  
5.3.1 Marriage as conceptualised in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
5.3.1.1 Equal status and capacity of spouses  
Section 3 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is particularly significant from a constitutional 
perspective as it expressly states that a wife and a husband in a Muslim Marriage are equal in 
human dignity and both have, on the basis of equality, full status, capacity and financial 
independence. This includes the capacity to own and acquire assets and to dispose of them, to 
enter into contracts and to litigate.138   
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5.3.1.2 Validity of Muslim marriages 
The requirements for the validity of Muslim marriages are set out in section 5 of the Draft 
Muslim Marriages Bill.  For a Muslim marriage entered into after the commencement of the 
proposed act to be valid, the prospective spouses must both consent to the marriage and the 
marriage officer must ascertain from a proxy, if any, whether the parties to the marriage have 
thus consented. Witnesses must be present, as required by Islamic law, at the time of the 
conclusion of the marriage, and the parties to the marriage must have attained the age of eighteen 
years.139   
No spouse in a Muslim marriage to whom the proposed act shall apply may enter into a marriage 
under the Marriage Act140 or any other law during the subsistence of such a Muslim marriage.141 
In the event of a marriage having been entered into in contravention of the provisions of section 
5(2), such purported marriage shall be null and void.142 Furthermore, if either of the prospective 
spouses are minors, consent must be obtained from both parents; if no parents are available, then 
the guardian must give consent.143 Should the consent of the parents or guardian be unavailable, 
the provisions of section 25 of the Marriage Act shall apply.144  
Despite the requirements of section 5(1)(d), the Minister, or any Muslim person or Muslim body 
authorised in writing thereto by the Minister, may grant written permission to a person under the 
requisite age to enter into a Muslim marriage, if the Minister (or person or body) considers such 
marriage desirable and in the interest of the parties in question.145 Permission granted in terms of 
section 5(6) shall not relieve the parties to the proposed marriage from the obligation to comply 
with any other requirements prescribed by law.146  
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In the event that a person under the age of eighteen enters into a Muslim marriage without the 
permission of the Minister (or person or body authorised by him), and if the marriage is in the 
best interest of the parties and in accordance with the provisions of the proposed act, the Minister 
may declare in writing the marriage to be a valid Muslim marriage.147 Subject to the provisions 
of section 5(6) and section 5(7), section 24 of the Marriage Act shall apply to the Muslim 
marriage of a minor entered into without the consent of a parent, guardian, commissioner of 
child welfare or a judge, as the case may be.148 The prohibition of a Muslim marriage between 
the parties based on blood, affinity or fosterage, or any other reason, will be determined by 
Islamic law.149 
5.3.1.3 Registration of Muslim marriages 
The registration of Muslim marriages is contemplated in section 6 of the Draft Muslim Marriages 
Bill. This section provides that a Muslim marriage entered into before the commencement of the 
proposed act, unless the parties have elected not to be bound by its provisions, as contemplated 
in section 2(2), must register their marriage within two years after the commencement of the 
proposed act.150 This includes marriages entered into after the commencement of the proposed 
act (as contemplated in section 2(1)), in the event that the parties agree to be bound by those 
provisions.151  
Section 6 furthermore stipulates that no marriage officer shall register any marriage unless each 
of the parties produce to the marriage officer his or her identity document.152 The marriage 
officer must inform the parties that they are entitled to conclude a marriage contract of their own, 
including the marital regime, or they may conclude a standard contract of which examples must 
 
147
 See section 5(8) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
148
 See section 5(9) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. Section 24 of Act 25 of 1961 provides that no 
marriage officer shall solemnize a marriage between parties of whom one or both are minors, unless the consent by 
the person who is legally required to grant such consent has been furnished in writing. 
149
 See section 5(10) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
150
 See section 6(1)(a) and section 5(7) of the Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. A longer period may from time to 
time be prescribed by the Minister by virtue of a notice in the Government Gazette.   
151
 See section 6(1)(b) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
152
 In the absence of the prescribed identity document, an affidavit shall be furnished to the marriage officer by 
either or both parties: see section 6(2)(a), section 6(2)(b) and section 6(2)(c) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 
2010. 
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be presented to them. The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill thus wishes to ensure that the parties 
make an informed choice and understand the registration process.153  
A Muslim marriage shall be contracted in accordance with the formulae prescribed in Islamic 
law, including zawwajtuka and ankahtuka (meaning “I marry you (to) …”).154 Should the 
marriage officer not be satisfied that a valid Muslim marriage was entered into by the spouses, 
the marriage officer may refuse to register the marriage.155 A court may, upon the joint 
application of the spouses, order the registration of any Muslim marriage or the cancellation or 
rectification of any registration of a Muslim marriage effected by a marriage officer.156 A 
certificate of registration of a Muslim marriage issued under this section (or any other law 
providing for the registration of Muslim marriages) will constitute prima facie proof of the 
existence of the marriage and of the particulars contained therein.157 Any marriage officer who 
knowingly registers a marriage in contravention of the provisions of the proposed act, shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding R5 000.158  
Any person facilitating the conclusion of a Muslim marriage, irrespective of whether such a 
person is a marriage officer, must inform the parties that they have a choice whether or not to be 
bound by the provisions of the proposed act. If the parties to a proposed marriage elect to be 
bound by the provisions of the proposed act as contemplated in section 2(1), the person 
facilitating the marriage referred to in paragraph (a), must direct the parties to a marriage officer 
for the purposes of registering the Muslim marriage so facilitated. In the event that the person 
facilitating the marriage fails to comply with the provisions of paragraph (b), he will be guilty of 
an offence and liable, upon conviction, to a fine not exceeding R5 000.159 
 
153
 If the marriage officer is satisfied that the spouses concluded a valid Muslim marriage, then the date of the 
marriage, the dower agreed to (whether payable immediately or deferred in full or in part), and any other particulars 
prescribed must be registered. A certificate of registration must be issued to the spouses and must immediately be 
transmitted to a regional or district representative designated as such under section 21(1) of the Identification Act 71 
of 1986: see, in particular, section 6(3)(a), section 6(3)(b), section 6(3)(c), section 6(3)(d) and section 6(3)(e) of the 
Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010.  
154
 See section 6(4) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
155
 See section 6(5) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
156
 See section 6(6) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
157
 See section 6(7) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
158
 See section 6(8) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
159
 See section 6(9)(a), section 6(9)(b) and section 6(9)(c) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
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5.3.1.4 Proof of age of parties to a proposed marriage and age of majority 
In terms of section 7 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, a marriage officer may refuse to 
solemnize a marriage if it appears that either of the parties is of an age which debars them from 
contracting a valid Islamic marriage. However, this requirement may be waived if there exists 
proof, in writing, of permission or consent showing the party in question is entitled to contract a 
marriage. Section 7 thus essentially deals with the proof of age of the parties to the marriage.160 
In terms of section 10 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, the age of majority of any person is to 
be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Age of Majority Act.161    
5.3.1.5 Propriety consequences of Muslim marriages and contractual 
capacity of spouses 
Section 8 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill relates to the propriety consequences of Muslim 
marriages and the contractual capacity of the spouses. In terms of section 8(1), a Muslim 
marriage entered into before or after the commencement of the proposed act shall be deemed to 
be a marriage out of community of property. The parties can regulate the propriety consequences 
of the marriage by mutual consent or with an antenuptial contract which can be registered in the 
Deeds Registry.162  
In the event that the marriage is entered into before the commencement of the proposed act, the 
time limit to attend to the registration of the propriety consequences is twelve months.163 
Although the ante-nuptial contract need not be attested by a notary, it but must not be contrary to 
any provision contained in any other law.164 The spouses in a Muslim marriage entered into 
before or after the commencement of the proposed act may jointly apply to court to change the 
matrimonial property to their marriage(s).165 In cases where the husband has more than one 
 
160
 See section 7 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
161
 Act 57 of 1972. 
162
 See section 8(1) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
163
 See section 8(1)(a) and  section 8(1)(b) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
164
 See section 8(2) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
165
 This can only take place if the court is satisfied that sound reasons exist for the change, sufficient notice has been 
given to creditors, the amount does not exceed R500 and that no person will be prejudice by the proposed 
matrimonial change: see section 8(3)(a), section 8(3)(b) and section 8(3)(c) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 
2010. 
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spouse, all persons who have an interest in the matter must join in the proceedings.166 Where the 
husband is a spouse in an existing civil marriage as well as in a Muslim marriage, all the spouse 
or spouses must join in such proceedings.167  
In the event that a husband wishes to enter into a further marriage after the commencement of the 
proposed act, he must make an application to court for permission in terms of section 8(7) and 
must deliver, for approval, a written contract which will regulate the future matrimonial property 
system of his marriage.168 The court may grant approval if it is satisfied that the husband is able 
to maintain equality between his spouses, as prescribed by the Qur’an. In the case of an existing 
marriage which is in community of property (or which is subject to the accrual system or other 
contractual arrangement), the court may terminate the matrimonial property system applicable to 
that marriage, order an immediate division of the joint estate in equal shares, or order the 
immediate division of the accrual concerned in accordance with the Matrimonial Property Act.169 
In the absence of any agreement, the marriage shall be deemed to be out of community of 
property.170 If a court grants an application concerning the matrimonial property system of a 
marriage, a certified copy of such order must be furnished to each spouse,171 and no marriage 
officer shall register a second (or subsequent) Muslim marriage, unless the husband provides the 
marriage officer with the order of the court granting such approval.172  
In the event that a husband enters into a further Muslim marriage whilst he is already married 
without the permission of the court, he shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a 
fine not exceeding R20 000.173 Furthermore, any person who intentionally prevents another from 
 
166
 See section 8(4) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
167
 See section 8(5) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
168
 See section 8(6) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
169
 Act 88 of 1984. 
170
 Unless the court decides otherwise for compelling reasons: see section 8(7)(a)(b)(i), section 8(7)(a)(b)(ii) and 
section 8(7)(a)(b)(iii) and section 8(7)(c) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. All persons having a sufficient 
interest in the matter and, in particular, the applicant’s existing spouse or spouses and his prospective spouse, may 
be joined in the proceedings in terms of section 8(6). See also section 8(8) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 
2010. 
171
 See sections 8(9) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
172
 See section 8(10) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
173
 See section 8(11) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
 
 
 
 
	

exercising any right conferred under the proposed act shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
upon conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.174  
5.3.2 Divorce as conceptualised in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
5.3.2.1 Termination of Muslim marriages 
The termination of Muslim marriages is addressed in section 9 of the Draft Muslim Marriages 
Bill. It is expressly stipulated that the provisions of section 2 of the Divorce Act175 shall apply in 
respect of the jurisdiction of a court;176 yet notwithstanding the provisions of the Divorce Act (or 
anything to the contrary contained in common law), a Muslim marriage may be dissolved on any 
ground permitted by Islamic law.  
The provision of section 9 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill shall also apply to an existing civil 
marriage.177 And in the case of talaq, the husband shall be obliged to cause an irrevocable talaq 
to be registered immediately, within thirty days of its pronouncement, with a marriage officer in 
the magisterial district closest to his wife’s residence, either in the presence of the wife, or her 
duly authorized representative and two competent witnesses.178 If the presence of the wife or her 
duly authorised representative cannot be secured for any reason, the marriage officer shall 
register the irrevocable talaq only if the husband satisfies the marriage officer that due notice of 
the intended registration was served upon her by the sheriff of the court.179 These provisions 
shall also apply where the husband has delegated to the wife the right of pronouncing a talaq, 
and the wife has subsequently pronounced an irrevocable talaq (tafwid ul talaq).180 Any husband 
who knowingly, or willfully, fails to register the talaq shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine not exceeding R50 000.181 If any dispute arises about the validity of the 
irrevocable talaq according to Islamic law, the marriage officer will not register the same until 
 
174
 See section 8(12) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
175
 Act 70 of 1979. 
176
 See section 9(1) of the Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
177
 See section 9(2) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
178
 See section 9(3)(a) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
179
 See section 9(3)(b) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
180
 See section 9(3)(c) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. See also section 1(xxi) which defines tafwid al-
talaq as “the delegation by the husband of his right of talaq to the wife or any other person, either at the time of 
conclusion of the marriage or during the subsistence of the marriage, so that the wife or the appointed person may 
terminate the marriage by pronouncing a talaq strictly in accordance with the terms of such delegation”. 
181
 See section 9(3)(d) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
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the dispute is resolved by arbitration182 or pursuant to a written settlement between the 
spouses.183  
A spouse shall, within fourteen days, as from date of the registration of the irrevocable talaq, 
institute legal proceedings in a competent court for a decree confirming the dissolution of the 
marriage by way of talaq. The action instituted shall be subject to the procedures prescribed by 
the applicable rules of court, and a copy of the certificate of registration of the irrevocable talaq 
shall be annexed to the summons initiating such action.184 An irrevocable talaq, taking effect as 
such prior to the commencement of the proposed act, shall not be required to be registered.185 A 
decree of divorce must be granted by a court in the form of a faskh on any ground which is 
recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Islamic law, including the grounds 
specified in the definition of faskh in section 1 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill.186 An action 
for a decree of divorce by the wife shall be instituted in the form of faskh in a competent court, 
and the applicable procedure shall be the procedure prescribed by the rules of the court.187  
The granting of a faskh by a court, including a faskh granted on application of the husband, shall 
have the effect of terminating the marriage.188 The spouses who have effected a khula’189 shall 
personally and jointly appear before a marriage officer, and such a dissolution of the marriage 
shall be registered in the presence of two competent witnesses. The marriage officer shall 
 
182
 In terms of section 14 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
183
 See section 9(3)(e) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
184
 This does not preclude a spouse from seeking the following interim relief: (a) an application pendent lite for an 
interdict or interim custody of, or access to, a minor child of the marriage, or for the payment of maintenance; (b) an 
application for a contribution towards the costs of such an action or to institute such an action, or to make such 
application, in forma pauperis, or for the substituted service of process in, or the edictal citation of a party to, such 
action or such application; or (c) an application for maintenance during the iddah period. See also, in this regard, 
section 9(3)(f)(i), section 9(3)(f)(ii) and section 9(3)(f)(iii) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
185
 See section 9(3)(g) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
186
 The definition of faskh contained in section 1(ix) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010 reads: “[f]askh 
means a decree of dissolution of marriage granted by a court, upon the application of a husband or wife, on any 
ground or basis permitted by Islamic law”. The grounds for such a decree of divorce are set out in section 1(ix)(a)-(j) 
and include, amongst other, absence, mental illness, cruelty and imprisonment. 
187
  Including appropriate relief pendent lite as referred to in section 9(3)(f) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 
2010. 
188
 See section 9(4) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
189
 Khula’ is defined in section 1(xii) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010 as the “dissolution of the marriage 
bond at the insistence of the wife, in terms of an agreement for the transfer of property or other permissible 
consideration between the spouses according to Islamic law”.  
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register the khula’ as one irrevocable talaq, in which event the provisions of section (3)(f) of the 
Draft Muslim Marriages Bill will apply.190  
The Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act191 and applicable sections of the Divorce Act192 
relating to safeguarding the welfare of any minor or dependent child, shall apply to the 
dissolution of a Muslim marriage.193 In the absence of an agreement relating to the division of 
the assets, the court may order that such assets de divided equally between the parties if deemed 
fair and equitable.194 The same principles will apply if the parties have contributed during the 
subsistence of the marriage to the maintenance or increase of the estate of each other (or any one 
of them) to the extent that is not feasible or possible to accurately quantify the separate 
contributions of each party.195 If a husband is a spouse in more than one Muslim marriage, all 
factors must be taken into consideration, including the sequences of the marriages and any 
contract, agreement or order made in terms of section 8(3) and section 8(7).196 Any person who 
has, in the opinion of the court, a sufficient interest in the matter may join in the proceedings.197  
The court may make any order with regard to the custody or guardianship of, or access to, any 
minor child of the marriage, having regard to the factors specified in section 11 of the Draft 
Muslim Marriages Bill.198 This could include an order for the payment of maintenance (including 
past maintenance), taking into account all the relevant factors.199 In addition, the court may make 
an order for a conciliatory gift (mut’ah al-talaq) in defined circumstances permitted by Islamic 
 
190
 See section 9(5) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
191
 Act 24 of 1987. 
192
 Act 70 of 1979. 
193
 A court granting or confirming a decree for the dissolution of a Muslim marriage enjoys the powers contemplated 
in section 7(1), section 7(7) and section 7(8) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 as well as section 24(1) of the 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984: see, in particular, section 9(6) and section 9(7)(a) of the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill of 2010. 
194
 See section 9(7)(b) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. This provision will find application where a 
party has assisted, or has rendered services in the operation or conduct in the family business(es) during the 
subsistence of the marriage: see, in particular, section 9(7)(b)(i) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
195
 See section 9(7)(b)(ii) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
196
 See section 9(7)(c) of the Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
197
 See section 9(7)(d) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
198
 See section 9(7)(e) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. Section 11 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 
2010 relates to the custody of and access to minor children. 
199
 See section 9(7)(f) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
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law.200 Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to 
lodge a claim against the deceased estate in respect of any unpaid dower, or otherwise in respect 
of any tangible contribution recognised by Islamic law.201   
5.3.2.2 Compulsory mediation  
In the event of a dispute arising during the subsistence of a Muslim marriage, any party to such 
marriage shall refer the dispute, at any time (whether before or after the institution of legal 
proceedings contemplated in section 9(2)(f) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, but prior to the 
adjudication thereof by a court), to a Mediation Council.202 The Mediation Council shall attempt 
to resolve the dispute through mediation within thirty days from the date of the referral thereof. 
The parties may each be represented at such mediation by a representative of their choice.203  
The Mediation Council, upon resolution of the dispute, shall submit the mediation agreement to a 
court within seven days from resolution, and such court shall, if satisfied that the interest of any 
minor children are duly protected, confirm the mediation agreement.204 If the Mediation Council 
has certified that a dispute remains unresolved, or if a dispute remains unresolved after the expiry 
of thirty days from the date of referral thereof, such dispute may be adjudicated by a court in 
terms of section 15 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill.205 
5.3.2.3  Maintenance  
Considerations pertaining to maintenance are considered in section 12 of the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill. Section 12 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill expressly stipulates that the 
 
200
 See section 9(7)(g) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
201
 See section 9(8). See also the Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. See also section 1(v) which defines dower or mahr 
as “the money, property or anything of value, including benefits which must be payable by the husband to the wife 
as an ex lege consequence of the marriage itself in order to establish a family and lay the foundations for affection 
and companionship”. 
202
 See section 13(1) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
203
 See section 13(2) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
204
 See section 13(3) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
205
 See section 13(4) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
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provisions of the Maintenance Act206 shall apply in respect of the duty of any person to maintain 
any other person.207  
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 15 of the Maintenance Act or the common law, the 
maintenance court shall, in issuing a maintenance order and in determining the amount to be 
paid, take into consideration various factors.208 These factors would include that the husband is 
obliged to maintain his wife during the subsistence of a Muslim marriage according to his means 
and her reasonable needs,209 and that the father is obliged to maintain his children until they 
become self-supporting.210 In the case of the dissolution of a Muslim marriage by divorce, the 
husband is obliged to maintain the wife for the mandatory waiting period of the iddah, and where 
the wife has custody of the children, the husband is obliged to maintain the wife only for the 
duration of such custody. This would include the maintenance of a separate residence if the wife 
does not own a residence. The wife will also separately be entitled to be remunerated (ujrah al-
hadanah) in relation to a breastfeeding period of two years, calculated from date of birth of an 
infant. The husband’s duty to support a child born of such a marriage includes the provisions of 
food, clothing, separate accommodation, medical care and education.211  
The amount of maintenance is to be determined on the basis of what the court may consider fair 
and just in the circumstances.212 The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill also provides that a 
maintenance order made in terms of the proposed act may at any time be rescinded, varied or 
suspended by a court if the court finds that there is sufficient reason therefore.213   
 
 
 
206
 Act 99 of 1998. 
207
 See section 12(1) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
208
 See section 12(2) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
209
 See section 12(2)(a) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
210
 See section 12(2)(b) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
211
 See section 12(2)(c)(i), section 12(2)(c)(ii), section 12(2)(c)(iii) and section 12(2)(c)(iv) of the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill of 2010. 
212
 See section 12(3) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
213
 See section 12(4) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. Unpaid arrear maintenance, which is due and 
payable to a wife, shall not be capable of being extinguished by prescription, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 or any other law: see, in particular, section 12(5) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 
2010. 
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5.3.2.4 Dissolution of an existing civil marriage 
Section 16 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill deals with various aspects pertaining to the 
dissolution of an existing civil marriage between the parties. In the event that a spouse to an 
existing civil marriage institutes a divorce action in terms of the Divorce Act after 
commencement of the proposed act, the court shall not dissolve the civil marriage by the grant of 
a decree of divorce, until the court is satisfied that the accompanying Muslim marriage has been 
dissolved.214  
Should the husband refuse, for any reason, to pronounce an irrevocable talaq, the wife to the 
accompanying Muslim marriage shall be entitled, in the same proceedings, to make an 
application for a decree of faskh in terms of the proposed act for that purpose only, in which 
event the provisions of the proposed act shall apply.215 The matter may be referred back to a 
court for determining the proprietary or other consequences of the marriage in terms of the 
Divorce Act216 and related matrimonial legislation.217  
Where, in addition to the existing marriage civil marriage, the husband has concluded a further 
Islamic marriage (or marriages that can be registered under the proposed act), the husband’s 
existing spouse (or spouses) must be joined in the divorce action contemplated in section 16(1) 
of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill.218 The provisions of this subsection shall apply, with such 
changes as may be required by the context, to spouses in an existing civil marriage who have 
elected to adopt the provisions of the proposed act as contemplated in section 2 of the Draft 
Muslim Marriages Bill.219  
A critical examination of the Draft Muslim Marriage Bill follows next. 
 
 
 
214
 See section 16(1) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
215
 See section 16(2) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
216
 Act 70 of 1979. 
217
 See section 16(3) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
218
 See section 16(4) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
219
 See section 16(5) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
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5.4 Critical Assessment of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
On the whole the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is to be welcomed, particularly in so far as it 
strives for the recognition and registration of Muslim marriages and the express acknowledgment 
of the equal status and capacity of the spouses.  
It is rather striking that the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill makes no explicit reference to the 
complex issue of inheritance, either in the context of a monogamous, or in the context of a 
polygynous, Muslim marriage. In Islam succession is governed by a Qur’anic injunction which 
instructs as follows:  
“Allah [thus] directs you as regards your children’s [inheritance]: to the male, a portion equal to that of two females: 
if only daughters, two or more, their share is two-thirds of the inheritance; if only one, her share is half”.220  
This injunction has rightly been construed as patently unfair as it clearly discriminates on the 
basis of both sex and gender. The situation of Muslim women is even more precarious where the 
testator dies without leaving a valid will. Unless the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is promulgated 
into law,221 the Qur’anic injunction will stand, except if the wife (or wives in the case of a 
polygynous Muslim union) were to approach the court for relief. But this means that Muslim 
women will be decidedly worse off compared to non-Muslim women in South Africa. The court 
will in effect have to be approached for legal redress on every single occasion where a testator, 
who was in a polygynous marriage, dies intestate.  
 
220
 See, in particular, Qur’an Sura IV: 10-11 section 2. This section further states: “For parents, a sixth share of the 
inheritance to each. If the deceased left children; if no children, and the parents are the [only] heirs, the mother has a 
third; if the deceased left brothers (or sisters), the mother has a sixth. [The distribution in all cases is] after the 
payment of legacies and debts. Your parents or your children are nearest to you in benefit. These are settled portions 
ordained by Allah and Allah is All-Knowing, All Wise”. And furthermore: “In what your wife leave, you share is a 
half, if they leave no child, but in they leave a child, ye get a fourth, after payment of legacies and debts. In what ye 
leave, their share is fourth, if ye leave no child, but if ye leave a child, they get an eighth, after payment of legacies 
and debts”. 
221
 The question of intestate succession (even in the case of a polygynous union) will then be governed by section 
1(4)(g) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 which will be amended to read: “(g) ‘spouse’ shall include a 
spouse of a Muslim marriage recognised in terms of the [Draft Muslim Marriages Bill], and shall otherwise include 
the spouse of a deceased person in a union recognised as a marriage in accordance with the tenets of any religion: 
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A 2008 judgment by the Cape High Court seems to underscore this point. In Hassam v Jacobs 
NO,222 the court held that women married in terms of Islamic law are entitled to joint ownership 
of land where they could not formerly make such a claim in terms of the housing policy of the 
City of Cape Town. The sixty three year old claimant was married for more than thirty six years 
to the deceased, and approached the court for relief when the executor of her deceased husband’s 
estate sought to sell the house, within which the couple and their children had resided, in order to 
place the money in trust for the deceased’s three minor children born from his marriage to a 
second wife. The deceased was married to both women simultaneously. The Cape High Court 
agreed that women married in terms of Muslim rites are entitled to joint ownership of council 
land owned by their husbands.  
The challenges surrounding intestate succession stem directly from the non-recognition of 
Muslim Marriages. Unless the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is promulgated into law, Muslim 
spouses will effectively be compelled to approach the court for (equitable) relief on every similar 
occasion. The non-recognition of Muslim marriages thus clearly bears significant legal 
consequences for all aspects relating to marriage and this is especially so in the case of intestate 
succession in the event of a polygynous marriage. Only once all existing Muslim marriages 
(irrespective of whether monogamous or polygynous) enjoy legal recognition, will Muslim 
women be regarded as surviving spouses and will they stand to benefit from present legislation, 
including provisions that relate specifically to intestate succession.223   
It is also interesting to note that whereas the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill prefers the term 
“Muslim” marriages, the Discussion Paper of the South African Law Reform Commission 
employs the term “Islamic” marriages.224 It is not clear from the context whether there exists a 
difference between the two concepts or whether the two terms are (to be) used interchangeably.  
It need not be argued that the substance of Muslim personal law and the interpretations thereof 
have consistently generated heated debates and that various obstacles have furthermore been 
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encountered by women activist.225 Questions that are of particular importance to women 
typically relate to what would constitute a valid Muslim marriage, the rules of maintenance of 
the spouses, and the rights of spouses during the subsistence of the marriage. Although these 
questions centre upon the basic tenets of Muslim personal law, unavoidably controversies may 
arise concerning which school(s) of interpretation is (are) to be followed.226 By lending 
legitimacy to one school of thought, to the exclusion of the other schools, could well be seen to 
amount to discrimination on the basis of religious belief. The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is 
vulnerable to such criticism, as the argument could be made that one school of thought is given 
priority over the other schools.227  
While the Shafi’i and Hanafi schools of thought are the most prevalent in the South African 
context, the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill appears to exclude, to a certain extent, the practices 
that are favourable to the Maliki and Hanbali schools of interpretation.228 In the event that the 
Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is promulgated, the legislature could well be seen to have 
subscribed to a particular school (or schools) of interpretation, thus controlling or mandating 
religious practices. It may also be questionable whether a secular state has the authority to define 
religious concepts and whether or not this type of interference amounts to a violation of the right 
to freedom of religion.229  
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A further challenge presented to the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill relates to the legitimisation of 
polygynous marriages. Manjoo rightly argues that the explicit legitimisation of polygynous 
marriages could be seen as an infringement of women’s rights and thus as a direct violation of 
section 9(2) of the South African Constitution.230 The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill also does not 
allow for the prohibition of the practice of polygyny, now or at any time in the future, and thus 
could be seen to ignore the issues of substantive equality and the realisation of the inherent 
human dignity of women within the context of religious practices. The previous chapter of this 
doctoral thesis has shown that Tunisia, by contrast, has prohibited polygyny as early as 1956 on 
the basis of equality and has attached sanctions to those who enter into such marriages.231 
Aspects pertaining to guardianship and the compulsory waiting period (iddah) could also be 
highlighted as potential issues of concern. Although it is to be welcomed that the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill only envisages guardianship for persons under the age of eighteen years of age 
and stipulates that the permission of both parents is required, a difficulty may arise in the event 
that there are no parents available and a guardian is assigned.232 Established Islamic 
jurisprudence confirms that the guardian may only be a male person, thereby diminishing a 
woman’s status by denying her the right to act in such a capacity, even in respect of her own 
(biological) children.  
The iddah period, in turn, could be construed as problematic as it is applicable to wives only. 
Although the iddah is supposed to function as a type of reconciliation period, the male is 
immediately at liberty to enter into a new marriage. This freedom could well be construed as a 
violation of the very notion of a reconciliatory period. Moreover, should it be discovered that the 
wife is pregnant during the three month iddah period, the waiting period, in fact, continues until 
she gives birth. Not only is the (former) wife placed in an indeterminate state, and thus a period 
of legal uncertainty, but there is no similar restriction placed on the (former) husband who may 
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continue unrestricted with his life. The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill does not appear overtly 
sensitive to any of these particular concerns.   
Section 15 of the South African Constitution allows the legislature to recognise systems of 
family and personal law under any tradition or systems adhered to by communities professing to 
practice a particular religion. The only requirement is that such legislation must be consistent 
with the provisions of the South African Constitution.233 The argument asserted in the South 
African Law Reform Commission’s Discussion Paper234 was that Muslims currently encountered 
difficulty enforcing maintenance, termination of marriage, proprietary, and custody rights arising 
from their marriages, and thus legislation must be specifically aimed at correcting these 
problems. The codification process, which has culminated in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, 
could thus rightly be seen as a way to actively provide social protection to women in Muslim 
marriages and to address problems within the family sphere.235   
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill prescribes that cases are to be tried by Muslim judges and 
assessors who have a specialised knowledge of Islamic law. The South African Law Reform 
Commission thus sought to give religious leaders greater discretion and authority by mandating 
that Muslim judges and institutions play a central role in dispute resolution. This poses an 
inherent danger, however, which may lead to a variety of interpretations of religious laws that 
may be potentially biased towards women.236 Some even argue that this is an example of the 
state attempting to prescribe how one should worship or practice one’s religion, whereas the state 
should not be permitted to force or influence particular religious beliefs or practices.237 The 
argument made by Motala is that there is a real risk of alienating the Muslim community, 
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because not all sectors of the community are in agreement with the prescriptions and 
interpretations contained in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill.238 Many are, in fact, of the view 
that the adoption of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill will encroach upon, and thus impact 
negatively on, shari’ah law.   
A further criticism raised by Manjoo relates to the dissolution of marriage. Here again there is 
different treatment in respect of the divorce process accorded to Muslim marriages, as compared 
to civil and customary law divorces.239 In terms of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, compulsory 
mediation is the first step in the process of dispute resolution, where after arbitration and, finally, 
litigation is to follow. Court proceedings will be presided over by a Muslim judge, failing that 
the matter would have to be heard by a Muslim attorney. Should the matter proceed to the stage 
of appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal would submit questions of Islamic law to accredited 
Muslim institutions.240  
The application of Islamic law could well introduce gender bias to both the procedure and 
substance of the case and the introduction of Muslim judges and attorneys as judicial officers 
may create unforeseen challenges in the courtroom. And since the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
introduces compulsory mediation, only Muslim persons would be compelled to go through this 
additional procedure in order to gain access to the formal justice system. This may well put the 
Muslim community at a disadvantage when compared to non-Muslims in so far as their 
constitutional right to have access to both due process and effective justice is concerned. Due to 
the fact that arbitration is a private process, there exist some concerns that gender bias will 
proceed unchecked by public scrutiny which may yield unfair results for women.241  
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill furthermore mandates that a husband must support his wife 
during marriage and for a limited period after the divorce during the iddah period, and that child 
support must be paid upon divorce. But the question of alimony, according to Manjoo, has not 
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been adequately addressed.242 The term “alimony” is commonly used to denote an allowance for 
support made by one person to the other, pending or after their divorce or legal separation. The 
fact that the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill limits maintenance to the iddah period after divorce 
could well create a serious financial obstacle for women.  
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill could thus be said to be rather vague on the issue of 
maintenance for the woman, as there is no clause stating that a woman may receive maintenance 
until she remarries or becomes self-supporting. This would create an unacceptable situation in 
the current constitutional dispensation in South Africa. In addition, the issue of maintenance in 
the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill appears to revolve around the maintenance of children, and the 
woman is only entitled to maintenance during the prescribed waiting period. In South Africa 
many women (not only Muslim women) traditionally work in an unpaid or informal sector of the 
economy (i.e. maintaining the household and caring for the children). The legacy of apartheid 
South Africa was the denial of education and opportunities for women in the work place which 
made it hard for women to enter the formal economic sector with limited education and 
experience. Therefore, the omission of alimony (i.e. maintenance for the woman or an allowance 
for support made by one spouse to the other, pending or after their divorce or legal separation) 
from the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill could well threaten to leave many women in financial 
ruin, if not destitute. Such an omission would unfairly discriminate against women, both 
formally and substantively and would ultimately further entrench inequality in South Africa law 
between Muslim and non-Muslim women.243   
The constitutional rights and imperatives potentially affected by the practices pertaining to 
Muslim marriage and divorce will be examined next. 
5.5 Constitutional Context: Affected Rights and Freedoms  
The rights to equality,244 human dignity,245 freedom and security of the person246 and freedom of 
religion, belief and opinion247 are all potentially affected when the status of Muslim women in 
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marriage and divorce is examined. The constitutional imperatives affecting the rights and 
freedoms of Muslim women in South Africa will be evaluated below. 
5.5.1 Equality  
Although regarded as a “difficult and deeply controversial social ideal”,248 equality at its most 
basic requires that individuals (or groups of individuals) who are similarly situated in relevant 
ways should be treated the same.249  
The South African Constitution plays an important role in analysing the appropriate means of 
addressing the issue of the non-recognition of Muslim marriages. Manjoo correctly argues that 
the South African Constitution must be interpreted in its historical context, that is, by focusing 
on fundamentally reversing the effects of racial and gender discrimination in a post democratic 
society.250 The constitutional mandate calls for transformative justice and the objective is that of 
substantive equality, not just formal equality.251 Since formal equality works on the assumption 
that inequality is an anomaly that can be terminated by extending the same rights and liberties to 
all in accordance with the same “neutral” norm or standard of measurement, it does not take into 
account social and economic disparities between groups and individuals. In contrast, substantive 
equality requires an examination of the current social and economic conditions of groups and 
individuals in order to determine whether the constitutional commitment to equality is 
maintained.252 Together with human dignity and freedom, equality constitutes a foundational 
value of the South African Constitution. The judiciary has accordingly emphasised that this 
history of institutionalised discrimination and the need to remedy the grave consequences of 
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apartheid must, out of necessity, inform any interpretation of the South African Constitution, 
especially the provisions relating to equality.253  
Certain practices relating to Muslim marriage and divorce may well violate the non-
discrimination clause contained in section 9(3) of the South African Constitution.254 In President 
of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo255 and in Harksen v Lane NO256 the Constitutional Court 
formulated a test to determine whether or not the differentiation in question was constitutionally 
problematic. By accentuating the central role of human dignity in an assessment of equality, the 
Constitutional Court held that in instances where the differentiation is based on any of the 
grounds expressly mentioned in section 9(3) of the South African Constitution, discrimination 
will exist.257 In order to determine whether the discrimination is unfair in the constitutional sense 
that this concept has acquired, the court must evaluate the position of the claimant in society, the 
nature of the action or provision and the effect of the provision or action of the claimant’s 
rights.258 Here too human dignity plays a central part in assessing whether the discrimination in 
question is unfair, thereby again confirming the dignity of the individual as a core legal and 
constitutional value.259  
The legal status of same-sex marriages was considered by the Constitutional Court in Fourie v 
Minister of Home Affairs.260 In this instance the significance of South Africa’s modern equality 
jurisprudence which is focused on the foundational values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom, rather than on religious texts, was accentuated.261 The Constitutional Court observed: 
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“[i]t is one thing for the Court to acknowledge the important role religion plays in our public life. It is quite another 
to use religious doctrine as a source for interpreting the Constitution. It would be out of order to employ the religious 
sentiments of some as a guide to the constitutional rights of others”.262  
Manjoo correctly argues that the Fourie judgment lends strong support to the contention that 
religious norms cannot outweigh the constitutionally protected right to equality within the 
context of marriage, and hence the inability of parties to lawfully marry their same-sex partners 
constitutes discrimination.263 The Constitutional Court’s judgment is significant and is to be 
welcomed as the concept of marriage was expanded from a union of one man and one woman to 
include same-sex marriage. And yet monogamous Muslim marriages entered into according to 
the tenets of Islam remain generally unrecognised in South Africa. Based on the reasoning 
followed by the Constitutional Court in the Fourie matter, the non-recognition of a monogamous 
Muslim marriage in South Africa would constitute an infringement of the right to equality. By 
the same token, the potentially polygynous nature of Muslim marriages could be construed as 
equally problematic as these unions could be seen as a violation of the constitutional values of 
and rights to equality and human dignity.   
5.5.2 Human dignity  
The right to human dignity stems from the assumption that dignity of all humans or persons must 
be respected by virtue of their membership to humanity.264 Human dignity, together with 
equality and freedom, are seen as core values of the South African Constitution and legal 
order.265 The Constitutional Court has confirmed that human dignity is a founding constitutional 
value.266 In the words of Chaskalson: 
“the 1996 Constitution now refers to the ‘inherent dignity’ of all people, thus asserting the respect for human 
dignity, and all that flows from that, as an attribute of life itself, and not a privilege granted by the State”. 267    
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Currie and De Waal rightly point out that human dignity is not merely a central value of the 
objective, normative value system established by the South African Constitution, but could well 
be regarded as the preeminent value.268 Section 1 of the South African Constitution confirms the 
core values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms.  
Motala and Ramaphosa correctly point out that the centrality of human dignity is of particular 
importance given South Africa’s apartheid history during which the majority of South Africans 
were denied their human dignity. In evaluating the constitutional impact of the death penalty in S 
v Makwanyane,269 O’Regan J observed that human dignity is an acknowledgement of the 
intrinsic worth of every person.270 This observation was reiterated by Chaskalson CJ who 
observed that: 
“[t]he rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other rights in the 
Bill of Rights. By committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to 
value these two rights above all”.271  
The recognition of human dignity, together with the values of equality and freedom, are 
expressly articulated in several places in the South African Constitution. For example, section 
7(1) affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom, section 39 stipulates 
that rights must be interpreted so as to promote and create an open and democratic society and 
section 36 allows for rights to be limited where reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The centrality of human dignity in the South African legal and constitutional dispensation has 
been confirmed in a number of judgments dealing with the situation of historically marginalised 
individuals and groups. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice,272 for example, the criminalisation of sodomy under common law was found to be a 
violation of the right to dignity. By highlighting the stigma, insecurity and vulnerability attached 
to gay men by virtue of the position under common law, the Constitutional Court experienced 
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little difficulty in finding that the existence of a law which punishes a form of sexual expression 
for gay men degrades gay men in our broader society, thereby constituting a “palpable invasion 
of their dignity” and a breach of section 10 of the South African Constitution.273  
The right to human dignity encompasses the right to marry freely and to raise a family. In 
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,274 the Constitutional Court was faced with a challenge to 
the constitutionality of section 29(9)(b) read with section 26(3) and section 26(6) of the Aliens 
Control Act.275 The Constitutional Court held that the right to dignity must be interpreted to 
afford protection to the institutions of marriage and family life276and that this protection extends 
at the very least to the core elements of these institutions, namely the right (and duty) of spouses 
to live together in community of life:277  
“[t]he decision to enter into a marriage relationship and to sustain such a relationship is a matter of defining 
significance for many, if not most, people and to prohibit the establishment of such a relationship impairs the ability 
of the individual to achieve personal fulfillment in an aspect of life that is of central significance. In my view, such 
legislation would clearly constitute an infringement of the right to dignity. It is not only legislation that prohibits the 
rights to form a marriage relationship that will constitute an infringement of the right to dignity, but any legislation 
that significantly impairs the ability of spouses to honor their obligations to one another would also limit that right. 
A central aspect of marriage is cohabitation, the right (and duty) to live together, and legislation that significantly 
impairs the ability of spouses to honor that obligation would also constitute a limitation of the right to dignity”.278   
The right to human dignity is not, therefore, only a justiciable and prescribed right that must be 
protected and respected, but it is also a core value that informs the interpretation of most of the 
fundamental rights, including the limitation clause,279 contained in the South African 
Constitution.280 
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5.5.3 Freedom and security of the person  
Section 12 echoes the sentiments expressed in Article 6 of the African Charter by recognising the 
right to freedom and security of every person.281 Section 12 combines the right to freedom and 
security of the person in respect of both the right to bodily and psychological integrity, thereby 
affording the individual protection from both physical and psychological harm. In this respect, 
South Africa has also honoured its commitments in terms of Article 5282  of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERC).283  
 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security284 sets out the nature and extent of the state’s 
obligation towards women, including others groups or communities which are within South 
Africa’s geographical region. The Constitutional Court acknowledged the state’s obligation, 
through its organs, to respect, promote and protect the dignity, security and freedom of each 
individual. Moreover, the Constitutional Court emphasised the right of women to be free from 
the threat of sexual violence,285 including the positive component enunciated in section 12 
“which obliges the state and its organs to provide appropriate protection to everyone through 
laws and structures aimed to afford protection”.286  
 
The same sentiment was expressed in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of 
Education.287 The Constitutional Court held that the state must take appropriate steps to reduce 
violence both in public and private life,288 including the protection of children which represents a 
powerful obligation on the state to act. The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the right to 
 
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 See Article 6 of the African Charter of 1981 which reads: “[e]very individual shall have the right to liberty and 
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down by the law. No one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained”. 
282
 See, in particular, Article 5 of the ICERC of 1969 which places an obligation on states to prohibit and eliminate 
racial discrimination and to promote understanding among races by guaranteeing equality before the law. Article 
5(b) expressly refers to the “right to security of the person and protection by the state against violence and bodily 
harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by individual groups or institutions”. 
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freedom and security of the person would buttress arguments for the recognition of Muslim 
marriages based on the psychological harm women suffer by virtue of the non-recognition of 
their marriages. Non-recognition renders women legally vulnerable and this may well facilitate a 
fertile breeding ground for other social evils, including physical harm where women are cast out 
from family homes as strikingly illustrated in Faro v Bingham NO.289 
5.5.4 Freedom of religion, belief and opinion 
The relationship between the state and church and, in particular, between law and religion 
continues to be a contentious issue. The history of this relationship is complicated and the 
reaction to religious persecutions by both state and religious affiliations prompted the 
development of human rights.290 It could therefore be argued that calls for religious freedom was 
to facilitate tolerance and for secular states to show no bias towards religion. The interpretation 
of the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion dates back to its historical origins in that 
the right first concerns the extent to which the state may recognise or establish a religion and, 
secondly, the freedom to exercise a religious belief.291 The nexus between these two aspects of 
religious freedom has been concisely explained by the United States Supreme Court when it 
held:  
“[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the 
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the officially approved religion is plain”.292  
The drafters of the South African Constitution were aware of the pitfalls that could arise by 
insisting on a strict separation between the state and church.293 In light of South Africa’s 
particular religious and civil history, the drafters of the South African constitution thus sought to 
entrench a compromise.  
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Such a compromise is not, however, unique.294 Section 15 of the South African Constitution does 
not prevent the state from recognising or supporting religion, but does require the state to treat all 
religion equally.295 This right, together with the right of cultural, religious and linguistic 
communities recognised in section 31, firmly entrenches the right of the individual (and 
communities) to freely exercise their religion. When read together with section 9(3) of the 
equality clause, section 15 prohibits the state from discriminating against any religious group. 
Therefore, in terms of the South African Constitution, the right to freedom of religion has both a 
free exercise component as well as an equal treatment component.296 In principle both 
components apply to the state (i.e. vertically) as well as to private conduct (i.e. horizontally).297 
In addition, the prohibition against unfair discrimination on the ground of religion in section 9(3) 
is unequivocally given horizontal application as it relates to the conduct of a private person or 
persons.298  
Although Muslim marriages have yet to enjoy official recognition, the possibility of converting a 
religious or traditional union into a civil marriage has always existed. Yet the legal requirement 
that such a marriage be monogamous has, however, remained.299 There are two conflicting 
approaches which the civil courts can adopt when approached with an interpretation relating to 
questions of religious law.300 While the first approach would be for the court to take it upon itself 
to provide an interpretation of religious law, the second approach would be for the court not to 
involve itself in interpreting questions relating to religious dogma.  
The first approach is illustrated by the Supreme Court of India where the court conducts an 
investigation to ascertain whether the religious practice in question is regarded as an essential 
 
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part of the particular religion.301 The court is thus given the status of a so-called “high priest” or 
“cleric” and possesses the final authority in determining issues of a religious nature.302  
In the matter of Ryland v Edros,303 the Cape High Court had to assess whether under Islamic law, 
and specifically under the Shafi’i school of thought, a divorced wife was entitled to a consolatory 
gift where the termination of the marriage was at the request of the husband and, secondly, 
whether the wife was entitled to an equitable share of the husband’s estate.304 Farlam J resigned 
himself to the reality introduced by the new constitutional dispensation that the courts would be 
called upon to deliberate over religious issues stemming from religious doctrine.305 On the 
pleadings before the court there did not appear to be an entanglement of doctrinal issues.306 
However, the court still had to deal with two competing views, based on the testimony of an 
expert witness, on the question of whether the former wife was entitled to an equitable 
distribution of the husband’s estate.307 Guided by the rights enshrined under the Interim 
Constitution,308 the court made a choice as to which interpretation reflected the “correct” view 
under Islamic law.309  
The second approach is demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court as well as the German 
Constitutional Court and respects the idea that religious freedom means that disputes relating to 
religious dogma should be resolved by religious institutions and not by the courts.310 The value 
of this approach is that it does not give the courts the powers to act as arbiters over issues of 
religious doctrine, based on the premise that the courts should not get involved in religious 
disputes, pronouncing on religious doctrines, and finally deciding what would, in the words of 
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Motala and Ramaphosa, constitute “true belief”.311 The authors are thus of the view that the court 
in Ryland v Edros312 erred by proceeding to assess what was meant by “religious law”.313   
Understanding the term “religion” is unnecessary because section 15 of the South African 
Constitution also protects the rights to freedom of conscience, thought, belief and opinion. While 
agnosticism and atheism will find support in terms such as “belief and conscience”,314 the term 
“conscience” contemplates a moral judgment and “thought” refers to human reason. Religious 
freedom may therefore also extend to the rejection of religious beliefs.315 Section 15(1) thus not 
only protects mainstream religious convictions, but also protects those persons who are not part 
of any mainstream religious affiliation. However, the same cannot be said for section 15(2), 
section 15(3) and section 31 (rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities). The 
application of section 15(2) would appear to be restricted to “religious observances”, while 
section 15(3) refers to “religious” and “traditional” marriages.  
The definition of freedom of religion was considered by the Constitutional Court in S v 
Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg.316 In this instance, Chaskalson P borrowed from Canadian 
jurisprudence317 and cited with approval318 the dictum by Dickson CJC who held that:  
“[t]he essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person 
chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to 
manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination”.319  
However, the above definition does not refer to the right to establish, maintain and manage 
religious institutions. Read with section 18 (freedom of association) and section 31, the right to 
freedom of religion also secures a degree of autonomy for religious groups to conduct their 
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affairs without impediment. The Constitutional Court rightly cautioned in Christian Education 
South Africa v Minister of Education320 that: 
“[j]ust as it is difficult to postulate a firm divide between religious thought and action based on religious belief, so it 
is not easy to separate the individual religious consciences from the collective setting in which it is frequently 
expressed. Religious practice often involves interaction between believers. It usually has both an individual and 
collective dimension and is often articulated through the activities that are traditional and structured, and frequently 
ritualistic and ceremonial”.321 
Section 15(3) does not prevent the legislature from recognising religious marriages and, in fact, 
empowers the state to give effect to such marriages in terms of a system of religious law. 
However, such recognition must be consistent with both section 15 and the South African 
Constitution as a whole. The compatibility of religious law within this constitutional framework 
has been seen as highly problematic and the potential for conflict is immense.  
The gender-specific discriminatory practice of polygyny is a case in point,322 so too are the 
practices whereby it is easier in term of Islam for men to divorce women than for women to 
divorce men, where Muslim widows inherent less than they would under civil law, and where 
Muslim women have a very limited entitlement to maintenance if abandoned by their 
husbands.323 Within this context, a careful examination of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, 
which makes provisions for the recognition of existing Muslim marriages, including 
monogamous and polygynous marriages, as well as an existing civil marriage to a second wife, 
becomes imperative within a constitutional framework that seeks to protect women against 
harmful and discriminatory religious and cultural practices.  
In the next paragraph, the possible impact of the limitation of rights as contained in section 36 of 
the South African Constitution on the situation of Muslim women will be examined. 
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5.5.5 Reasonable and justifiable limitation  
Constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute.324  Rights and freedoms have boundaries set 
by other rights as well as social concerns such as public order, safety, democratic values and 
issues of health. Limitations are found in most international human rights instruments which lay 
out circumstances under which derogation from rights may be allowed.325  
Therefore, once it has been established that a fundamental freedom or constitutional right has 
been infringed by a law or conduct, it must be assessed whether the infringement can be justified 
as a possible limitation of the applicable right or freedom. Section 36(1) of the South African 
Constitution stipulates that rights may only be limited by law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on the 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom.326 This requires a two stage 
approach. First, the court must assess whether there is a violation of the protected right in 
question. At this stage of the inquiry, the court is concerned with the definition and interpretation 
of the right. If it is found that the right has been violated, the court then proceeds to the second 
stage where it considers whether the limitation is permissible under the limitations clause.  
A limitation is synonymous to infringement or, in the case of the South African Constitution, 
justifiable infringement.327 The infringement will not be deemed unconstitutional if compatible 
with an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Only a “law 
of general application” can validly limit a right and this is the minimum requirement for the 
limitation of a right under section 36 of the South African Constitution.328   
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The Constitutional Court indicated a willingness in Christian Education South Africa v Minister 
of Education329 to depart from the two-stage approach in order to avoid having to decide the 
(prior) question whether or not a right has been infringed. The Constitutional Court has not, 
however, directly dealt with what would qualify as “law of general application”, but has given 
wide interpretation to this phrase elsewhere in the South African Constitution.330 It would 
include all forms of legislation331 as well as common law and customary law.332  
On the strength of the above interpretation, a practice which is sanctioned by customary law 
would thus qualify as the “law of general application” if it applies in the same way to everyone 
that it regulates. The question to be answered is therefore whether practices affecting women in 
Muslim marriages could be deemed as general or specific in their application. If not general, then 
there can be no “law of general application” and thus no limitation of a fundamental right. The 
rule or practice must not solely apply to an individual, nor must it restrict the rights of a 
particular individual or group of individuals. The rule or practice must provide for parity of 
treatment, in other words, “like must be treated alike”.333 In Larbi-Odam v Minister of 
Education334 the Constitutional Court explained:  
“[t]he law of general application does not mean that a law must apply to everyone, but simply that it applies to 
everyone that it regulates”.335  
Therefore, due to the parity of treatment of Muslim women, it could be argued that practices that 
are commonplace in marriage and divorce indeed constitute “law of general application” in the 
constitutional sense that this phrase has acquired. The issue whether the restriction is reasonable 
and justified in an open, democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, seeks 
to ascertain if it serves as a constitutionally acceptable purpose.336 But since these very values are 
employed to make this determination, one will be hard pressed to conclude that a restriction 
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which impedes women’s constitutional interest in equality, dignity and freedom could be 
regarded as constitutionally reasonable and justifiable. 
Moreover, the non-recognition of Muslim marriages could be seen as a restriction being placed 
on a certain (religious) group in society and thus there has to be a sufficient link between the 
infringement and the purpose of the law, rule or practice, which must be evaluated against the set 
of “relevant factors” as prescribed in section 36(1)(a-e).337 These factors serve to establish 
whether the infringement serves a purpose that is considered legitimate by all reasonable 
citizens338 in a constitutional democracy that values human dignity, equality and freedom above 
all other considerations.        
The remainder of this chapter will consider the most significant interpretative declarations and 
reservations made by South Africa to a select number of international and regional human rights 
instruments. In addition, South Africa’s response to the AU Solemn Declaration and the African 
Decade of Women will be examined.  
5.6 South Africa’s Response to the International Human Rights System  
The South African judiciary is expressly obliged to consider international law when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.339 Section 39(1) of the South African Constitution states: 
 “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and must consider international law”.340  
The international human rights instruments to which South Africa is a signatory all echo the 
centrality of equality norms in a pluralistic and democratic society. South Africa ratified the 
ICCPR341 and CEDAW342 in 1998 and 1995, respectively, without reservations. South Africa has 
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yet to ratify the ICESCR,343 almost twenty years after becoming a signatory to this instrument.344 
The norms and standards contained in the ICESCR have, however, been implemented by South 
Africa for some time as many of the socio-economic rights contained in this instrument echo 
those set out in the African Charter345 as well as in the South African Constitution.346 Ratification 
of the ICESCR will, however, signal the realization of South Africa’s desire to “take its rightful 
place as a sovereign state in the family of nations” as recognised in the Preamble to the South 
African Constitution. South Africa confirmed in October 2012 its intention to ratify the 
ICESCR.347   
By ratifying the ICCPR without reservations, South Africa commits itself to the recognition of 
the “equal rights of men and women” articulated in Article 3 to ensure the full enjoyment of all 
rights contained in this instrument. And while Article 18(3) places a limitation on freedom of 
religion, this seems to be comparable with the idea of a general limitation clause such as the one 
contained in the South African Constitution. Neither the ICCPR nor the South African 
Constitution thus endorses the idea that the right to freedom of religion is absolute.  
The family unit also receives recognition in the ICCPR by virtue of Article 23, and refers to the 
family as the “natural and fundamental group of society”, a sentiment also subsequently echoed 
in the African Charter.348  
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Article 27 is of particular importance for an ethnically and religious diverse society such as 
South Africa in that it states: 
“in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall 
not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language”. 
Article 27 flows from Article 26 which emphasises the equality of all persons before the law 
without any form of discrimination on any ground, including race, colour, religion and sex. 
These two provisions thus place a distinct obligation on South Africa to ensure that no legal 
impediments exist that deny religious communities the right to engage in their religious 
practices. The non-recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa may be construed as a factor 
that impacts negatively on the full enjoyment of the rights enshrined under Article 26 and Article 
27 of the ICCPR as well as section 15 of the South African Constitution.         
By ratifying CEDAW without reservations, South Africa endorses its women-specific 
framework, especially in so far as it relates to various forms of discrimination against women.349 
In particular, South Africa confirmed the definition of “discrimination against women” as 
defined in Article 1350 and the positive obligation placed on a state in terms of Article 5 to 
“modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women”.351 Furthermore, South 
Africa endorsed the idea that the upbringing of the children is expressly conceived of as the 
responsibility of both men and women.  
The granting of equal rights between men and women to acquire, change or retain their 
nationality in terms of Article 9 is to be welcomed, especially as this provision extends to the 
sphere of marriage, including the requirement that all marriages must be registered.352 Within 
this context, Article 16 is of specific importance to South Africa in so far as it relates to issues 
accompanying marriage. Since the rights of women in Muslim marriage and divorce is 
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 See Wallace RMM and Dale-Risk K “Women” in Wallace RMM and Dale-Risk International Human Rights, 
Texts and Materials 2ed (2001) 20 at 20-21. 
350
 Article 1 of CEDAW of 1979 defines “discrimination against women” as “any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”. Compare 
Article 1 of CEDAW of 1979 with Article 1(f) of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003. 
351
 See Article 5 of CEDAW of 1979. 
352
 See Article 9 of CEDAW of 1979. 
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contentious, it is thus to be welcomed that Article 16 of CEDAW not only grant women equal 
rights in marriage, but also equal rights in the dissolution of the marriage in terms of Article 
16(c). Should the marriage be dissolved, both parties have equal rights and responsibilities 
towards their children. The well-being of the child shall thus be of paramount importance. 
Article 16(e) grants both parties the right to decide on the number of children and the spacing 
thereof. It follows, therefore, that women (and men) may use contraceptives in the planning of 
the family. 
The fact that CEDAW does not specify a particular age requirement for children entering into 
marriage, coupled with the fact that CEDAW suffers from important restrictions on its 
enforcement policy, are deemed serious drawbacks. CEDAW has also not escaped blame for 
being considered “un-African” due to the omission of issues that most affect women on the 
African continent,353 nor has it escaped criticism from other vulnerable and historically 
marginalised groups such as lesbians, cohabitants and the elderly. Recent concerns around 
gender issues such as sexual violence, forced impregnations during armed conflict and sexual 
orientation have also not received specific attention in CEDAW.354  
5.7 South Africa’s Response to the African Human Rights Framework  
While South Africa has signed and ratified the African Charter in 1996 without reservations,355 
three reservations, as well as two interpretive declarations, were made to the African Women’s 
Protocol upon ratification in 2004.356   
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 See Karungonjo-Segawa R “The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa” Research Partnership 2/2005 Danish Research Institute for Human Rights available at 
http://www.findarticles.com [accessed 2 October 2013]. 
354See Bonthuys E and Domingo W “Constitutional and International Law Context” in Bonthuys E and Albertyn C 
(eds) Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 51 at 58-59.   
355
 See the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/6/73 rev. 5 21 ILM 58 
(1982) adopted on 27 June 1981and entered into force on 21October 1986. South Africa both signed and ratified the 
African Charter on 9 July 1996 without reservations.  
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 See the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 1999 
DOC/OS (XXXVII) adopted on 15 November 1999 and entered into force on 11 July 2003. South Africa signed the 
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5.7.1 South Africa and the African Charter 
By ratifying the African Charter without reservations, South Africa supports the establishment of 
bodies to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights on the continent357 as well as the 
implementation of legislative or other measures to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms 
are afforded proper recognition.  
But by the same token, South Africa also endorses the notion of addressing discrimination 
against women within the specific context of the family as custodian of traditional values358 and 
the state’s obligation to assist the family in its custodial duties.359 This is rather puzzling given 
the fact that South African law at the time of ratification duly appreciated that the private sphere 
is a domain of male privilege and oppression and that family life could produce a decidedly 
harmful environment for women.360 South Africa’s uncritical endorsement of the joining together 
of women and children in Article 18(3) of the African Charter is even more puzzling given the 
comprehensive body of feminist and legal scholarship dedicated to the dismantling of 
stereotypical assumptions about women’s role and status in the family.  
5.7.2  South Africa’s response to the African Women’s Protocol  
By establishing the African Women’s Protocol, the shortcomings in the African Charter were 
highlighted, in particular as revealed in Article 18(3) of the African Charter which seeks to 
protect women almost exclusively within the context of the family unit. Outside the family unit, 
very little protection is afforded to women by the African Charter. The African Charter has in 
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 Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary 
Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of a “preliminary draft on an African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect 
human and peoples’ rights”. 
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 See Article 18(1) of the African Charter of 1981 which reads: “[t]he family shall be the natural unit and basis of 
society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral”. 
359
 See Article 18(2) of the African Charter of 1981 which stipulates: “[t]he State shall have the duty to assist the 
family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community. The State shall have 
the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community”. 
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 See, in particular, the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
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fact failed it address specific issues such as female genital mutilation, inheritance by women and 
the question of forced marriages.361  
South Africa made two interpretative declarations and three reservations to the African Women’s 
Protocol. The declarations relate to Article 1(f) which defines “discrimination against women”362 
and Article 31 which concerns the question of whether the South African Constitution offers 
more favourable human rights protection than the African Women’s Protocol.363 The declaration 
to Article 1(f) is far from clear and expects a sound knowledge of both section 9 of the South 
African Constitution as well as the equality jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.364 
Nsibirwa rightly points out that the definition of discrimination against women differs from an 
earlier definition considered under the Draft Kigali Protocol.365 The latter defines discrimination 
against women as “differential treatment of which the effects compromise or destroy the 
recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.366 
The African Women’s Protocol, by contrast, deals not only with the effect of such treatment, but 
also with the object of such treatment. Under the African Women’s Protocol the definition of 
discrimination is therefore broader in its application. 
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 See Article 1(f), Article 1(g), Article 1(j) and Article 1(k) of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003. 
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 Article 1(f) of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003 defines “discrimination against women” as “any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and whose objectives or effects 
compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life”. This definition is rather similar to Article 1 of 
CEDAW of 1979 which defines “discrimination against women” in terms of “any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in political, economic, social, civil or any other field”. 
363
 Article 31 of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003 provides that “none of the provisions of the present Protocol 
shall effect more favourable provisions for the realisation of the rights of women contained in the national 
legislation of States Parties or in any other regional, continental or international conventions, treaties or agreements 
applicable in these States Parties”.  
364
 The declaration to Article 1(f) reads: “[i]t is understood that the definition of ‘discrimination against women’ in 
the Protocol has the same meaning and scope as is provided for in section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996), as interpreted by the Constitutional Court of South Africa from time to 
time”. 
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 See Nsibirwa MS “A brief analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women” (2001) 1:1 African Human Rights Journal 43 at 45. 
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South Africa’s declaration to Article 31 clarified that its national constitution, in spite of 
containing a general limitation clause, offered more favourable protection to women in South 
Africa than the African Women’s Protocol.367 
The reservations South Africa made to the African Women’s Protocol relate to Article 4(2)(j),368 
Article 6(d)369 and Article 6(h).370 The reservation made to Article 4(2)(j), which proscribes the 
death penalty in the case of pregnant or nursing mothers, concerns the abolition of the death 
penalty in South Africa in 1995 by virtue of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in S v 
Makwanyane371 and section 11 of the South African Constitution which protects the right to 
life.372  
The reservation made to Article 6(d) of the African Women’s Protocol concerns the recording in 
writing and registration of a marriage in accordance with national laws in order to be legally 
recognised. South Africa declared it not bound by the requirements of Article 6(d) by virtue of 
 
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 The declaration to Article 31 reads: “[i]t is understood that the provisions contained in article 31 may result in an 
interpretation that the level of protection afforded by the South African Bill of Rights is less favourable than the 
level of protection offered by the Protocol, as the Protocol contains no express limitations to the rights contained 
therein, while the South African Bill of Rights does inherently provide for the potential limitations of rights under 
certain circumstances. The South African Bill of Rights should not be interpreted to offer less favourable protection 
of human rights than the Protocol, which does not expressly provide for such limitations”. 
368
 Article 4(2)(j) of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003 reads: “States Parties shall take appropriate and 
effective measures to ensure that, in those countries where the death penalty still exists, not to carry out death 
sentences on pregnant or nursing women”. 
369
 Article 6(d) of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003 reads: “States Parties shall ensure that women and men 
enjoy equal rights and are regardedas equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate national legislative 
measures to guarantee that: every marriage shall be recorded in writing and registered in accordance with national 
laws, in order to be legally recognised”. Emphasis added. 
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 Article 6(h) of the African Women’s Protocol of 2003 reads: “States Parties shall ensure that women and men 
enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate national legislative 
measures to guarantee that: a woman and a man shall have equal rights, with respect to the nationality of their 
children except where this is contrary to a provision in national legislation or is contrary to national security 
interests”. Emphasis added. 
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 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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 The reservation to Article 4(2)(j) reads: “Article 4(2)(j) of the Protocol does not find application in the Republic 
of South Africa as the death penalty has been abolished. Inasmuch as the existence of Article 4(2)(j) may be 
construed to be an inadvertent sanctioning of the death penalty in other States Parties, this may conflict with section 
2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996). South Africa is in principle 
opposed to the application of the death penalty and no adverse legal consequences, including any conflict with 
section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, may be visited upon the Parliament and the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa pertaining to the ratification of the Protocol”. Section 2 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 provides: “the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; 
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section 4(9) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act373 which stipulates that the failure to 
register a customary marriage does not affect the validity of that marriage. South Africa argued 
that the non-registration of customary marriages “is considered to be a protection for women 
married under customary law”.374 This justification could at first be construed as highly 
problematic as it apparently fails to appreciate the protection and legal certainty accorded to 
women through the registration of marriage. It could, for example, be argued that by not insisting 
on the registration of marriage, the marriage of children is encouraged, a practice expressly 
forbidden under both the African Women’s Protocol and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (ACRWC).375 But such an argument loses sight of the fact that section 
3(1)(a)(i)-(ii) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act requires that the prospective 
spouses must both consent to the marriage and both be above the age of eighteen. And while the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act does not prohibit the marriage of a minor, as the 
parents or legal guardian can consent to such a marriage,376 a customary marriage must in all 
instances be registered. South Africa’s reservation thus merely confirms the legal position that 
failure to register a customary marriage will not affect the validity of the marriage.      
The reservation made to Article 6(h) of the African Women’s Protocol seeks to protect children’s 
inherent right to citizenship and their right to nationality.377 As Mujuzi rightly points out, 
children born from a South African father and a mother who is a foreign national could end up 
being stateless, should South Africa deny the children nationality for security reasons and the 
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 Act 120 of 1998. 
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 The reservation to Article 6(d) reads: “[t]he Republic of South Africa makes a reservation and will consequently 
not consider itself bound to the requirements contained in article 6(d) that a marriage shall be recorded in writing 
and registered in accordance with national laws in order to be legally recognised. This reservation is made in view of 
the provision of section 4(9) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act No 120 of 1998), which 
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October 1997 and ratified this instrument on 7 January 2000.  
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 See section 3(3)(1)(a) of Act 120 of 1998 which provides that “for a customary marriage entered into after the 
commencement of this Act to be valid, if either of the prospective spouses is a minor, both his or her parents, or if he 
or she has no parents, his or her legal guardian must consent to the marriage”. 
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 The reservation to Article 6(h) reads: “[t]he Republic of South Africa makes reservation to Article 6(h), which 
subjugates the equal rights of men and women with respect to the nationality of their children to national legislation 
and national security interests, on the basis that it may remove inherent rights of citizenship and nationality from 
children”. 
 
 
 
 


mother cannot, by virtue of the law of her state, pass on nationality to her children.378 This 
would, for example, mean that children born from a Moroccan mother and a non-Muslim South 
African father will be stateless, should South Africa deny the children nationality for security 
reasons. Although Moroccan women married to foreign-born men may pass on their nationality 
to their spouses and children, Morocco has still not fully removed all discriminatory laws and 
practices, as women cannot pass on their nationality to their children if their husbands are not 
Muslims. Morocco’s decision not to endorse the African Women’s Protocol means that key civil 
and political rights specifically tailored to address the unique needs of women in Africa, 
especially the rights enshrined in Article 6, cannot be used as a compelling legal basis to argue 
for legal reform in Morocco  
Apart from the above reservations, South Africa is bound by all other provisions contained in the 
African Women’s Protocol. In what follows, specific aspects of Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 20, as 
these relate to the protection of women generally as well as to specific aspects of marriage and 
divorce, will be examined.  
Article 1 contains key definitions and to this end, Article 1(j) defines sexual violence against 
women as: 
“all acts directed against women which causes them physical, sexual, or psychological harm, including the threat of 
such as acts, or the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or 
public life in peace time and during situations of conflict/war”.  
It is furthermore interesting to note that the definition of “women” contained in Article 1(k) of 
the African Women’s Protocol is both gender and sex-specific, as it refers to women “as persons 
of the female gender, including girls”.  
Article 2 of the Women’s Protocol places an immediate obligation on the state to combat all 
forms of discrimination against women. This obligation instructs the respective states to 
proscribe all forms of discrimination against women and to include this prohibition not only in 
their constitutions, but also in their national legislation. Therefore, national constitutions must 
both contain the principle of equality between men and women and ensure the effective 
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56.  
 
 
 
 


application of the provision proscribing discrimination against women.379 The South African 
Constitution has followed suit and incorporates both the right and value of (gender) equality, 
coupled with the principle of supremacy.380  
Article 3 of the African Women’s Protocol affirms the right that every human being is entitled to 
dignity.381 As violence against women is multi-faceted, it is to be welcomed that the African 
Women’s Protocol expressly refers to, and thus proscribes, verbal violence.382 While human 
dignity is recognised both as a constitutional value383 and as a fundamental right384 in the South 
African Constitution, the definition of domestic violence contained in the Domestic Violence 
Act385 encompasses a broad definition which includes verbal abuse,386 thus confirming South 
Africa’s compliance with Article 3 of the African Women’s Protocol.   
The African Women’s Protocol devotes an entire article to marriage. To this end, Article 6 
expressly states that the partners to a marriage shall enjoy equal rights and status therein. In 
addition, the African Women’s Protocol insists on informed consent coupled with a minimum 
age for both partners.387 And as pointed out above, all marriages are to be recorded in writing 
and registered “as soon as possible”.388 Although monogamy is identified as the preferred form 
of marriage,389 the rights of women in polygynous (“polygamous”)390 marriages also enjoy 
protection under the African Women’s Protocol.  
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 Act 116 of 1998. 
386
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Article 7 of the African Women’s Protocol expressly states that men and women shall enjoy the 
same rights in the case of marriage and the termination and marriage. Moreover, divorce and the 
annulment of a marriage shall be granted by the courts.391 Either of the parties may seek 
separation, divorce or annulment of the marriage.392 Whether the parties to the marriage decide 
to divorce, separate or annul their union, they will enjoy equal rights to the children and the 
property of the marriage.393  
The African Women’s Protocol furthermore has an article specifically dedicated to the rights of 
widows. Article 20 explicitly provides that not only may a widow not be subjected to inhumane, 
humiliating and degrading treatment,394 but she will become the guardian of her children.395 The 
choice of a (new) marriage partner too will be at the discretion of the widow.396  
5.7.3 South Africa’s commitment to the AU Solemn Declaration and the African 
Decade of Women 
South Africa has committed itself to the objectives of the AU Solemn Declaration which 
endeavours to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment. To this end, South Africa 
has submitted its annual report on progress relating to gender equality.397 While only eighteen 
Member States398 have submitted their initial reports in terms of the AU Solemn Declaration, 
only Senegal has thus far submitted a second annual report.399  
South Africa furthermore bears a distinct legal obligation, by virtue of its membership of the AU, 
to enforce the provisions of the African Decade of Women with a view to promote gender 
equality. In essence, South Africa is tasked with the empowerment of women by speeding up the 
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implementation of commitments made through the ratification of various international and 
regional human rights instruments. The discussion in the previous paragraphs has shown that 
South Africa has done well in this regard. In so far as the African Women’s Protocol is 
concerned, the South African legal and constitutional landscape appears to provide a much 
broader and deeper scope of protection for women than contemplated by this significant regional 
instrument. The appointment of the former South African Minister of Home Affairs, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, as chairperson of the AU Commission,400 appears furthermore to have provided 
significant impetus to pledges for the reduction of poverty on the African continent, coupled with 
the prioritisation of education, health and the emancipation of women.401 
5.8 Concluding Observations   
The introduction of the first supreme constitution and justiciable bill of rights in 1993402 meant 
that any law or practice must withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Preamble to the South 
African Constitution of 1996 expresses the distinct desire to: 
“heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights”.403  
As a formerly divided nation due to a system of institutionalised segregation based on race, 
ethnicity, sex and gender, the post-1994 South Africa needs to address these challenges to lay the 
foundation for the promotion and protection of basic rights and freedoms, especially in so far as 
women, as a historically marginalised group, are concerned. 
Since 1994 both the South African judiciary and the South African Law Reform Commission 
have shown their sincere commitment to the realisation of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of Muslim women as these are entrenched in the South African Constitution.404 These efforts 
reiterate how imperative it is that the proposed legal recognition of Islamic marriages should now 
become a reality. But sadly there has yet to be any formal recognition of Muslim marriages and 
divorces in South Africa. Muslim women are at a distinct disadvantage when compared to 
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marriages entered into in terms of African customary law which have enjoyed legal recognition 
since 1998.405 The South African constitutional context can no longer tolerate a situation 
whereby the marriages of a certain sector of the community are deemed contra bones mores and 
the children born from such unions are deemed to be illegitimate.  
It is unlikely that any legislative attempt to address the situation will be met with universal 
approval, and yet women stand to benefit the most from the formal regulation of Muslim 
marriages and divorces. In the absence of such protection, Muslim women will continue to be 
forced to repeatedly approach the courts to seek redress as a means to achieve their inalienable 
constitutional rights and freedoms. Every effort must accordingly be made to overcome the 
stalemate that exists around the eventual promulgation of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill into 
law.  
Moosa correctly points out that the different ideological perspectives on the interpretation of 
Islamic law are, after all, permitted in a constitutional democracy. And while this has “divided 
[Muslims] on the question of [the] recognition of [marriage], it should not preclude 
recognition”.406 The stalemate has prompted Non-Governmental Organisations, such as the 
Women’s Legal Centre,407 to approach the South African courts in an effort to provide 
momentum to the process of recognition while those opposed to the recognition of Muslim 
marriages have embarked on a similar legal strategy in an attempt to delay the process of 
recognition.408  
This chapter has shown that legal developments in South Africa since 1994 have resulted in an 
increasing number of statutory provisions409 and judgments in which Muslim marriages enjoy 
“legal recognition” for specific purposes. While these legal interventions have brought some 
relief, piecemeal statutory amendments and judgments are neither practical nor can they hope to 
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secure meaningful legal recourse and substantive reform. It is, after all, the primary task of the 
South African legislature to enact legislation and not the task of the judiciary to provide partial, 
and at times rather limited, relief. As Abrahams-Fayker rightly observes: 
“[a]lthough the courts have made significant inroads towards the development of the recognition of [Muslim 
personal law] in South Africa, one cannot rely on the courts to provide relief to the majority of Muslim women who 
do not have the financial resources, education and/or time to turn to the courts for relief. Piecemeal legislation is 
costly and time consuming, which the Muslim woman on the street who has no access to resources does not 
have”.410 
 
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is thus to be welcomed and the state must be complimented on 
its endeavours to bring together diverse schools of thought in order to produce a document 
which, for the most part, is based on some of the complementing values enshrined in both Islam 
and in the South African Constitution. What is required at this stage is a comprehensive and 
meaningful drive to inform Muslims at grassroots level of its contents, and to reach consensus on 
the potentially more contentious issues of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill. As Narain rightly 
points out: 
“[i]ndeed, the role of human rights activists at the grass roots level is of great importance. At the very least, such 
local grassroots activists pose a challenge to the received binary categories such as local versus global and western 
versus traditional.411 
 
South Africa’s ratification of key international and regional human rights instruments is likewise 
to be welcomed and this chapter has shown that the reservations made to the African Women’s 
Protocol are by virtue of the fact that South Africa’s legal and constitutional frameworks greatly 
surpass the rights and freedoms enshrined in these instruments. In particular, the body of 
constitutional jurisprudence developed by, amongst other, the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, on the rights to equality, human dignity, freedom and security of the 
person and freedom of religion, belief and opinion buttress the protection accorded to Muslim 
women in South Africa in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned.     
 
 
410
 See Abrahams-Fayker H “South Africa Engagement with Muslim Personal Law: The Women’s Legal Centre, 
Cape Town and Women in Muslim Marriages” Women’s Legal Centre 39 at 60-61 available at 
http://www.agi.ac.za/sicos/agi.ac/fa15casestudypdf [accessed 17 January 2014]. 

See Narain V “Muslim Women’s Equality in India: Applying a Human Rights Framework” (2013) 35 Human 
Rights Quarterly 91 at 112.   
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The next chapter will unpack the lessons that South Africa could possibly learn from the 
Moroccan and Tunisian experiences with a view to, amongst other, provide momentum to the 
legal regognition of Muslim marriage and divorce in South Africa.
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CHAPTER 6 
Lessons for South Africa from Morocco and Tunisia? 
“Our society is male dominated both economically and socially and women are assigned, invariably, a 
dependent role, irrespective of the class of society to which she belongs. A woman on her marriage very 
often, though highly educated, gives up all other vocations and entirely devotes herself to the welfare of the 
family, in particular she shares with her husband, her emotions, sentiments, mind and body, and her 
investment in marriage is her entire life sacramental sacrifice of her individual self and is far too enormous 
to be measured in money”.1 
 
“The general viewpoint is that the Draft [Muslim Marriages] Bill will alleviate the hardships that resulted 
from the non-recognition of Muslim marriages. Although there are concerns because some groupings of the 
Muslim community do not support the Draft Bill, it is generally accepted that it will eventually create 
certainty regarding the validity of Muslim marriages, and give effect to Muslim values. To date, however, 
no legislation pertaining to Muslim marriages or personal law has been enacted”.2 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter is intended to thrash out the possible lessons that South Africa could learn from the 
Moroccan and Tunisian experiences. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have shown that Morocco and 
Tunisia embarked on significant constitutional and legal reforms with a view to enhance 
women’s fundamental rights and freedoms as these pertain to marriage and divorce. As this 
doctoral thesis has illustrated, these three African jurisdictions display striking similarities. 
Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa, as ethnically diverse and pluralistic societies, share a 
common history of colonialism, political transition and democratic reform within a present 
context of almost identical socio-economic conditions. Moreover, while all three jurisdictions 
have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)3 and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),4 
South Africa has declared its intention to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
 
1
 See Denson R and Carnelly M “The Awarding of Post-Divorce Maintenance to a Muslim Ex-Wife and Children in 
the South African Courts: The Interaction between Divine Law and Secular Law” (2009) 3 Obiter 679 at 685.  
2
 See Rautenbach C, Goolam NMI and Moosa N “Religious Legal Systems: Constitutional Analysis” in Rautenbach 
C, Bekker JC and Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal Pluralism 3ed (2010) 187 at 206. 
3
 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GOAR 21st Session Supp No 
16 UN Doc A/6316 (1996) 999 UNTS 171 adopted on 16 December 1966. 
4
 See the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women GA Re 34/180 UN GAOR 
34th Session Supp No 46 UN Doc A/34/36 (1980) adopted on 18 December 1979, opened for signature on 1 March 
1980 and entered into force on 3 September 1981 following receipt of the twentieth ratification. 
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and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),5 thus bringing South Africa in line with the international human 
rights commitments of Morocco and Tunisia. 
The lessons advanced in this chapter centre upon five interrelated focal areas that were critically 
explored in the preceding chapters. These include the appropriate theoretical framework within 
which to examine the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in marriage and divorce, the 
desirability of codifying Muslim personal law, the role of the courts in the interpretation of 
Islamic marriage and divorce, some aspects of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill and the political 
drive required to secure the recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa.  
The first lesson, which concerns the applicable theoretical framework within which to examine 
the rights and freedoms of Muslim women pertaining to marriage and divorce, will be examined 
next. 
6.2 Theoretical Framework  
6.2.1 Dominant schools of thought and fundamental principles of Islam  
The shari’ah plays a central role in the historical evolution of Islamic societies and impacts upon 
both the legal system and the constitution of the state, together with the command under which 
such a society progresses and crystallizes. Although in a narrow sense shari’ah is generally 
understood as Islamic law, the interpretation thereof is usually broader. The shari’ah thus 
embodies the fundamental elements of an Islamic system of governance,6 derived from the 
Qur’an and the sunnah, as well as the views of the four dominant Islamic jurisprudential schools, 
namely the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali schools of thought. Chapter 2 of this doctoral 
thesis explored the views of the four schools of thought on marriage and divorce, including 
maintenance. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have shown that national codes of personal status do not 
 
5
 See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GOAR 21st 
Session Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 993 UNTS 3 adopted on 16 December 1996. A statement released by the 
South African Cabinet conveyed the decision taken at an ordinary meeting held on 10 October 2012 to ratify the 
ICESCR: see “South Africa to Ratify International Socio-Economic Covenant” available at 
http://www.ngopulse.org/press-release/south-africa-ratify-international-socio-economic-covenant [accessed 5 
February 2014]. 
6
 See Anwar Z and Rumminger JS “Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: Challenges, Possibilities and 
Strategies for Reform” (2007) 64 Washington and Lee Law Review 1529 at 1529.  
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necessarily follow a single school of thought, but rather prefer to adhere to a combination of 
schools.7  
As the Islamic states have evolved, Islamic jurists have had to deduce new directives under 
changing social conditions.8 Over a period of time, governmental religious institutions 
subscribing to a particular school (or a combination of schools) and Islamic jurists have played 
an important role in guiding both Muslim societies and states whose social policies and laws 
comply with basic Islamic legal ideas and concepts. In addition, religious institutions provide 
spiritual guidance for Muslims to comprehend the interpretation(s) of Islamic ideas, concepts and 
principles, including how to apply these in their day to day lives.9 This integration has resulted in 
religious institutions becoming closely connected with, as well as being respected by, both the 
state and the community of believers. Furthermore, this integration of religious institutions can 
also be viewed as lending legitimacy to those who are in power and, by association, which 
school of thought is to apply in that particular state. 
This unparalleled position has given religious authorities and institutions the power to acquire an 
important power base for presenting their views on women’s rights, status and roles. These 
religious institutions have the ability to cement politics with religious legitimacy and contribute 
immensely to the formulation of laws and policies.10 As the opinions of these religious 
institutions are readily available to the greater public, they have the potential to influence not 
only popular opinion but also social practices. In effect, these religious institutions possess the 
socio-political mandate to enhance, halt, or reverse any advances towards the promotion and 
protection of women’s rights and their emancipation.11  
A further notable factor relating to the increasing influence of religious institutions in so far as 
the promotion and protection of women’s rights are concerned relate to the historical differences 
 
7
 See Zoglin K “Morocco’s Family Code: Improving Equality for Women” (2009) 31:4 Human Rights Quarterly 
964 at 965.  
8
 See Abusharaf A “Women in Islamic Communities: The Quest for Gender Justice Research” (2006) 28:3 Human 
Rights Quarterly 714 at 718. 
9
 Ibid.   
10
 See Alidadi K “The Western Judicial Answer to Islamic Talaq: Peeking through the Gate of Conflict of Laws” 
(2005-2006) 5 UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 3 at 26.   
11
 See Htun M and Weldon S “State Power, Religion, And Women’s Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Family 
Law” (2011) 18:1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 145 at 145.  
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that are to be found amongst the four schools of thought. These differences arise from some of 
the main doctrines of jurisprudence found in Islam, such as, the sunni and the shia.12 A few 
examples of differences that are found amongst the two main doctrines of legal thought include 
different interpretations of the verses found in the Qur’an, disagreement relating to the validity 
of some principles derived from the hadith (narrations or sayings) of Muhammad (PBUH)13 and 
dissension on the acceptance of some of the secondary sources of Islamic law. These different 
views have the potential to impacts on the level of protection that women enjoy, including 
women’s rights and roles, and dictate the lives of Muslims as these find expression in national 
laws and policies. The religious institutions may well support the non-implementation of gender-
equal laws or policies and legitimise gender discriminatory practices, including customary 
practices which are not supported by Islam nor have any basis in Islam.  
Htun and Weldon rightly point out the four dominant schools of Islamic jurisprudential exert 
considerable influence and thus have the ability to shape virtually every aspect of a woman’s 
life.14 Codes of personal status determine a woman’s status at birth, her capacity to own property, 
her freedom to work, inherit, manage property, enter into marriage, obtain a divorce, remarry 
and, not least of all, her relationship with her children. These codes of personal status could be 
seen to create a stereotypical view of women which has the effect of maximising men’s power 
over women and limits the ability of women to make decisions and to exercise free and 
independent choices.15 In parts of the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, state-
administered family law has continued to conform closely to religious dogma and the Code of 
Personal Status adopted by Morocco in 1956 is a case in point.16 By contrast, Tunisia has veered 
the furthest away from employing religious dogma as a foundation for the protection and 
promotion of women’s rights in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned.  
 
12
 See Charrad MM “State and Gender in the Maghrib” (1990) 163 Middle East Report 19 at 20. 
13
 The salutation PBUH (Peace and Blessings Upon Him) will, for the sake of respect, be implied, but not repeated 
throughout this chapter. 

14
 See Htun M and Weldon S “State Power, Religion, and Women’s Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Family 
Law” (2011) 18:1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 145 at 145. 
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid.  
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Yet even though Tunisia has shown a willingness to move away from religious doctrine, one 
would be hard pressed to argue that Tunisia has fully embraced secularism. After careful 
examination of both the Moroccan and Tunisian legal systems, it becomes clear that both 
continue to display traces of religious dogma. While the Constitution of Morocco of 2011 
explicitly states that “Islam is the religion of the State, which guarantees to all the free exercise 
of beliefs”,17 the new constitution of Tunisia adopted in January 2014, even though it contains no 
reference to shari’ah as a source of law, nevertheless explicitly retains Islam as the official 
religion.18 
It need not be argued that the substance of Muslim personal law and the interpretations thereof 
have consistently evoked animated debate and that various obstacles have been encountered by 
women activist calling for women’s liberation.19 Questions pertaining to the requirements of a 
valid marriage, the rules of maintenance of the spouses and the rights of spouses during the 
subsistence of the marriage have proven to be particularly difficult. Although these questions 
centre upon the basic tenets of Muslim personal law, the true challenge lies in the sometimes 
conflicting jurisprudence of the dominant schools of thought and the different interpretations 
yielding different outcomes.20 It is accordingly in the interpretation of the Qur’an and sunnah 
where much of the divergent views and disagreement arise amongst scholars. Reiss thus 
correctly concludes that due to the various interpretations and application of Islamic principles, 
an internal form of legal pluralism has come into existence within Islam.21  
In essence, Islam seeks to promote that which is beneficial to the community and to prohibit that 
which is deemed harmful,22 thereby advancing the three primary values of educating the 
 
17
 See Ruchti J “Morocco Draft Text of the Constitution Adopted at the Referendum of 1 July 2011” available at 
http://www.sgg.ma/BO/bullettin/FR/2011/bo5952.pdf [accessed 4 September 2013]. 
18
 See Article 1 of the Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 which reads: “Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; 
its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system the Republic. This article cannot be amended”. 
19
 See Manjoo R “The Recognition of Muslim Personal Laws in South Africa: Implications for Women’s Human 
Rights” (2007) Human Rights Program Harvard Law School Working Paper 1 at 9. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 See Reiss M “The Materialization of Legal Pluralism in Britain: Why Shari’a Council Decisions should be Non-
Binding” (2002) 26 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 739 at 743. 
22
 See Yakub AI “The Islamic Roots of Democracy” (2004) 12 University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review 269 at 288-289. 
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individual, establishing justice and promoting the interest of the public.23 The first Qur’anic 
injunction to be revealed to Muhammad reiterates both the value and prominence of education 
and states: 24 
“Read in the name of your Lord”.25  
The concept of justice is addressed in several verses of the Qur’an and in Chapter 4 justice is 
incorporated into marriage, divorce, property rights, succession and the conduct of the 
individual.26 In this context conduct does not only refer to a person’s behavior towards others in, 
for example, conducting business transactions, but also generally refers to the dispensing of 
justice. Chapter 4 verse 58 thus explains the concept of justice as follows:  
“Allah doth command you To render back your Trust to those whom they are due; And when ye judge between man, 
That ye judge with justice”.27  
The application of the concept of justice is explained in Chapter 6 verse 152 and reads:  
“And come not nigh to the orphans property, Except to improve it, until her attains age of full of full strength; give 
measure and weight with (full) justice”.28  
And yet Western perceptions of Islam could, on the whole, well be regarded as problematic. 
Dalia Mogahed, a member to President Barack Obama’s Council on Faith-Based and 
Neighborhood Partnerships, recently appeared on a London cable television show to discuss 
Islam and the perception of Islam.29 Mogahed stressed that the Western view of shari’ah was 
 
23
 See Bernhard NM, Du Plessis, Gokul R, Goolam NMI, Heyns and Rautenbach C “Religious Legal Systems: 
General Foundations” in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and Goolam NMI (eds) 3ed (2010) Introduction to Legal 
Pluralism in South Africa 215 at 232-233. See also Arshad R “Sharia Law” in Arshad R Islamic Family Law (2010) 
15 at 15. 
24
 See Abdal-Haqq I “Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origins and Elements” in Ramadan HM (ed) Understanding 
Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary (2006) 1 at 9. 
25
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter XCVI” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 
1764 at 1764. 
26
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter IV” Yusuf Ali A The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 178 at 
178.  
27
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter IV” Yusuf Ali A The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 178 at 
197-198. 
28
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter VI” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 288 at 
335. 
29
 See Gilligan A and Spillius A “Barack Obama Adviser Says Sharia Law is Misunderstood” Daily Telegraph 8 
October 2009.  
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“oversimplified” and that a majority of women “around the world”, in fact, associated shari’ah 
with “gender justice”.30 She explained: 
 “I think the reason so many women support Shari’a is because they have a different understanding of Shari’a than 
the common perception in Western Media”.31  
The fact that Mogahed, who is an American Muslim and a White House staff member, cautioned 
against oversimplified and stereotypical notions of shari’ah is commendable, suggesting that 
Muslim women are beginning to reclaim their voice and that the seeds for the emancipation of 
Muslim women are to be found within Islam itself.32 Hursh correctly surmises, however, that 
Muslim women face a daunting task of making their voices heard in a largely patriarchal 
religious context, while at the same time encountering a stereotypical and an oversimplified 
Westernised view of Muslim women and their status in Islam.33 
And yet the jurisprudence produced by the four dominant schools of thought on marriage and 
divorce has, for the most part, remained stagnant, calling into question the potential of classical 
Islamic jurisprudence to facilitate the effective realization of women’s fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Subsequent to the demise of Muhammad, male domination and privilege increasingly 
led to the exploitation of the rights of women.34 The biased construction of Islamic jurisprudence 
caused the exploitation and eroding of women’s rights, with the result that gender neutral terms 
were translated and interpreted as masculine, thereby creating gender hierarchies and unequal 
rights and freedoms for men and women.35 
The core legal ideas and concepts found in Islam, as these were discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
doctoral thesis, could, by contrast, very well hold the key to women’s emancipation. In order to 
further explore this possibility, these values, together with the values and constitutional 
imperatives found in the South African Constitution, will be examined next.   
 
 
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 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 See Hursh J “Advancing Women’s Rights through Islamic Law: The Example of Morocco” (2010) 27:2 Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law & Justice 252 at 276.  
33
 Ibid. 
34
 See Rehman J “The Sharia, Islamic family laws and international human rights law: examining the theory and 
practice of polygamy and Talaq” (2007) International Journal of Law, Politics and the Family 108 at 115. 
35
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6.2.2 Constitutional values and imperatives 
It could very well be argued that the core ideas found in Islam, such as equality and human 
dignity, mirror the foundation principles found in many international and regional human rights 
instruments, including the South African Constitution. The three fundamental values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom are enshrined in key sections throughout the South African 
Constitution36 and distinct traces of these values are also present in Islamic jurisprudence. In fact, 
several verses in the Qur’an expressly testify to the equality between men and women. Men and 
women are likewise equally addressed in terms of their religious and spiritual duties. The 
Qur’an, for example, explicitly states:  
“For Muslim men and women – For believing men and women, For devout men and women, For true men and 
women, For men and women who are patient, For men and women who give charity, For men and women who fast 
(and deny themselves), For men and women who guard their chastity, And fro men and women who engage much in 
Allah’s praise – for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and a great reward”.37  
The early development of Islam documents the active involvement of women in all spheres and 
in all aspects of society. Women were certainly not lowered to the level of dependent 
individuals38 and their involvement spanned diverse areas of social activity such as business, 
literature, law, religion and even active engagement in warfare.39 It has been reported that the 
wives and daughters of Muhammad were directly involved in the development of Islam. In 
addition, Muhammad on various occasions sought the counsel of his wives relating to socio- 
economic changes that occurred during his lifetime. And yet changes that have been affected by 
Muhammad may have fallen by the wayside due to the misogynistic traditions and interpretation 
of Islam as male resistance to the power and active involvement of women in the public sphere 
 
36
 Human dignity, equality and freedom are recognised as fundamental constitutional values in section 1(a), section 
7(1), section 9, section 10, section 36(1) and section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 
1996. 
37
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter II Yusuf Ali A The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 17 at 19. 
38
 See Entelis J “International Human Rights: Islam’s Friend or Foe? Algeria as an Example of the Compatibility of 
International Human Rights Regarding Women’s Equality and Islamic Law” (1997) 20 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1251 at 1286. 
39
 Ibid. 
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began to emerge during his lifetime.40 These traditions and interpretations noticeably gained 
momentum after the demise of Muhammad.41 
The Moroccan and Tunisian experiences have shown the challenges that could arise out of the 
different interpretations produced by the four dominant schools of Islamic jurisprudence. And 
while the codification of family law, in particular in so far as marriage and divorce are 
concerned, is not exclusively based on the jurisprudence of the four dominate schools of thought, 
it remains true that these schools have developed marriage and divorce in a specific socio-
historical context in which gender inequality and the subjugation of women were often 
practiced.42  
Both Morocco and Tunisia have thus been confronted with the challenge of Muslim family laws 
couched in centuries-old assumptions that do not address or conform to, or possibly even have 
any bearing on, the demands imposed by modern societies.43 On the whole, the jurisprudence of 
the four dominant schools of thought lack a distinct gender sensitivity and thus, in reality, the 
authority of a husband to delegate his right of repudiation to the wife seldom occurs because of 
social constructs that render men/husbands and women/wives unequal. The husband’s unilateral 
right of repudiation as understood by the four schools of thought thus seems to be of an absolute 
nature. By contrast, the limited grounds for divorce available to the wife starkly accentuate her 
position of inequality.  
The distinct male bias displayed by the four dominant schools of thought in interpreting the 
primary sources of Islam confirms that the schools have not evolved substantively since the time 
of their establishment. The ensuing jurisprudence could even be said to be in conflict with 
directives of the founders of the four schools who cautioned their followers to adhere to the 
primary sources of Islam for clarity and guidance in the event of doubt. 
 
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 See Warren CS “Lifting the Veil: Women and Islamic Law” (2008) 15:1 Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 33 at 
43. 
41
 See Rehman J “The Sharia, Islamic family laws and international human rights law: examining the theory and 
practice of polygamy and Talaq” (2007) International Journal of Law, Politics and the Family 108 at 115. 
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 See Anwar Z and Rumminger J “Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: Challenges, Possibilities, and 
Strategies for Reform” (2007) 64 Washington and Lee Law Review 1529 at 1537. 
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The jurisprudence produced by four dominant schools of thought is thus not, as such, likely to 
produce a suitable and nuanced framework to achieve the objectives articulated in Chapter 1 of 
this doctoral thesis. It thus becomes imperative to integrate the basic legal ideas and concepts of 
duty, honour, equality and human dignity found in Islam into an analysis of women’s rights and 
freedoms in marriage and divorce. The concepts of human dignity and equality, in particular, are 
closely aligned with the values and imperatives found throughout the South African Constitution 
and which have been confirmed by the Constitutional Court on many occasions in its assessment 
of the right to equality, the right to human dignity, the right to freedom and security of the person 
and the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion as illustrated in Chapter 5 of this doctoral 
thesis.     
In essence, therefore, this doctoral thesis motivates for the integration between Muslim personal 
law and human rights law as both display a deep cognisance of, and respect for, the values of 
equality and human dignity, thus proposing a religious-cum-secular framework within which to 
address the status of Muslim women within the challenging contexts of marriage and divorce. As 
Narain rightly argues: 
“[i]nvariably the framing of the debate about women, religion, and human rights focuses on misleading oppositional 
constructions of public/private, westernized feminist/true Muslim woman, east/west, modernity/tradition, and 
cultural relativism/universalism. These simplistic oppositions tend to abstract the material realities of the everyday 
lives of Muslim women and to perpetuate gender inequalities ... It is also important to close the gap between the 
religious and secular and to understand that it might not be realistic to draw too sharp an opposition between the 
two”.44 
 
And Moosa reiterates that: 
“a synergy and symbiosis between [Muslim persona law] and constitutional human rights are possible”.45 
This is indeed confirmed by the substantive legal reforms introduced by both Morocco and 
Tunisia. By ratifying the ICCPR,46 the ICESCR47 and CEDAW,48 Morocco and Tunisia have 
 
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 See Narain V “Muslim Women’s Equality in India: Applying a Human Rights Framework” (2013) 35 Human 
Rights Quarterly 91 at 103.  Emphasis added. 
45
 See Moosa N “A Snapshot of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) in South Africa: Past to Present” in Moosa N 
Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position of Women in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 143 at 160. 
Emphasis added. 
46
 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI),UN GAOR 21st Session Supp 
No 16 UN Doc A/6316 (1966) UNTS adopted on 16 December 1966. While Morocco signed the ICCPR on 19 
January 1977 and ratified the instrument on 3 May 1979, Tunisia signed and ratified the ICCPR on 30 April 1968 on 
18 March 1969 without reservations.  
 
 
 
 


aligned their codes of personal status with the dictates of these key international human rights 
instruments. In fact, the withdrawal of all reservations to CEDAW by Morocco in 2008 and by 
Tunisia in 2011 confirms the successful integration of Muslim personal law and human rights 
law.   
By embracing a degree of secularism, both Morocco and Tunisia have thus boldly confronted the 
challenges imposed by an ever changing modern reality and have accordingly amended their 
codes of personal status to reflect both a sensitivity to, and recognition of, women’s right to 
equality and human dignity, with Tunisia even going so far as to accede to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) without reservations in 1983, thereby 
endorsing the particular human rights framework envisaged for the African continent,49 and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (Optional Protocol to CEDAW)50 in 2008. Of particular significance is the fact that 
Tunisia proscribed the practice of polygyny in as early as 1956 on explicit considerations of 
equality and has affirmed the elevated status of international treaty law above domestic law in 
terms of the newly adopted Constitution of Tunisia of 2014.51 
The second lesson that could be extracted for South Africa from the Moroccan and Tunisian 
experiences, which will be examined next, concerns the codification of Muslim personal law. 
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 See the International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200 (XXI) UN GAOR 21st 
Session Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 993 UNTS 3 adopted on 16 December 1966. While Morocco signed the 
ICESCR on 19 January 1977 and ratified the instrument on 3 May 1979, Tunisia signed and ratified the ICESCR on 
30 April 1968 on 18 March 1969 without reservations.  
48
 See the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women GA Re 34/180 UN GAOR 
34th Session Supp No 46 UN Doc A/34/36 (1980) adopted for signature on 1 March 1980 and entered into force on 3 
September 1981, following receipt of the twentieth ratification. While Morocco ratified CEDAW on 21 June 1993, 
Tunisia signed CEDAW on 24 July 1980 and ratified this instrument on 20 September 1985 with a general 
declaration. 
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 See the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/6/7/3 rev. 5 21 ILM 58 
(1982) was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. Tunisia acceded to the African 
Charter on 16 March 1983. 
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 See the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
GA Res 54/4 28th Session Supp. UN Doc A/RES/54/4 (1999) adopted on 6 October 1999. Tunisia acceded to the 
Optional Protocol to CEDAW on 23 September 2008. 
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 See, in particular, Article 19 of the Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 which reads: “[i]nternational agreements 
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6.3 Codification of Muslim Personal Law 
  
Arguments against the codification of Muslim personal law in South Africa are, for the most 
part, based on the fear that the shari’ah will be interpreted subject to the South African 
Constitution and/or that the civil (i.e. secular) courts will misinterpret the tenets of the Islamic 
faith. These objections seem to suggest that a statute which seeks to codify Muslim personal law 
is either an impossibility or is simply irreconcilable with the tenets of the Islamic faith.  
Aside from numerous examples where Muslim personal law has been successfully codified,52 
including the instructive experiences of Morocco and Tunisia which have been examined in this 
doctoral thesis, these objections are essentially based on fears that appear completely oblivious to 
the fact that legal issues arising from Muslim marriages and divorces are already subject to 
constitutional scrutiny and are thus interpreted by the South African courts. Objections to the 
codification of Muslim personal law in South Africa furthermore seem to have no sympathy with 
Muslim women who are otherwise compelled to seek relief through the civil courts and thereby 
continue to, if the objections are drawn to their logical conclusion, indulge in prohibited conduct 
(haraam) throughout their lives.          
This doctoral thesis has shown that both Morocco and Tunisia have successfully codified 
Muslim personal law and have embraced a degree of secularism in their legal systems as far back 
as the mid-1950s. By contrast, South Africa has to date not recognised Muslim marriages and 
divorce twenty years after the introduction of a constitutional democracy. It is therefore quite 
 
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 Muslim personal law has been widely codified across Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. In Egypt, for example, 
the Ministry of Justice oversees the shari’ah courts and qadis, while various codes of personal status (such as the 
Personal Status Law on Marriage and Divorce 44 of 1979, the Personal Status Law 100 of 1985 and the Personal 
Status Law 1 of 2000) regulate marriage, divorce and child custody. In Kenya, Islamic law is applied by shari’ah 
courts where all the parties profess the Muslim religion. Article 170(5) of the Constitution of Kenya of 2013 limits 
the jurisdiction of the shari’ah court to matters relating to “personal status, marriage, divorce or inheritance in 
proceedings in which all the parties profess the Muslim religion and submit to the jurisdiction of the [shari’ah] 
courts”. In the Asia-Pacific region, India adopted the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act in 1937 which 
directs the application of Muslim personal law and in Bangladesh, marriage, divorce, alimony and inheritance are 
regulated by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 26 of 1937 which is applied by the civil courts.  
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ironic that the South African constitutional dispensation is regarded globally as one of the most 
progressive.53  
In both Morocco and Tunisia the codification of Muslim personal law involved a variety of 
experts, allowing the codification process to be transparent and accountable and thereby avoiding 
attempts to steer the codification process in favour of male interpretations of the sources of 
Islam. The codification process also enabled Morocco and Tunisia to honour their obligations 
under international human rights law, thereby creating an opportunity, and displaying a 
willingness, to promote and protect women’s fundamental rights and freedoms.  
By codifying Muslim personal law South Africa will not only be respecting core constitutional 
imperatives, but will likewise honour the commitments it had made both in terms of its 
obligations under international human rights instruments and under the African human rights 
framework, thereby giving expression to the desire expressed in the Preamble to the South 
African Constitution to “[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”.  
Prior to 1994 the South African judiciary refused to examine religious dogma thereby creating an 
unacceptable and intolerable situation which Muslim women had to endure. A number of 
prominent judgments highlight this fact, including Ismail v Ismail,54 Ryland v Edros,55 Amod v 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund,56 Daniels v Campbell,57 Hassam v Jacobs NO58 and 
the Women’s Legal Centre Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa.59 The distinct 
benefit of codifying Muslim personal law, especially in so far as marriage and divorce are 
concerned, is to be found in the fact that legal issues will no longer be situated in the exclusive 
domain of Muslim clerics and religious institutions where it may well be argued that women find 
it difficult and frustrating to obtain a divorce compared with the relative ease with which men 
 
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 See, in particular, Heyns C and Brand D “Introduction to Socio-economic Rights in the South African 
Constitution” (1998) 9 Law Democracy and Development 153 at 153. See also Currie I and De Waal J “Introduction 
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights” in Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) 1 at 1-
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may enter into a marriage and obtain a divorce. And yet the ease with which a husband may 
divorce his wife without her knowledge does not conform to the strict dictates of Islam. Chapter 
2 of the Qur’an is instructive in this regard in that it expressly states:  
“And for women are rights over men similar to those of men over women”.60  
By codifying Muslim personal law, cultural practices that are harmful to women and that have 
developed within the institutions of marriage and divorce and can be proscribed. Moreover, the 
codification of marriage and divorce will create legal certainty not only for women, but also for 
children born from such a union. The codification of Muslim personal law will prevent men from 
marrying and divorcing women at a whim knowing that if they do so, they may be liable to 
prosecution and a fine or even imprisonment for their actions.  Section 15 of the South African 
Constitution is particularly instructive in this regard as it could be interpreted to allow the 
legislature to recognise systems of family law and personal law under any tradition, or systems 
adhered to by communities professing to practice a particular religion. The only requirement is 
that any such legislation must be consistent with the provisions of the South African 
Constitution.61  
The codification of Muslim personal law will furthermore allow those groups that are not in 
favour of certain provisions found in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill to approach the courts to 
either seek clarity of particular provisions or to strike down provisions, or parts thereof, that may 
be found to be unconstitutional, thereby bringing the proposed Islamic Marriages Act into the 
judicial domain. This process will be advantageous in that the proposed legislation will be 
subject to scrutiny and deliberation, thus allowing for possible amendments.  
The lesson that South Africa can draw from Morocco and Tunisia is that the codification of 
Muslim personal law must proceed as this will brings clarity, transparency and due recognition 
of the legal status of all Muslims in South Africa. The argument by Motala that there exists a real 
 
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 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter II” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 17 at 
19. 
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 See section 15(3)(a) of the South African Constitution of 1996 which reads: “This section does not prevent 
legislation recognising – (i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family 
law, or (ii) systems of personal family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular 
religion”. Section 15(3)(b) reads: “Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and 
other provisions of the Constitution”.  
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risk of alienating the Muslim community, because not all sectors are in agreement with the 
prescriptions and interpretations contained in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill,62 is somewhat of 
an over simplification. Morocco and Tunisia both realised that by codifying Muslim personal 
law, the community of believers stand to benefit considerably through the granting of substantive 
rights, through the techniques of legal reasoning (ijtihad),63 to women. The explicit invocation of 
ijtihad by the drafters of the Moroccan and Tunisian codes of personal status confirms the 
critical role of ijtihad to facilitate legal reform. The Moroccan and Tunisian processes of legal 
reform reiterates that every Muslim possesses the same right to interpret the sacred text through 
ijtihad and thus all believers are equal to the task of interpreting the word of Allah. And since the 
codes of personal status were created by man, these legislative texts are open to revision and 
amendment, unlike the primary sources of Islam.   
The legislative process, by its very nature, must proceed through several phases which will allow 
sufficient opportunity for critical engagement and comment. As Abrahams-Fayker rightly 
observes: 
“[l]egislation is imperative to protect the Muslim woman in her being able to turn to the courts for protection. 
Furthermore the process of implementation of legislation is through a consulting process with those that the 
legislation affects, which can ensure that the religious principles will be respected”.64 
 
Yet even though the adoption of the future Islamic Marriages Act is imperative, in reality 
codification will still not address all aspects of Muslim personal law, particularly the issue of 
inheritance, under the realm of official South African state law.   
 
The third lesson that could be extracted for South Africa from the Moroccan and Tunisian 
experiences relates to the role of the courts and judicial interpretation of Muslim personal law. 
This lesson will be examined next. 
 
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 See Motala Z “The Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim Marriages: An Unwise, Improvident and 
Questionable Constitutional Exercise” (2004) 37 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
327 at 327. 
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 The word ijtihad appears in a hadith (saying or narration) of Muhammad in which Muhammad asked one of his 
delegates how he would solve problems in the region under his control. The man replied that he would use the 
Qur’an. “And then what?” Muhammad asked. “The sunna” the man replied.  “And then what?” Muhammad asked. 
“Then I will make a personal effort (ijtihad) and act according to that.” And this Muhammad approved. 
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 See Abrahams-Fayker H “South Africa Engagement with Muslim Personal Law: The Women’s Legal Centre, 
Cape Town and Women in Muslim Marriages” Women’s Legal Centre 39 at 61 available at 
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6.4 Role of the Courts: Judicial Interpretation  
Motala recommends that the state ought to give religious institutions and Muslim organisations 
the authority to handle matters of concern to Muslims, notably marriage and divorce.65 This 
recommendation could, however prove to be problematic. The question needs to be posed 
whether women will be adequately represented in such religious structures as experience has 
shown that this is seldom the case. The composition of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC)66 in 
the Western Cape is but one striking example. And while there is no evidence that the MJC “is 
vested with any special authority or jurisdiction under the tenets of Islam”, it nevertheless 
“considers whether Islamic unions have been dissolved in accordance with Islamic rites”.67 
Gender insensitivity and a lack of gender parity will no doubt translate into further erosion of 
women’s constitutional rights and freedoms. While Morocco has opted to retain the shari’ah 
courts, Tunisia has abolished the shari’ah courts as far back as 1957 and saw it prudent to insist 
that disputes relating to marriage and divorce should be placed before national courts.  
The establishment of shari’ah courts poses inherent challenges particularly in so far as the 
representation of women is concerned. By establishing shari’ah courts, religious leaders and 
institutions are granted a greater discretion and authority through the process of dispute 
resolution. The ensuing jurisprudence may also lead to a variety of interpretations of religious 
laws, which experience has shown, may well be harmful to women and not lead to the 
enhancement and protection of the rights and freedoms of Muslim women within the contexts of 
marriage and divorce. 
Furthermore the establishment of shari’ah courts has the potential to perpetuate the already 
jurisprudential conflict which is evident in Islam. For example, those belonging to a different 
school of thought may argue that the matter be heard by a judge who is of the Hanafi school of 
thought, instead of a judge who adheres to the Shafi’i school of thought. By having religious 
 
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 See Motala Z “The Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim Marriages: An Unwise, Improvident and 
Questionable Constitutional Exercise” (2004) 37 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
327 at 327-329. 
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 The Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) is a non-profit organisation or a faith-based organisation which was 
established in 1945. It is one of the oldest, most representative and most influential religious organisations in South 
Africa enjoying local, national and international credibility. See http://www.mjc.org.za [accessed 2 March 2010].   
67
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matters before secular courts, believers will be granted direct access to the courts. South African 
courts with the jurisdiction to hear marriage and divorce matters are situated in large urban areas 
which are within relatively easy access as most Muslim women reside in the greater urban areas, 
thereby eliminating having to travel long distances to reach the courts. 
At present religious disputes are heard by religious institutions such as the MJC.68 The MJC does 
not have the power to enforce its decisions, thereby rendering its decisions on the conscience of 
the husband to provide an equitable distribution of assets. This is not nearly adequate, as women 
in reality do not receive an equitable distribution of assets upon divorce when this decision is 
entirely within the husband’s discretion. As a last resort Muslim women have to approach the 
civil courts for assistance. During the interim, while women wait for the matter to be heard by 
the civil courts, they are often left destitute as the judgment of the Cape High Court in Faro v 
Bingham69 starkly illustrated.  
Having religious matters heard before the civil courts may very well alienate certain sectors of 
the Muslim community, but the reality of the matter is that women are, more often than not, 
compelled to approach the secular courts for effective legal redress. A further advantage of civil 
courts presiding over religious matters is that this will allow any party, who is dissatisfied with 
the outcome, to have the matter heard by a higher court, thereby facilitating transparency and 
legal certainty. Any constitutional matters can be referred to the Constitutional Court, thereby 
further securing the inalienable rights and freedoms of the parties, together with the fundamental 
values, enshrined in the South African Constitution.   
The fear that a judge presiding over a dispute concerning marriage or divorce will misinterpret 
Muslim personal law as (s)he does not possess specialist knowledge of Islam is not well founded. 
The practice of calling expert witnesses is long established in South African procedural law. In 
the matter of Cooper (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Schädlingsbekämpfung Mbh,70 
Wessels JA pointed out that the opinion of experts is admissible when they are better qualified 
 
68
 The MJC decides questions relating to marriage, divorce, maintenance, succession and other legal and religious 
issues. A case in point is the halaal certificate issued to restaurants and food outlets, indicating to Muslims that it is 
acceptable to eat at those establishments. See http://www.mjc.org.za [accessed 2 March 2010]. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 1976 (3) SA 352 (A). 
 
 
 
 



than the judicial officer to draw inferences by reason of their special knowledge and skill.71 Two 
situations must be distinguished: in the first, a court would be quite incapable of forming an 
opinion without the assistance of expert evidence, whereas in the second, the assistance of an 
expert would be useful.72 In the matter of Ismail v Ismail73 the court held:  
“[a]s far as annulment is concerned, the marriage is terminated by moulana (who, according to the court, is a high 
ranking office bearer of the Muslim faith who acquired his title and powers by studying and passing an examination 
at a recognized Muslim ecclesiastical institution)”.74 
Although the court did not make any reference to the introduction of expert witnesses, it shows 
that a secular court, when uncertain about Islamic methodology and terminology, can call on 
those with expert knowledge of Islam to testify, thus addressing and alleviating any possible 
misunderstanding on the part of the court. This very course of action was followed with success 
by the Cape High Court in Faro v Bingham.75 This approach lends itself to transparency and 
accountability in reaching a decision which is well grounded in tenets of Islam. 
The synergy and symbiosis that can exist between Muslim personal law and human rights law is 
aptly illustrated by the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in Daniels v Campbell NO.76 In this 
instance, the Constitutional Court based its argument on the constitutional values of equality, 
together with human dignity and freedom, to provide legal recourse to the applicant, rather than 
on an interpretation of the word “spouse” in accordance with existing judicial precedents. The 
Constitutional Court argued that the non-recognition of Muslim marriages creates an unfair and 
intolerable situation for women married in terms of Muslim rites and that the discrimination: 
“has created real disadvantage and violated dignity and freedom. Its impact on the applicant and on other surviving 
spouses in her position is most adverse and demeaning. It treats her as undeserving of legal recognition enjoyed by 
other religious and civil marriages. The [Intestate Succession Act and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act] 
withhold from Muslim women economic protection they extend to socially vulnerable widows of Christian, Jewish 
and secular civil marriages and, recently, customary unions”.77  
The legal reform facilitated by both Morocco and Tunisia have shown due appreciation of the 
fact that the emancipation of women cannot be realized without reflection on, and 
 
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acknowledgment of, the broader applicable legal, social and political contexts. Modern realities 
dictate a distinct and broad context seeking to promote fundamental individual rights and 
freedoms and thus no convincing assessment of the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in 
Islam can be undertaken without due consideration of the applicable human rights and/or 
constitutional frameworks. 
Civil courts are in an ideal position to develop such integration and the Constitutional Court, in 
particular, is tasked with realizing the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in accordance with 
the constitutional imperatives of human dignity, equality and freedom. By adjudicating matters 
pertaining to Muslim marriage and divorce, the judgments of civil courts will not merely 
enhance legal certainty, but will also facilitate an effective enforcement of judgments. The 
ensuing jurisprudence will moreover, provide impetus to the development of a body of 
constitutional jurisprudence that will assist Muslim women to realize their inalienable rights and 
freedoms under the South African Constitution.      
The fourth possible lesson that could be extracted for South Africa emanates from the Tunisian 
experience and relates to some of the provisions of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill. This lesson 
will be considered next. 
6.5 Revisiting the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill  
The Preamble to the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill reads:  
“[t]o make provisions for the recognition of Muslim marriages, to specify the requirements for a valid marriage, to 
regulate the registration of Muslim marriages, to recognize the status and capacity of spouses in Muslim marriages, 
to regulate the proprietary consequences of Muslim marriages, to regulation the termination of Muslim marriages 
and the consequences thereof, and to provide for matters connected therewith”.  
The Preamble to the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill appears to advantage Muslim women as the 
clearly articulated objective is to regulate Muslim marriages within a constitutional and legal 
context, albeit that the wording of the Preamble is gender neutral. 
In its definitions clause,78 the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is explicit in that all disputes that 
relate to its content will be heard by secular courts. The possibility of establishing shari’ah 
courts is accordingly not in the foreseeable future. The definitions clause expressly stipulates that 
 
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“unless the context otherwise”, “‘court’ means a High Court of South Africa, or a court for a 
regional division as provided for in section 29(1B) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act”.79  
This is to be welcomed. All disputes relating to the future Islamic Marriages Act must be 
adjudicated before secular courts, thereby establishing uniformity and facilitating the efficient 
and effective enforcement of judgments. Tunisia likewise eliminated all special jurisdictions, 
including the jurisdiction of the shari’ah courts, and consolidated all litigation before the 
national (secular) courts. After gaining political independence in 1956 Tunisia thus enacted what 
could be described as a process of double reform in which not only the shari’ah courts were 
abolished, but significant substantive changes were introduced in the realms of marriage and 
divorce.80  
As pointed out in Chapter 5 of this doctoral thesis, it is a cause for concern that the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill makes no explicit reference to the issue of inheritance, either in the context of a 
monogamous, or in the context of a polygynous Muslim marriage. It may be argued that without 
the inclusion of specific provisions dealing with polygynous marriage where a husband dies 
intestate, widows may well have no other legal recourse but to approach the courts for relief.  
A further distinct challenge presented to the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill relates to the 
legitimisation of polygynous marriages. Manjoo rightly argues that the recognition of 
polygynous marriages could be seen as an infringement of women’s rights and thus as a direct 
violation of section 9(2) of the South African Constitution.81 The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
also does not proscribe the practice of polygyny, now or at any time in the future, and thus could 
well be seen to ignore the issues of substantive equality as contemplated in section 9(3) of the 
South African Constitution and the realisation of the inherent human dignity of women within 
the context of religious practices. By retaining polygyny, together with legal sanctions, it would 
appear as if the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill only affords formal equality to women. The notion 
 
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of substantive equality could well be said to be incompatible with the practice of polygyny.82 
One would furthermore be hard-pressed to argue convincingly that the practice of polygyny does 
not violate the core values of the South African Constitution, notably the values of equality and 
human dignity.  
Although Tunisia has prohibited polygyny and has attached severe legal sanctions to those who 
proceed with such marriages,83 polygyny has been an important symbol in Morocco in the 
struggle to facilitate the reform of family law. For liberals, polygyny has been interpreted as a 
symbol of inequality; for the conservatives and those wishing to return to the Maliki school of 
thought that existed before the reforms, it is viewed as a divine privilege for the male.84  
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill thus appears to follow the middle road similar to Morocco by 
prescribing a legal process, coupled with legal sanctions, if the husband is to proceed with the 
taking of another wife.85 Therefore, in the event that the husband enters into a further marriage 
after the coming into effect of the proposed Islamic Marriages Act, an application must be made 
to the court for permission in terms of section 8(7) and the husband must deliver, for approval, a 
written contract which will regulate the future matrimonial property system of his marriage.86 In 
the event that a husband enters into a further Muslim marriage, whilst he is already married, 
without the permission of the court, the husband shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine not exceeding R20 000.87 Furthermore, any person who intentionally 
prevents another person from exercising any right conferred under the proposed Islamic 
Marriages Act shall be guilty of an offence and liable upon conviction to a fine or imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding one year.88 The court may grant approval if it is satisfied that the 
husband is able to maintain equality between his spouses, as prescribed by the Qur’an.   
 
82
 Ibid 1 at 21. 
83
 See Grami A “Gender Equality in Tunisia” (2008) 35:3 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 350 at 351.  
84
 See Buskens L “Sharia and national law in Morocco” in Otto JM (ed) Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative 
Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (2010) 89 at 115. 
85
 See section 8 of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010.  
86
 See section 8(6), section 8(7) and section 8(8) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
87
 See section 8(9) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
88
 See section 8(12) of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010. 
 
 
 
 


And yet the Tunisian legal reform has rightly cast doubt on this particular interpretation, 
indicating that such an interpretation may, in fact, be a rather selective understanding of the 
Qur’an. Chapter 4 verse 3 of the Qur’an reads: 
“Marry women of your choice, Two, or three, or four; But if ye fear that ye shall not Be able to deal justly [with 
them], Then only one”.89 
Yet Chapter 4 verse 129 of the Qur’an explicitly confirms: 
“Ye are never able To be fair and just As between women, Even if it is Your ardent desire”.90 
Article 18 of the Code of Personal Status of 1956 in no uncertain terms states that “[p]olygyny is 
prohibited” and attaches a punishment of “one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 240,000 francs 
or either of them” for non-compliance. 
The prohibition of polygyny in Tunisia is correctly based on the impossible ideal requiring the 
equal treatment of wives.91 Tunisia is furthermore correct by understanding that polygyny was a 
practice revealed in a special context, namely the conditions prevailing in seventh-century 
Arabia,92 at the time of its revelation. Properly interpreted, therefore, the Qur’anic verse thus, in 
fact, supports monogamy.93 Such an understanding is confirmed by Yusuf Ali, one of the most 
respected interpreters of the Qur’an, who explains that: 
“[t]he unrestricted number of wives of the ‘Times of Ignorance’ was now strictly limited to a maximum of four, 
provided you could treat them with perfect equality, in material things as well as in affection and immaterial things. 
As this condition is most difficult to filfil, I understand the recommendation to be towards monogamy”.94   
 
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 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter IV” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 177 at 
179. 
90
 Ibid 177 at 221. 
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 See Mashhour A “Islamic Law and Gender Equality: Could There Be a Common Ground?: A Study of Divorce 
and Polgamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt” (2005) 27:2 Human Rights 
Quarterly 562 at 585.  
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 See Bonderman D “Modernization And Changing Perceptions of Islamic Law” (1968) 18 Harvard Law Review 
1169 at 118.  
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 Ibid. 
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 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter IV” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 177 at 
179 n 509. Emphasis added. On this basis, the practice of polygyny in Islam must, therefore, be distinguished from 
the practice of polygyny accommodated in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 as the 
latter is not based on a guiding (religious) text, but solely on a practice established through custom. See also, in 
general, Amien W “Reflections on the Recognition of African Customary Marriages in South Africa: Seeking 
Insights for the Recognition of Muslim Marriages” (2013) Acta Juridica 357 at 379-380.   
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Vehement opposition to the proposed prohibition on polygyny, based on arguments that the 
Qur’anic verse requiring the equal treatment of wives constituted no more than a moral 
suggestion,95 did not sway the Tunisian government which stood firm in the conviction that the 
equal treatment of a plurality of wives was a practical impossibility.96 Moosa confirms this view 
by pointing out that: 
“[o]f the Prophet Muhammad's nine to eleven wives, only one was a virgin, whom he preferred and loved more 
deeply or differently than his other wives, and was, therefore, himself not able to treat his wives with absolute 
equality”.97 
It need not be argued that the mere reliance on the moral conviction of a husband carries the 
potential of severe harm and injury. Tunisia has through the prohibition of polygyny, albeit 
indirectly, furthermore condemned the idea that women are to be construed as symbols and/or 
possessions that enhance the social, economic or political status of men. Gaffney-Rhys rightly 
points out that: 
“polygamy adversely affects a woman’s social status, economic position and health … because the adverse 
implications of plural marriage by far outweigh the potential advantages … the disadvantages of polygamy are 
acutely damaging to women”.98  
By accentuating the impact of polygyny on the health of women, Gaffney-Rhys duly 
acknowledges the psychological as well as physical impact of the practice which could leave 
women vulnerable and broaden their (as well as their newborn children’s) exposure to sexually 
transmitted diseases, including the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).99 Although statistics 
concerning the incidence of HIV amongst Muslims in South Africa are not readily available, 
Moosa confirms that “it certainly exists and is on the increase in the Muslim community, 
including its religious leaders”.100  
 
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 See Bonderman D “Modernization And Changing Perceptions of Islamic Law” (1968) 18 Harvard Law Review 
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 See Mashhour A “Islamic Law and Gender Equality: Could There Be a Common Ground?: A Study of Divorce 
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Moreover, a study conducted in South Africa in 2011 by Shaikh, Hoel and Kagee reveals that 
seventy percent of Muslim women who participated in the study indicated that they would 
“divorce or try to stop a husband from contracting an additional marriage”.101 The results of this 
study thus seem to suggest that the consent required in terms of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
will effectively render polygynous Muslim marriages in South Africa defunct. And thus the 
study concluded that: 
“[g]iven the increasing awareness of scholars of the reality that ‘the personal is political’, the individual rejection of 
polygyny by most of the women in this study should be taken very seriously by Muslim leaders who [will] officiate 
at polygynous unions”.102       
Amien rightly cautions that the South African legislature should avoid the “risk that rules 
underscored by patriarchal norms could become ossified”,103 thus providing further persuasive 
force to calls for the prohibition of the practice of polygyny in the proposed Islamic Marriages 
Act. Moreover, the interpretation clause in the South African Constitution insists on an 
interpretation that “promote[s] the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. If the practice of polygyny is retained in the proposed 
Islamic Marriages Act, the statute will indeed be hard pressed to satisfy the requirements 
contained in section 39(1)(a) of the South African Constitution.104   
The fifth and final lesson that could be extracted for South Africa from the Moroccan and 
Tunisian experiences, which will be examined below, concerns the political will to facilitate 
effective legal reform. 
6.6 Political Will for Effective Legal Reform  
The discussion in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis has revealed that proposals 
for the recognition of Muslim marriages and the ensuing legal consequences has engendered a 
variety of opposing reactions across the South African spectrum. There are those who are 
steadfastly opposed to the proposed Draft Muslim Marriages Bill arguing that the proposed 
 
101
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legislation will be subject to constitutional (i.e. secular) scrutiny which is unacceptable as the 
Qur’an is regarded by all Muslims as the literal word of Allah and thus as supreme divine law. 
Others are in favor of proposed legislation only if there are independent shari’ah courts to ensure 
that adjudicating process is in accordance with the dictates of Islam. And finally, there are those 
within the Muslim community who argue that the advantages of the proposed legislation far 
outweigh any disadvantages in that there will exist a legislative framework which will based on 
the core concepts found in Islam.105 
As South Africa has emerged from colonialism and apartheid, Muslim marriages were 
considered as contra bones mores.106 It is against this background that Islamic institutions and 
clerics regulated family life through the practices of Muslim personal law as an unofficial code 
running parallel to secular law.107 According to Abrahams-Fayker, the effectiveness of Islamic 
institutions and clerics regulating the affairs of Muslims has been decidedly problematic. The 
difficulties are to be found in the fact that Islamic institutions in South Africa function as 
community organisations with severely restricted funding resulting in a lack of resources to 
provide Muslim women with the urgent assistance required. There furthermore appears to be no 
consistency amongst the “judgments” handed down.108 In addition, these institutions are manned 
by conservative clerics who do not always heed the core principles found in the primary sources 
of Islam, notably equality and human dignity.109  
Abrahams-Fayker reveals that the majority of clients that utilise the services of the MJC are 
women who are between the ages of eighteen and fifty years. These women seek assistance for 
marital problems in abusive relationships, are mainly homemakers or otherwise unemployed and 
 
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rely solely on their husbands.110 Islamic institutions and clergy have both been criticised for 
serious shortcomings in addressing the plight of women. Their decisions often favour of men and 
are thus male biased and women who attend the offices of the Women’s Legal Centre argue that 
obtaining a divorce through one of the Islamic institutions is a difficult procedure.111  
Women are thus effectively forced to choose between their religious beliefs and the continuation 
of hardship, rightly finding it difficult to reconcile that Islam condones pain and suffering where 
the religious institutions do not grant redress based on religious doctrine.112 The result is that 
women are increasingly approaching secular courts for legal redress, having little faith that the 
Islamic clergy will take due consideration of their plight.113 This is but one untenable reality of 
the stalemate that has thus far prevented the adoption of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill and the 
recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa.  
Both Morocco and Tunisia have shown that a strong political will is required in order to codify 
Muslim personal law. In Morocco, legal reform was driven by the monarchs and although their 
primary objective was not necessarily to secure the fundamental rights and freedoms of women 
in so far as marriage and divorce were concerned, but rather as a means to starve off political 
opponents and thus to secure political survival, the reforms introduced significantly enhanced 
women’s emancipation. In Tunisia legal reform was spearheaded by successive presidents who 
boldly sought to enhance the status of women in both marriage and divorce and who often 
encountered severe opposition from political opponents and Islamic clerics alike. The 
Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 expressly incorporates the principle of equality between men and 
women114 in recognition of the status enjoyed by women in Tunisian society as well as in the 
Code of Personal Status of 1956 as amended in 1993 and in 2007, respectively. 
 
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The necessary political will to reform the status of Muslim women in South Africa is thus an 
indispensable part to untangle the uneasy stalemate which has developed around the debate on 
the recognition of Muslim marriages and the ensuing legal consequences. This is a valuable 
lesson provided by both Morocco and Tunisia, to press forward with legal reform even in the 
face of the most vehement disagreement and opposition.  
Given South Africa’s history of institutionalised sexism and racial oppression, a legal duty rests 
on Parliament to decisively move forward towards the adoption of legislation that will enhance 
the protection of Muslim women in both marriage and divorce, thereby realising women’s 
fundamental rights and freedoms as guaranteed in key international and regional human rights 
instruments and under the South African Constitution.         
6.7 Concluding Observations   
Morocco and Tunisia have codified Muslim personal law as far back as the mid-1950s. Tunisia, 
in fact, codified Muslim personal law before the adoption of the first post-independence 
Constitution of Tunisia in 1959. Morocco has proceeded on a similar path with its legal reforms. 
While promoting the realization of women’s right within the context of Islam, the reforms of 
Muslim personal law have not remained stagnant. In the case of both Morocco and Tunisia, the 
codes of personal status have been amended several times to bring the legislative texts in-line 
with those international human rights instruments which both states have ratified. As Narain 
rightly points out:   
“[t]he framework of human rights arguably allows Muslim women to reclaim a selfhood free from essentialist 
definitions of gender identity and what constitutes a group’s interests”.115 
 
It has been more than twenty years since South Africa has ushered in a new constitutional 
dispensation, one which is founded on the fundamental values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom. But sadly there has yet to be any formal recognition of Muslim marriages in South 
Africa. This is despite the fact that the South African Constitution has been hailed as one of the 
most liberal and progressive constitutions in the world. In addition, South Africa has ratified 
almost all significant international and regional human rights instruments with very few, if any, 
 
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reservations. The interpretive declarations made to these instruments were, for the most part, 
based on the fact that the South African Constitution affords more substantive protection to 
women than those contained in the applicable international and regional human rights 
instruments.  
In 2013, the Cape High Court in Faro v Bingham116 issued an ultimatum to Parliament to enact 
the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill by August 2014. The judiciary thus clearly appreciates the 
intolerable situation of Muslim women in South Africa which could be relatively easily remedied 
through the adoption of the proposed Islamic Marriages Act. South African women married in 
terms of Islamic rites are at a distinct disadvantage when compared to women married in terms 
of African customary law as customary marriages have enjoyed official recognition since 1998.  
The South African legal and constitutional contexts can no longer tolerate a situation whereby 
the marriages of a certain sector of the community are deemed contra bonos mores and the 
children born from such unions are deemed illegitimate. It is unlikely that any legislative attempt 
to address the situation will be met with universal approval, and yet Muslim women stand to 
benefit the most from the formal regulation of Muslim marriages, divorce and maintenance. In 
the absence of such protection, Muslim women will continue to be forced to approach the courts 
to seek redress as a means to realize their inalienable constitutional rights and freedoms. Every 
effort must accordingly be made to overcome the impasse that exists around the eventual 
promulgation of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill. Omar rightly concedes that: 
“[although] the Muslim community’s engagement with the democratic process in South Africa … has been robust [it 
has been] limited and short-sighted”.117  
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is to be welcomed and, in particular, the South Africa Law 
Reform Commission must be commended for producing a text which is based, for the most part, 
on the foundational values enshrined both in Islam and the South African Constitution. This is 
indeed a singular achievement, the effects of which are likely to be far reaching. In the words of 
Moosa: 
 
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“should the envisaged legislation be passed in South Africa in the not too distant future, its adoption will also set a 
world example to scholars and policy-makers in Africa and Asia and serve as a viable model for religious minorities 
living in secular democracies”.118 
South African can, through the adoption of the proposed Islamic Marriages Act, reclaim its 
position as a beacon of hope in the universal struggle for human rights and can, in so doing, 
fortify its status as a leader among states in securing the inalienable rights and freedoms of a 
distinctly marginalised group which has suffered from the effects of persistent historical 
disadvantage.     
The next chapter will be the culmination of this doctoral thesis and will set out the various 
conclusions reached, proffer suitable recommendations and answer the research question posed 
in Chapter 1.   
 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
“One of the areas where the clash between traditional interpretations of Islamic principles and international 
human-rights norms was most acute was that of women’s rights. Although conservatives propounded the 
notion that full equality for women violated Islamic precepts, feminists argued that it was patriarchal 
attitudes and inadequate study of the Islamic sources that led to the notion that Islam required keeping 
women in a subordinate position”.1 
“[I]f significant progress in the legislative process has not been made by August 2014 the one point that is 
unlikely to be received with judicial sympathy is that the national executive has not had enough time to 
bring appropriate legislation before Parliament.”2 
 
7.1 Introduction   
This doctoral thesis endeavoured to critically assess the rights and freedoms of women in Islam 
with particular reference to the institutions of marriage and divorce. As explained in Chapter 1, 
the rules and practices that find application within marriage and divorce could be seen as barriers 
to the emancipation of Muslim women.3 And since the concepts of marriage and divorce stand 
central to many traditional and religious communities, the question unavoidably arises whether 
Muslim women enjoy effective protection by virtue of the manner in which these two institutions 
are interpreted in classical Islamic jurisprudence. The issue of women’s status in Islam is often 
obfuscated by strong opposing positions, coupled with pervasive patriarchal views, 
misconceptions and contradictions.  
Although this doctoral thesis neither proceeds from a distinct school of feminist thought nor calls 
for the emancipation of women strictly outside of the context of Islam, the emancipation of 
Muslim women cannot be assessed without due consideration and appreciation of the broader 
applicable legal, social and political reality. This doctoral thesis thus attempted to show that no 
plausible assessment of the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in Islam can be undertaken 
without due consideration of the human rights frameworks applicable at both the international 
and regional (African) level. 
 
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The non-recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa has placed women married in terms of 
Islamic rites in a particularly disadvantaged position. Not deemed “spouses” in terms of South 
African jurisprudence, Muslim women have been forced to either accept an unbearable situation 
or approach the courts in an attempt to realize their constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
freedoms. An uneasy stalemate has furthermore developed twenty years after the introduction of 
a constitutional democracy in South Africa. The Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim 
Marriages (the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill) released by the South African Law Reform 
Commission in 2003 (and adapted in 2010) was met with deeply opposing reactions from the 
Muslim community. As a means to attempt to resolve the ensuing impasse, this doctoral thesis 
sought to examine the legal experiences of two other African jurisdictions, notably Morocco and 
Tunisia, that have both successfully codified Muslim personal law. In particular, both have 
successfully introduced legal reforms in respect of marriage and divorce in the face of strong 
resistance and opposition. Tunisia, in particular, has fearlessly pressed forward with the 
emancipation of women both in marriage and divorce and has managed, amidst acute political 
and socio-economic turmoil, to adopt a new constitution in January 2014 which explicitly 
entrenches equality between men and women. 
The conceptual framework specified in Chapter 1 of this doctoral thesis thus encompasses the 
concepts of sex, gender and patriarchy, feminism and Muslim personal law.4 In addition, the 
envisaged theoretical and philosophical framework for this doctoral thesis, notably the core 
values and imperatives found in Islam and in the South African Constitution, were introduced 
and unpacked.5  
Chapter 1 explained that, given the particular context of this doctoral thesis, whether or not 
Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa have ratified or have made any interpretative declarations 
and/or reservations to specific international and regional (African) human rights instruments had 
to be examined.6 The applicable international and regional human rights instruments to be 
scritunised were therefore introduced in Chapter 1, namely the International Covenant on Civil 
 
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and Political Rights (ICCPR),7 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),8 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW)9 as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter)10 and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol).11 It was pointed out that the latter assessment 
would be specifically contextualised against the backdrop of the African Union Solemn 
Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (AU Solemn Declaration) and the African Decade of 
Women. 
While a reasonable body of academic scholarship on Muslim marriage and divorce exists in 
South Africa, the literature review conducted in Chapter 1 of this doctoral thesis revealed that 
most scholarship is historical in nature12 or merely set forth the basic tenets of Islam, including 
the core elements of marriage and divorce.13 Very few South African authors have substantively 
and critically addressed the status of Muslim women from a human rights and/or a constitutional 
perspective and endeavoured to integrate these imperatives with the core principles of Islam.14 In 
particular, almost no South African legal scholarship exists on the legal and constitutional 
 
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reforms introduced in Morocco and Tunisia, even though women in these two African 
jurisdictions have progressively enjoyed the fruits of legal and political emancipation since the 
mid-1950s.   
Chapter 1 of this doctoral thesis pointed out that even though feminism in Islam enjoys a long 
history, no homogenous body of feminist scholarship exists. It was accordingly stressed in 
Chapter 1 that both Islamic and secular (feminist) perspectives that seek to critically explore the 
situation of women in marriage and divorce were to be embraced and that the research literature 
was accordingly to be examined with this express purpose in mind. No distinct feminist 
perspective was to be endorsed, nor was the purpose of this doctoral thesis to produce a feminist 
framework within which to examine women’s rights and freedoms in Islam within the contexts 
of marriage and divorce.15   
The conclusions reached over the course of Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis will be summarised below.            
7.2 Conclusions                  
Chapter 2 sought to develop the theoretical and philosophical framework for the arguments to be 
advanced throughout this doctoral thesis. To this end, Chapter 2 critically explored applicable 
aspects of Islamic jurisprudence, notably the basic legal ideas and concepts in Islamic thought,16 
approaches to scriptural interpretation,17 gender sensitivity as projected by modernism, 
conservatism and fundamentalism in Islam18 as well as the jurisprudence of the four dominant 
schools of Islamic thought.19 
The examination of the four primary schools of thought in Islam revealed that opinion is 
markedly divided on key aspects relating to marriage and divorce. And although the schools 
display a degree of consensus on some issues, they have failed to adequately address particular 
concerns pertaining to the status of women and their fundamental rights and freedoms.20 The 
 
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dilemma is particularly acute in the interpretation of the four dominant schools in relation to the 
Qur’an and the argument that the interpretation of the primary sources of Islam has been 
overwhelmingly patriarchal and accordingly demonstrates a distinct male dominance and bias. 
The basic concepts of duty, honour, equality and human dignity in Islamic jurisprudence, as 
these relate to the situation of women, may, however, be of particular significance in furthering 
the rights, freedoms and interests of women. Chapter 2 alluded to the fact that these basic 
concepts appear to be closely aligned with the fundamental values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom enshrined in section 1(a), section 7(1), section 9, section 10, section 36(1) and 
section 39(1)(a) of the South African Constitution and may well therefore have the potential to 
serve as a primary theoretical framework for this doctoral thesis.21  
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 introduced the comparative analysis conducted in this 
doctoral thesis in respect of Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa. In light of the particular 
challenges encountered by Muslim women after the introduction of a constitutional democracy in 
South Africa in 1994, the need to consider other (African) jurisdictions for guidance within a 
legal and constitutional context has become increasingly important. Although Chapter 3 
conceded that care should be taken not to oversimplify the similarities and dissimilarities 
between South Africa, Morocco and Tunisia, a strong case could be made for embarking on this 
particular comparative analysis.22 All three states are ethnically diverse African jurisdictions that 
face the challenge of aligning their plural legal systems with the dictates of key international and, 
in some instances, regional human rights instruments. All three states thus bear the distinct 
responsibility to honour their commitments under international and regional human right charters 
that give effect to key civil and political rights while struggling through an often painful and 
protracted process of political instability, nation-building and democratisation.  
Furthermore, a careful inspection of the socio-economic conditions in South Africa, Morocco 
and Tunisia revealed that these three jurisdictions are more closely aligned that any other African 
states, sub-Saharan or otherwise. In fact, Chapter 3 found that the socio-economic conditions in 
South Africa, Morocco and Tunisia were virtually indistinguishable, with Morocco, Tunisia and 
South Africa ranking fourth, fifth and sixth, respectively, in an independent nonpartisan research 
 
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project which measures social, political and economic indicators in thirty five African 
jurisdictions published in October 2013.23 Chapter 3 thus motivated that Morocco and Tunisia 
allow for a critical and nuanced assessment of the legal status of Muslim women in so far as 
marriage and divorce are concerned, particularly as both jurisdictions have successfully codified 
Muslim personal law. 
Chapter 3 accordingly traced the various legal and constitutional reforms introduced in Morocco 
to alleviate the legal status of women and revealed that King Mohamed VI continued the reforms 
begun by his predecessor in the promotion and protection of women’s rights.24 Pertinent legal 
reforms facilitated the granting of equal rights to both husband and wife, the rendering of divorce 
more accessible and even facilitating reform to enable women to hold at least thirty seats in 
parliament, thereby increasing Morocco’s ranking in Africa among the leaders in terms of 
women’s political participation. 
Moreover, the reform of the Code of Personal Status in 2004 produced one of the most advanced 
legislative frameworks in the Middle East and North Africa for the promotion of gender equality. 
Chapter 3 had shown how the mudawana fashioned equal rights and responsibilities for 
husbands and wives and granted women more rights in divorce matters, including the right of 
Moroccan women married to foreign-born men to pass on their nationality to their spouses and 
children.25 However, Morocco has still not removed all discriminatory laws and practices, both 
in divorce and in marriage. Women who are Moroccan nationals still cannot pass on their 
nationality to their children if their husbands are not Muslims and this may well render children 
born from such a marriage stateless.  
Although Chapter 3 thus welcomed the legal reforms that Morocco introduced to assist in the 
eradication of discrimination against women with a view to improve gender equality, Morocco 
could still improve its overall record on women's rights. Morocco’s decision not to endorse the 
African human rights framework was a case in point.26 Core civil and political rights specifically 
tailored to address the unique needs of women in Africa, particularly those enshrined in the 
 
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 See Chapter 3 para 3.2 and para 3.3 and accompanying footnotes. 
25
 See Chapter 3 para 3.4 and para 3.7 and accompanying footnotes. 
26
 See Chapter 3 para 3.6, especially para 3.6.2, and accompanying footnotes. 
 
 
 
 


African Charter and the African Women’s Protocol, cannot, therefore, be employed as a 
convincing basis to motivate for further substantive legal reform in Morocco. Chapter 3 thus 
concluded that the legal reforms introduced in Morocco have, to some degree, been a matter of 
political expedience, alliance and survival, rather than a strong desire to enhance women’s rights 
and freedoms per se as these pertain to marriage and divorce.      
Chapter 4, the second in a comparative trilogy, critically evaluated the rights, freedoms and 
status of women in Tunisian law. Here too the issue of secularism and its impact on the Tunisian 
legal system was examined,27 including recent reforms pertaining to marriage and divorce.28 As 
was the case in the preceding chapter, Chapter 4 also examined the Tunisian response to both the 
international29 and the regional human rights framework as these specifically relate to (African) 
women.30  
Chapter 4 found that compared to Morocco, Tunisia had chosen a decidedly secularised approach 
to promote and protect women’s rights.31 After political independence, Tunisia promulgated 
legislation to address the status of women within the context of the family. To this end, the Code 
of Personal Status of 1956 and the Constitution of Tunisia of 1959 were instrumental to address 
the emancipation of women.32 And yet while the rights of women within the context of the 
family were interrogated, male privilege, although now somewhat obscured, remained 
entrenched. Women continued to be excluded from the political sphere and this meant that 
women were denied the right to vote for members of the National Constituent Assembly, the 
body responsible for the drafting the Tunisian constitutions.33 
The fact that polygyny has been proscribed in Tunisia since 1956 rivals most Arab and Middle 
Eastern states where polygyny is still allowed, based on a narrow interpretation of the Qur’anic 
 
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 See Chapter 4 para 4.3, especially para 4.3.1 and para 4.3.2, and accompanying footnotes. 
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 See Chapter 4 para 4.4 and para 4.5 and accompanying footnotes. 
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 See Chapter 4 para 4.6, especially para 4.6.1, and accompanying footnotes. 
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 See Chapter 4 para 4.6, especially para 4.6.2, para 4.6.2.1 and para 4.6.2,2, and accompanying footnotes. 
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Women’s Rights: Lessons from a Half-Century of Tunisian Progress” (2007) 64:4 Washington and Lee Law Review 
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text.34 The Code of Personal Status of 1956 forbids marriage to more than one wife at a time and 
includes legal sanctions which may vary from imprisonment to the payment of a fine.35 Divorce 
is also now available to both parties, while before 1956 the husband had the unilateral right of 
repudiation. The Code of Personal Status of 1956 rendered divorce a legal matter. The 
involvement of the national courts is compulsory, shari’ah courts have been abolished and a 
woman may institute divorce proceedings.36 Moreover, the rights of women are protected in 
terms of acquiring and disposing of assets without the consent of the husband. 
Despite these legal gains, however, Chapter 4 illustrated that Tunisia continued to face a serious 
threat from Islamist movements37 and thus expressed the hope that the progress made since 1956 
and, in particular, the adoption of a new constitution in 2014,38 will not be threatened with a 
reverting to practices sanctioned predominantly by the Hanafi and the Maliki schools of thought. 
Although the new Constitution of Morocco of 2014 entrenches Islam as the official religion, 
similar to the Constitution of Tunisia of 1957, it is to be welcomed that the new constitution does 
not import the shari’ah as a basis for legislation or favor any one religion over another. Freedom 
of conscience is thus expressly protected in Tunisia.39 
Chapter 4 nevertheless concluded that the outlook for Tunisia remains positive, even though the 
threat of a conservative interpretation of legal and constitutional provisions lingers as a cause for 
concern with a noticeable absence of scholarship exclusively dedicated to an analysis of the 
democratic revolution on the rights and freedoms of women in Tunisia.40 
Chapter 5 concluded the critical comparative trilogy conducted in this doctoral thesis and 
consisted of a critical analysis of the status of Muslim women in South Africa and therefore 
focused on the invalidity of Muslim marriages,41 the legal implications thereof,42 as well as the 
 
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 See Salem L “Tunisia” (2010) available at www.freedomhouse.org [accessed 20 November 2013]. 
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legal implications of divorce.43 A number of prominent judgments handed down by a range of 
superior courts in South Africa, including the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court were examined as a means to illustrate the particular challenges experienced by women 
due to the non-recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa.44 These judgments illustrated 
that South African courts were reluctant to examine religious doctrine, thus leaving Muslim 
women with no effective legal recourse. And although the adoption of an Interim Constitution in 
1993 significantly altered the legal landscape, the Constitution Court’s interpretation of the right 
to freedom of religion, belief and opinion enshrined under section 15 of the South African 
Constitution, for the most part, still displays a distinct reluctance to engage with the tenets of 
Islamic thought.45  
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill was furthermore critically examined46 against the backdrop of 
the applicable values, rights and freedoms contained in the South African Constitution, notably 
human dignity, freedom and security of the person, equality and freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion.47 And as was the case in the preceding two chapters, Chapter 5 examined the South 
African response to the international human rights system48 and the African human rights 
framework49 as these find specific application to women. 
Although Chapter 5 conceded that it is unlikely that any legislative attempt to formalise Islamic 
marriage and divorce will be met with universal approval, women stand to benefit the most from 
such formal regulation. In the absence of distinct legal protection, Muslim women will continue 
to be forced to repeatedly approach the courts to seek redress as a means to enforce their 
inalienable constitutional rights and freedoms. Developments in South Africa since 1994 have 
resulted in an increasing number of statutory provisions50 and judgments in which Muslim 
 
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marriages are recognised for particular purposes. While these legal interventions have brought 
some relief, Chapter 5 argued that piecemeal statutory amendments and judgments are neither 
practical nor can they hope to secure meaningful legal recourse and substantive legal reform. It 
is, after all, the South African legislature which is mandated to enact legislation and not the task 
of the judiciary to provide such relief. 
The Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is thus a step in the right direction and is to be welcomed. 
Although not entirely devoid of criticism, the South African Law Reform Commission must be 
complimented for producing a document which earnestly seeks to give recognition to the some 
of the complementing values enshrined in both Islam and in the South African Constitution.  
South Africa’s ratification of key international and regional human rights instruments is likewise 
to be welcomed and Chapter 5 confirmed that the reservations made to the African Women’s 
Protocol are by virtue of the fact that South Africa’s legal and constitutional frameworks greatly 
surpass the rights and freedoms enshrined in these instruments.51 In particular, the body of 
constitutional jurisprudence developed by, amongst other, the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, on the rights to equality, human dignity, freedom and security of the 
person and freedom of religion, belief and opinion52 buttress the protection accorded to Muslim 
women in South Africa in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned. 
Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis assessed critically whether or not the two comparative (African) 
jurisdictions hold any lessons for South Africa in so far as marriage and divorce are concerned. 
Both Morocco and Tunisia have adopted Muslim personal law and have sought to progressively 
address key issues pertaining to marriage and divorce even though their legal and political 
contexts are somewhat different. The lessons advanced in Chapter 6 revolved around five 
interrelated focal areas53 that were critically explored in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 of this doctoral thesis. These included the appropriate theoretical framework within 
which to examine the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in marriage and divorce,54 the 
 
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desirability of codifying Muslim personal law,55 the role of the courts in the interpretation of 
Islamic marriage and divorce,56 certain provisions of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill57 and the 
political commitment required to secure the recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa.58  
Based on the experiences of both Morocco and Tunisia, Chapter 6 concluded that the 
jurisprudence produced by the four dominant schools in classical Islamic thought is not, as such, 
likely to produce a suitable and nuanced framework to achieve the aims set out in Chapter 1 of 
this doctoral thesis.59 Chapter 6 accordingly motivated for the integration of the basic legal ideas 
and concepts of duty, honour, equality and human dignity found in Islam and the core values of 
the South African Constitution.60 The concepts of human dignity and equality, in particular, were 
found to be closely aligned with the values and imperatives found throughout the South African 
Constitution and correspond with the established jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in its 
assessment of the right to equality, the right to human dignity, the right to freedom and security 
of the person and the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion.     
Chapter 6, in essence, thus motivated for a religious-cum-secular framework within which to 
address the status of Muslim women within the challenging contexts of marriage and divorce, 
particularly as such an interpretative framework would appear to align with a modernist stance in 
Islam which proceeds from the assertion that the fundamental principles of the Qur’an have the 
potential to enable equality among men and women, thereby rejecting discrimination of any 
kind.61 The core principles found in the Qur’an can thus be integrated successfully into the 
fundamental rights and freedoms typically enshrined in international and regional human rights 
instruments.62 The experiences of Morocco and Tunisia whereby both jurisdictions have 
successfully codified and amended their codes of personal status subsequent to ratifying and/or 
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acceding to key international and regional human rights instruments are indeed testament to the 
successful integration of Muslim personal law, constitutional and human rights law. The newly 
adopted Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 furthermore affirms the successful amalgamation of 
Islamic principles into human rights law by verifying the elevated status of international treaty 
law in relation to domestic law.63 
Chapter 6 furthermore motivated for the codification of Muslim personal law as a means to bring 
clarity, transparency and due recognition of the legal status of all Muslims in South Africa.64 
Chapter 6 argued that civil courts are ideally placed to develop such integration and the 
Constitutional Court, in particular, is tasked with realizing the rights and freedoms of Muslim 
women in accordance with the constitutional imperatives of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.65 By adjudicating matters pertaining to Muslim marriage and divorce, the judgments of 
civil courts will not merely enhance legal certainty, but will also facilitate an effective 
enforcement of judgments. The ensuing jurisprudence will moreover, provide impetus to the 
development of a body of constitutional jurisprudence that will assist Muslim women to realize 
their inalienable rights and freedoms under the South African Constitution.      
The fourth possible lesson extracted for South Africa in Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis 
emanated from the Tunisian experience and concerned some of the sections of the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill allowing for a plurality of wives.66 The prohibition of polygyny in Tunisia was 
rightly found to be based on the impossible ideal insisting on the equal treatment of wives.67 The 
Tunisian experience furthermore showed that polygyny was a practice revealed in the particular 
historical context of seventh-century Arabia.68 Chapter 6 accordingly confirmed that, properly 
interpreted, the Qur’anic verse, in fact, supports monogamous unions.69 Vehement opposition to 
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the proposed prohibition, based on arguments that the Qur’anic verse requiring the equal 
treatment of wives constituted no more than a moral suggestion, did not persuade the Tunisian 
government which stood firm in the conviction that the equal treatment of a plurality of wives 
was a practical impossibility.70 By recognising that the equal treatment of a plurality of wives is 
impossible, Tunisia had indirectly also condemned the idea that women are to be construed as 
possessions and/or symbols enhancing the social, economic or political status of men.71 
The fifth and final lesson extracted in Chapter 6 for South Africa from the Moroccan and 
Tunisian experiences concerned the political will to facilitate effective legal reform.72 Both 
Morocco and Tunisia are indicative that a strong political will is required in order to codify (and 
subsequently amend) Muslim personal law. In Morocco, legal reform was driven by the 
monarchs and although their primary objective was not necessarily to secure the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of women in so far as marriage and divorce were concerned, but rather as a 
means to starve off political opponents and thus to secure political survival,73 the reforms 
introduced significantly enhanced women’s emancipation. In Tunisia legal reform was 
spearheaded by successive presidents who boldly sought to enhance the status of women in both 
marriage and divorce and who often encountered severe opposition from political opponents and 
Islamic clerics alike.74 The Constitution of Tunisia of 2014 explicitly incorporates the principle 
of equality between men and women75 in express recognition of the status enjoyed by women in 
Tunisian society as well as in the Code of Personal Status of 1956 as amended in 1993 and in 
2007, respectively. 
Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis accordingly motivated that the necessary political will to reform 
the legal status of Muslim women in South Africa is an indispensable part to untangle the uneasy 
stalemate which has developed around the debate on the recognition of Muslim marriages and 
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the ensuing legal consequences.76 The lesson provided by both Morocco and Tunisia is therefore 
to press forward with legal reform even in the face of strong divergence of opinion and 
resistance. Morocco and Tunisia have codified Muslim personal law as far back as the mid-
1950s. Tunisia, in fact, codified Muslim personal law before the adoption of its first constitution 
in 1959 after the gaining of political independence. Morocco has proceeded on a similar path 
with its legal reforms. While promoting the realization of women’s right within the context of 
Islam, Muslim personal law has thus not remained stagnant and the codes of personal status of 
both Morocco and Tunisia have been amended on several occasions to bring the legislative texts 
in-line with those international and regional human rights instruments which both states have 
ratified.  
The recommendations proposed by this doctoral thesis follow next. 
7.3 Recommendations                 
South Africa, which consists of an ethnically diverse pluralistic community, has rightly opted to 
conceptualise legislation to address the rights and freedoms of Muslim women, but which has, to 
date, not received any formal recognition. This doctoral thesis explained the frustrating impasse 
that followed after the release of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill in 2003.77 Whether or not the 
latter is likely to be tabled before the South African Parliament during the course of 2014, eleven 
years after its conception, remain to be seen.78  
Based on the five lessons extracted in Chapter 6 from the distinct experiences of Morocco and 
Tunisia, three primary recommendations are made by this doctoral thesis. The three 
recommendations concern the applicable theoretical framework, the practice of polygyny and the 
formal recognition of Muslim marriages. 
7.3.1 Integration of Islamic and human rights principles   
This doctoral thesis calls for the integration of the fundamental principles of Islam with key 
human rights imperatives commonly found in international and regional human rights 
instruments as well as entrenched in national constitutions. At its core, therefore, this doctoral 
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thesis recommends a religious-cum-secular framework within which to address the legal status of 
Muslim women within the contexts of marriage and divorce.  
 
Efforts to secure women’s rights and freedoms within the contexts of marriage and divorce are 
bound to fail if religious values and human rights principles continue to be situated in strictly 
opposing, and thus mutually excluding, domains. Simplistic oppositions often serve to abstract 
the material conditions of women’s lives and thus serve to perpetuate, rather than eradicate, 
gender inequality.79 This is particularly so in the case of the private domain where male privilege 
is often so deeply entrenched so as to become invisible. The religious and the secular need not be 
in opposition and modern realities indeed call for a tempering of the conventional demarcation 
between the two. By integrating Muslim personal law and human rights law, a new narrative can 
begin to take shape, one premised on the distinct similarities, rather than the antiquated and 
perceived differences, between Islamic principles and human rights discourse. 
 
South Africa is ideally placed to construct such a new narrative. The Draft Muslim Marriages 
Bill creates an exciting new platform from which to significantly advance women’s rights in 
marriage and divorce. Chapter 1 of this doctoral thesis alluded to the fact that the emancipation 
of Muslim women should ideally occur foremost within the realm and core tenets of Islam80 and 
the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill is indeed testament to this possibility. The South African legal 
and constitutional orders are indeed sensitive to, and thus embrace, the principal values of human 
dignity and equality and these are the very same fundamental principles enshrined in Islam. By 
proceeding from the theoretical position that a synergy and symbiosis81 between Islam and 
human rights law is indeed possible, the legal status of Muslim women in marriage and divorce 
can effectively be addressed.  
 
The second recommendation relates to the practice of polygyny and follows next.  
 
7.3.2 Prohibition of polygyny 
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A sober assessment of the practice of polygyny included in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill 
reveals the distinct challenge of aligning this practice with section 9(2) and section 9(3) of the 
South African Constitution,82 thereby calling into question the commitment of the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill to facilitate both formal and substantive equality.83 Moreover, the practice of 
polygyny could be said to frustrate the realisation of the inherent human dignity of women and 
thereby two of the foundational values of the South African Constitution.  
There exists no convincing legal, constitutional and/or theological argument for retaining 
polygyny in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill. The equal treatment of wives in affection, as well 
as in material and immaterial things, is an unattainable abstract ideal. In fact, a proper reading of 
the Qur’an unquestionably supports monogamy.84 Polygyny bears distinct economic, social and 
health disadvantages for women and a study conducted in South Africa confirms that the 
overwhelming majority of Muslim women would contemplate divorce or would attempt to 
prevent a husband from contracting an additional marriage.85  
The results of this study appear to call into question the wisdom of including the practice of 
polygyny in the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, albeit that polygyny is dependent on the 
permission of the wife and/or wives. By including the practice of polygyny in the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill, this patriarchal practice bears the potential to become deeply entrenched in South 
African statutory law86 which will no doubt have an adverse effect on the legal status of Muslim 
women in marriage and divorce.  
7.3.3 Formal recognition of Muslim marriages 
 
82
 See Manjoo R “The Recognition of Muslim Personal Laws in South Africa: Implications for Women’s Human 
Rights” (2007) Human Rights Program Harvard Law School Working Paper 1 at 20. Section 9(2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 reads: “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect, 
persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken”.  
83
 Ibid 1 at 21. 
84
 See Yusuf Ali A “Chapter IV” in Yusuf Ali A The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (1938) 177 at 
179 n 509. 
85
 See Shaik S, Hoel N and Kagee A “South African Muslim Women: Sexuality, Marriage and Reproductive 
Choices” (2011) 31 Journal for Islamic Studies 96 at 122. 
86
 See Amien W “Reflections on the Recognition of African Customary Marriages in South Africa: Seeking Insights 
for the Recognition of Muslim Marriages” (2013) Acta Juridica 357 at 382. 
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This doctoral thesis has illustrated the challenging impasse that developed around the Draft 
Muslim Marriages Bill. And while the different ideological perspectives on the interpretation of 
Islamic law are, after all, permitted in a constitutional democracy, this has caused division within 
the Muslim community. Yet differences of opinion need not preclude recognition.87 Every effort 
must accordingly be made to overcome the stalemate that exists around the eventual 
promulgation of the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill into law.  
Both Morocco and Tunisia are testament to the fact that a strong political will is required to 
facilitate the codification of Muslim personal law. The necessary political will to reform the 
status of Muslim women in South Africa is thus an indispensable part to untangle the uneasy 
situation which has developed around the debate on the recognition of Muslim marriages and the 
ensuing legal consequences.  
Given South Africa’s history of institutionalised sexism and racial oppression, both a legal and 
moral duty rests on Parliament to decisively move forward towards the adoption of legislation 
that will enhance the protection of Muslim women in both marriage and divorce, thereby 
realising women’s fundamental rights and freedoms as guaranteed in key international and 
regional human rights instruments and under the South African Constitution. A comprehensive 
and meaningful drive to inform Muslims at grassroots level of the contents of the Draft Muslim 
Marriages Bill is likely to provide significant impetus to the eventual adoption of an Islamic 
Marriages Act. Moreover, local grassroots activists could pose a challenge to the perceived 
dichotomy between the religious and the secular as well as between traditional and Western 
values.88 
By adopting the Draft Muslim Marriages Bill, South Africa will enjoy the unique opportunity to 
construct a model for religious minorities in a pluralistic secular democracy.89 Such a course of 
action would comply with section 15 of the South African Constitution which allows for the 
 
87
 See Moosa N “A Snapshot of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) in South Africa: Past to Present” in Moosa N 
Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position of Women in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 143 at 158. 
Emphasis added. 
88
 See Narain V “Muslim Women’s Equality in India: Applying a Human Rights Framework” (2013) 35 Human 
Rights Quarterly 91 at 112.   
89
 See Moosa N “A Snapshot of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) in South Africa: Past to Present” in Moosa N 
Unveiling the Mind: The Legal Position of Women in Islam – A South African Context 2ed (2011) 143 at 160. 
Emphasis added. 
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legislature to recognise systems of family and personal law under any tradition or systems 
adhered to by communities practicing a particular religion, provided that any such legislation 
must be consistent with the provisions of the South African Constitution.90 Apart from the 
human rights concerns raised in the previous paragraph regarding the practice of polygyny, 
Muslim women in South Africa stand much to gain if Parliament were to move on the legal 
recognition of Muslim marriages. This task is of fundamental importance and Parliament ought 
to press forward even in the face of fervent disagreement and opposition.  
7.4 Research Question Answered               
As explained in Chapter 1,91 the research question was essentially two-fold: first, this doctoral 
thesis sought to ascertain whether the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in the contexts of 
marriage and divorce were adequately protected in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, and secondly, 
whether any valuable lessons could be learnt in this regard by South Africa based on the specific 
legal experiences of two (other) African jurisdictions, notably Morocco and Tunisia. The 
research question was therefore restricted to the legal impact of marriage and divorce on Muslim 
women and was situated within a comparative Islamic and human rights framework.  
This doctoral thesis has uncovered that the first part of the research question must regrettably be 
answered in the negative. The four dominant schools of Islamic thought do not, for the reasons 
advanced in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis, have the potential to provide a 
nuanced understanding and assessment of the rights and freedoms of Muslim women in marriage 
and divorce. Whether South Africa could learn any valuable lessons from the experiences of 
Morocco and Tunisia can, however, be answered in the affirmative as Chapter 6 of this doctoral 
thesis identified five distinct, yet interrelated, lessons for South Africa from the two chosen 
fellow African jurisdictions. 
7.5 Concluding Observations  
 
90
 See section 15(3)(a) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1996 which reads: “This section does not 
prevent legislation recognising – (i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or 
family law, or (ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a 
particular religion.” Section 15(3)(b) reads: “Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this 
section and the other provisions of the Constitution.” 
91
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The themes explored in this doctoral thesis are complex and multi-faceted and a sincere effort 
was made to extract from the many layers of religious, philosophical, political, legal and 
constitutional debate the essence of the issues affecting women in Islam pertaining to marriage 
and divorce. Mindful of the distinct legal and constitutional contexts of South Africa, this 
doctoral thesis endeavoured to thrash out women’s status in marriage and divorce with particular 
reference to the basic principles of Islam and the specific experiences of two other African 
jurisdictions, notably Morocco and Tunisia. 
South Africa embraced a new constitutional dispensation exactly twenty years ago founded on 
the fundamental values of human dignity, equality and freedom, thereby signaling a fundamental 
break with an oppressive racist and sexist past. In addition, South Africa has ratified almost all 
significant international and regional human rights instruments with very few, if any, 
reservations and/or interpretative declarations.  
The challenge issued by the Cape High Court to Parliament in Faro v Bingham92 to enact the 
Draft Muslim Marriages Bill by August 2014 stands in sharp relief to South Africa’s positive, 
and internationally acclaimed, human rights narrative. And yet the untenable legal status of 
women married in terms of Islamic rites in South Africa highlighted in this doctoral thesis could 
be relatively easily remedied through the adoption of an amended Islamic Marriages Act.  
By doing so, South African can reclaim its position as a pace-setter among (African) states in 
securing the inalienable rights and freedoms of a clearly identifiable and marginalised group 
which has suffered from the effects of persistent historical disadvantage. Such a course of action 
would simultaneously signal South Africa’s unequivocal support for the articulated goals of the 
African Decade of Women.  
South African owes nothing less to its Muslim women.     
 
 
92
 Case No 4466/2013 [2013] ZAWCHC 159 (25 October 2013). 
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